The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[Jedburgh]

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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned - Military Advisor Support

[marct]

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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned - Military Advisor Support

<grump, grump, grump>. I wish they would add something like "aproved academics"

Marc

[selil]

<grump, grump, grump>. I wish they would add something like "aproved academics"

Marc

Isn't that the truth... Well back to the Ivory Tower and the vestal virgins.

[Jedburgh]

MCCLL access now requires a CAC card. Now I'm cut off too. Damn.

[jcustis]

Once again, the need for information security is kicking our ass. I'm all for ensuring that sensitive FOUO information is secured, but I rarely have the time during a normal workday to rummage through the MCLL site, and would prefer to do so from my home office.

Just another example of fighting with one hand tied behind our back.

[sullygoarmy]

Does anyone have a "Ranger handbookish" version of an advisor handbook? JCISFA is going to take lead on this and wanted to see if there's anything floating around the FID/Advisor community right now. Thanks!

Sully

[RTK]

I think Tom is doing something similar along those lines with CALL.

[Jedburgh]

There's this on the SWJ library:

Military Assistance and Training Advisory Course (MATA) Handbook for Vietnam - US Army Special Warfare School Handbook, January 1966.

Reference material for the military advisor in Vietnam. Reflects doctrine as taught at the Special Warfare School in the 1960's and early '70's. The handbook was prepared for use in the MATA courses of instruction and served as a ready reference for advisors in Vietnam.

There's also the more current FOUO MNF-I COIN handbook, published in May 06. It's not really an "Advisor Handbook", but it does have sections specifically targeted to those in advisory positions. If you don't have it, PM me with a .mil address and I'll get it to you.

[Tom Odom]

Sully,

CALL did one in early 2006 and is doing another right now. I am doing a companion newsletter. the Kilcullen 28 articles project is part of it along with a long piece I wrote on Experience and Cultural Understanding. Rob Thornton and RTK wrote individual articles. I pulled your article and interview from OP 18/19. I would also welcome your help on the Kilcullen 28 project. I just sent that to you and an outline for the newsletter.

Best

Tom

[Jimbo]

Sully,

Let em go through what I have here in DC with me. If you want any feedback on what I learned in 2005 at MNSTC-I, I can provide some stuff. I have been compiling some FID stuff.

Jim

P.S. Sully, have you seen the latest and greatest version of the SAMS reading list yet?

[Tom Odom]

Jimbo

Your assistance in the Advisor Team newsletter would be most welcome.

Tom

[Jimbo]

Tom,

No problem, I would be honored to help. It will be a welcome change from the inter-agency project that I am currently banging my head against a wall trying to get stuff done.

[Martin]

OP18 and OP19 could be interesting.

[Tom Odom]

OP18 and OP19 could be interesting.

Yes Martin they are very good, written by a close friend of mine Bob Ramsey. I would recommend them to anyone looking at FID in a historical sense.

Best

Tom

[sullygoarmy]

Thanks for the feedback all. OPs 18 and 19 along with the MATA handbook are part of the JCISFA CD we hand out/take with us as part of our takeaway package. Right now there is some discussion about a short tasker for creating an Advisor Handbook (think Ranger Handbook format) and I wanted to see if the community has anything already established. We are working with Fort Riley, Phoenix Academy in Iraq and some organizations to gather the materials to get this knocked out. Thanks for the advice.

Jimbo, that's a big negative. I've been knocking things off the current reading list since I figure things won't change that much. Plus I found out I'm doing the KSU piece so my list may be different (or more!) than the standard reading list.

[Jimbo]

Sully,

Shoot me a PM with some contact info, I need to bounce something off of you tomorrow. What is the KSU thing??? Hell, Sully, I am even looking for the old reading list. Thanks.


Jim

[SWJED]

Latest at the SWJ Blog - It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps by LTC John Nagl.

In the linked paper I argue that, just as the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the 1960's, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor Corps. It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service in Iraq and Afghanistan, and may prove of some interest to the Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council community of interest.

"Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps" was published by the Center for a New American Security.

The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.” Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them…

[Old Eagle]

Once again, Colonel Nagl offers an eloquent and persuasive piece on Long War requirements. Hopefully it will engender some meaningful discussion, not just a lot of head nodding.

With that in mind, I have problems with a tactically organized force structure being tasked to provide both "Title 10" type support while simultaneously being responsible for operations on the ground. Can the corps commander fulfill his force provider duties while deployed as an advisor to a minister of defense?

On the blog post, Rob Thornton offers the additional insight for including other JIIM players in the mix. This is also critical. Even if you limit the military involvement to advising security forces, that is still best done by full spectrum joint forces, augmented by civilian experts from other agencies. IMHO.

[Jimbo]

In the Army it exists: It is called the AC/RC units that are set up to advise the ARNG. There has been heistatnce by the Army to deply regular Army AC/RC brigades and battalions to support the training mission. This has been done in limited numbers. What you have is a sturcture as brigade ready to cover down on an entire division. The upside is that when the unit isn't deployed, it is working with the ARNG. Working with the ARNG involves bringing expertise and recent TTP's to to training focused on tactical and administrative requirements. Granted the cultural and language differences are not close to being the same, but it still is enough to "keep your mind right". As far as JIIM, it is going to be 5 years at best beffore anything on the civilian side catches up in the capacity that we would like to see, and that is best case involving the upcoming election not screwing up needed legislation to make this happen.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Old Eagle, Jimbo,

Jimbo are you saying the AC/RC example is a good pattern for hashing out Title 10 turf? Or are you saying that AC/RC is the way to go for advising foreign security forces? It sounds like both.

I've seen one AC/RC unit deploy as MiTTs - 2nd IA DIV MiTT down to the BN level - we replaced them. They had some real challenges as they tried to figure out what was different from the methodology they used working with USARNG units and Iraqis. I think the gap may be too far to bridge and have them do both missions good enough.

I think the value of what LTC Nagl puts forward is that it is a "more" dedicated capability that balances creating units that do nothing but advisory work and hyper specialized with taskings that reach down in to MTO&E and TDA units where their primary missions are compromised. To me it asks the very important question of "How important is the training & use of host nation forces to reduce our global requirements in maintaining stability?" We need to decide that. Much like the Inter-Agency debate, and the debate over conventional war systems aquisitions, the problems we face now are going to influence how we spend our nickel. What is the best way to use the force structure increase? Is it just more BCTs which allow us to slow OPTEMPO for deploying BCTs in Iraq, or do we see the need for more BCTs to do more with in other places, and then we wind up with the same OPTEMPO? It becomes the proverbial self-licking ice cream cone.

The other side of the coin - that I think LTC Nagl is advocating is using those force structure gains as a more dedicated Combat Multiplier - both in the sense of developing Host Nation Security Forces, but also in the sense of what those soldiers bring to the MTO&E and TDA units when they return and are sent out into the Force. While LTC Nagle cites Iraq and Afghanistan for use of the Advisory course, but I think we need them beyond. This could become a core compentency and I don't know if adding it to the MTO&E units METL is a good idea. I'd have to go back, but what I'd like to see is a long enough tour in the advisory core to do perhaps a focused train up on the georgrpahical location they will be working before they deploy for a year. This might require a 2 year tour.

I understand that JIIM cooperation on any real scale is probably a ways out - I know you have been working it, but how much would it cost in reources to establish an HSOC (Home Station Operations Command) in say Riley or wherever home might be that is staffed by either Inter-Agency onesies and twosies or even contractors with Inter-Agency experience to work the connections back to OGAs, Regional CMDs and Embassies? How about some OGA experienced contractors who deploy with the HQs to work LNO issues on the ground? We're not talking about building Host Nation (DIE) capacity yet, we're talking about connectors and wheel grease.

For the Title 10 stuff - I thnk once they deploy they work for the Regional CDR or his designated CDR - you can't have unity of command any other way.

Hopefully will resolve the Inter-Agency piece fully without another 9/11, but I don't know. I guess you can tell what is really important to somebody based on how they spend their money. I guess that is what we're asking, what is really important?

Regards Rob