By late 1953, almost 20,000 men were under his command-probably the largest unit ever commanded by an army major-and engaged in operations covering several thousand square miles of enemy territory. Native tribesmen were flocking to his maquis in greater numbers than could be armed and trained; but before he could make full use of them, what Trinquier-in a masterly understatement -calls "the regrettable Dien Bien Phu incident* ended the Indochina war. What followed was a horrible debacle: Thousands of partisans had to be abandoned to the enemy, since the stipulations of the Geneva cease-fire of 1954 did not permit the French to continue to supply them.
This installment of the BiWeekly History Lesson will look at a French view of modern war. MODERN WARFARE, A French View of Counterinsurgency by Roger Trinquier offers a look back at hard line French military thinking first developed in Indochina and the matured in Algeria. Bernard Fall, author of Street Without Joy, penned the foreword to this monograph, reprinted and offered by the Combat Studies Institute. I offer Fall's introduction as the first part of this five part series. As in the past, I will follow this first section with a new installment every few days until it is completed.
Trinquier is the model for the French Colonel featured in the film, The Battle for Algiers, one recently used as a professional development topic in the Pentagon. Fall does a good job of introducing the man and offers insights into his background and career. But as a reader you will learn more about Trinquier from the man's own hand. I first read of this French colonel when studying the 1960s troubles in the Congo. As an "advisor" there, Trinquier and his men earned the title Les Affreux, or the Horrible Ones. In his chapter, Trinquier writes of Terrorism-The Principal Weapon of Modern Warfare; that will come in the next installment.
That is not to say that Trinquier's thoughts are completely without merit. As Fall points out in the opening vignette, Trinquier as a major commanded some 20,000 irregulars in Indochina. He pioneered many of the insurgency techniques used by the US Forces in Viet Nam. But as you read consider that Trinquier's willingness to stop at nothing to win--as he did in Algiers and the Congo--meant he could never achieve victory.
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