First I saw this, and thought this certainly isn't deterrence and it doesn't look like something CSIS would propose as a viable sole action to deter North Korea from conducting cyber attacks.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/nort...000200315.html

Outside information questioning Kim's legitimacy can be response to N.K. cyber attacks: CSIS report

Penetrating outside information into North Korea questioning the legitimacy of leader Kim Jong-un should be considered as a key means to retaliate against and curb the communist nation's cyber attacks, a U.S. think tank said.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) made the suggestion in a report on policy suggestions on how to counter the North's cyber operations, saying responding to cyber attacks with cyber attacks won't be effective because the North isn't as dependent on networks as South Korea and the U.S. are.

"Therefore, responses should be tailored to leverage North Korea's specific weaknesses and sensitivities," said the report released this week. "North Korea has unique asymmetric vulnerabilities as well, especially to outside information that attacks the legitimacy of the regime."
Then I found and read the report (executive version), and the recommendations are fortunately more comprehensive than simply pushing more information to the North.

http://csis.org/files/publication/15...dout_final.pdf

NORTH KOREA’S CYBER OPERATIONS: STRATEGY AND RESPONSES

It identifies four policy objectives:

a. Prepare a graduated series of direct responses targeting North Korea’s cyber organizations.
b. Curb North Korea’s operational freedom in cyberspace.
c. Identify and leverage North Korea’s vulnerabilities to
maintain strategic balance.
d. Adopt damage mitigation and resiliency measures to ensure that critical systems and networks maintain operational continuity despite suffering an attack.
Provides four recommendations for the U.S., and then provides seven recommendations (culturally insensitive) for the U.S.-ROK Alliance, one of which was Consider
exploiting North Korea’s vulnerability to outside information
.

By all means keep pumping information into North Korea, in fact governments can't stop it, because if they stop non-state actors are engaged in their own information campaign against the backwards and incredibly cruel KJU regime. North Korea a festering wound from the 20th Century that continues to threaten regional and increasingly global stability, not to mention the human rights atrocities.

However, I don't think the use of information is an effective deterrent if we're truly talking deterrence. For one, this implies we would only push information north in response to a provocative act (cyber attack, nuclear weapons test, long range missile test, a kinetic engagement). While the ROK PSYOP unit may only blare it loud speakers near the border in response to a provocative attack, others are pushing information via balloons and items smuggled across the border such as DVDs. The Kim family façade is slowly cracking, we should never stop pushing the truth forward, and using it as a deterrence implies we would do just that if North Korea ceased the undesired behavior. Second, if anything, the information is provocative and North Korea is hardly deterred by it. They continue to conduct cyber activities, test long range missiles, and recently conducted another nuclear weapons test.

A recent article in the strategist indicates some of the information warfare activities ongoing.

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/inf...ean-peninsula/

At the same time, however, US–ROK forces have also engaged in a war through information—particularly focusing on psychological operations. Following the sinking of the Cheonan warship and subsequent shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the South Korean military established a new psyops unit to diffuse news and information into North Korea—whether through radio transmissions, balloon leaflets, DVDs, and possibly USB memory sticks. Since then, it has sent thousands of leaflets and transmitted broadcast into North Korea using mobile broadcast vehicles and six relay stations. While its effects on North Korean society are difficult to ascertain, North Korea has previously threatened to fire across the heavily fortified border to stop such campaigns.

With changing strategic realities on the Korean Peninsula, information warfare has important ramifications for the US–ROK defence strategy.
Another recent article of interest.

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/ht.../20151110.aspx

Information Warfare: North Korea Surrenders To The Future

Despite the high price of these North Korea smart phones (about $500) there are over 300,000 users, many of them members of the new “trader class” who have made a lot of money operating legal markets. There are believed to be over a million illegal cell phones, which can access the international Internet if near the Chinese border or a foreign wi-fi hotspot within North Korea. These hotspots are available in the North Korean capital. There, many embassies have taken to installing powerful wi-fi systems that can be easily used by nearby North Koreans.
North Koreans have noticed the abundance of Korean language Internet content down south. Those who can connect to get to these South Korean can use “grabber” apps (many of them available free) to download all the content on a website. This can then be passed around inside North Korea via a USB memory stick. The North Korean government does not like this sort of thing but so far has preferred to avoid international condemnation for cracking down on embassy Internet use.
It appears that even North Korea can't resist the ever growing integration of globalization. That will hopefully be a good thing.