The success of the Iraqi Security Forces and the bureaucratic systems that support them are our center of gravity, if they fail, then we need a new strategy to address that reality. Using a tribal approach may result in short term success and more stability (in the short run), but it will eventually result in a quasi-state like Afghanistan, where the tribes rule, and the State presents a pretense of being in charge. Who knows how it will sort itself out the in long........ run.

Of course the article motivates me to ask a few what if questions to ensure we don't repeat mistakes, or take the wrong lessons from this conflict:

1. What if we didn't demobilize the Iraqi Army?
2. What if we didn't try to accelerate the development of a new Army, which resulted in a poorly trained, equipped, and led armed force with the exception of Iraqi's CT force?
3. Tied into question, what if we implemented the current strategy in 2003 to create a semi-stable state, before the insurgency spun out of control? Perhaps resulting in an environment where the new Iraqi Army and Police could be successful, when we fielded them?
4. What if we actually established functional bureaucratic systems where the Iraqi Soldiers were feed, equipped, resupplied, etc.?

There are gems of hope throughout the Iraqi military and police, and the situation can still be turned around, but it didn't have to be this hard.