The CoG of guerrillas/insurgents/buzz-name-of-the-day is their sanctuary. No guerrilla who preserves their sanctuary has failed, no guerrilla who has lost their sanctuary has succeeded (although, I would be willing to listen to a counter-example if presented with one). Traditionally, this would be a geographically contiguous location outside the ability of the opponent to attack, but with the internet and FedEx this is no longer necessarily the case. Yemeni and Indonesian sanctuaries supporting folks in CONUS for example.

If you accept that sanctuaries are a CoG, then it follows that sanctuaries and lines of communication between the sanctuaries and operations would be operational and strategic CVs.

Whether the sanctuary is a 'no-go' area within the borders of the sovereign state in the midst of a Small War, or a balmy tropical island half way around the world, the sanctuary, communication with the sanctuary, and movement of personnel and supplies between the operational areas and the sanctuary are the most important strategic and operational targets. The problem with Islamofascism is the extremely decentralized nature of the sanctuaries and lines of communication. The coward mufsid who practice hirabah and send brave but deluded young people to their deaths from sanctuary should be in the sight picture first, as should the even more reprehensible swine who send them money and other resources without sharing their risks. The challenge is squaring this with political and diplomatic needs as they hide in sovereign territory that hasn't authorized direct action yet.