The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[Ski]

Perhaps someone can chime in on why Special Forces units in the Gan were more concerned about direct action missions, and not these missions, which to me seem to fall under FID, which is a SF core competency...?

[Rob Thornton]

Ski, I'd say its a question of having enough SOF, and how expensive it is to grow SOF capabilities that are more then just numbers. Our SOF are executing a growing number of DA missions that require time and effort to train and plan, but are also so important (HVT) that to increase the margin of success we have assigned them to a SOF unit. FID/Advisory missions also take resources and are also growing. We can't grow SOF fast enough or big enough with enough QA/QC to ensure we get relevant SOF capabilities so you are left with having conventional forces doing parts pieces to make up the delta, or not doing the missions at all - its a tough choice. A SOF soldier is a huge investment - a very worthwhile one, but a big investment if we are talking about people. Having said that, it would seem a lot more jobs feel more like "special" or "irregular" and less like "conventional".

On that note, I'd point out that serving as an advisor offers a pretty good investment strategy. All the qualities that are emphasized as leadership traits, and the skill sets we say we need such innovation, mental agility, flexibility, etc. are cultivated on advisory duty. It was on par with CMD as both the most professionally rewarding and professionally influencing assignment I've had. It fundamentally altered the way I view training, equipping, and fighting because it afforded me another perspective of the enemy I had not had. It also offered me immersion in another culture under fire - important I think since we fight mostly away games. The benefits of having as many soldiers afforded this opportunity I think cannot be overstated, as they rotate back into the force they will bring the experience of how indigenous security forces deal with problems from a long term perspective vs. a CF unit rotation. This is critical to understanding long term reasons for conflict and identifying and solving potential problems we might create prior to them having an adverse effect on operations. It also helps unit CDRs understand when something is really an operational problem vs. an operational condition. Further it forges ties at the grass roots which will pay off long after an advisor leaves for home.

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Rob and Ski--

Rob certainly has a part of the story but there is more to it.

Part 1: SF, since its founding, has not less than 3 esthos, based on the dominant mission of particular groups. 10th SFG was founded to conduct UW behind Soviet lines in ways similar to the Jedburg and other OSS/SOE teams in WWII. Training partisans was their thing. 5th SFG made its name in Vietnam where it conducted mucho direct action (DA) missions. The high point of its history was the Son Tay Raid - DA all the way. 7th SFG focused largely on LATAM and the FID mission; it was highly successful in El Salvador. All the other groups fall somewhere in between dpending on their peacetime and wartime experience. My sense is that 3rd Group is pretty close to 7th based on discussions with them during Operation Uphold Democracy. In any event, SF reflects many of the divisions within the regular forces on the best way to fight COIN. Obviously, it is far more complex but I really suspect that Group ethos is reflected in the degree to which particular SF Groups are more enemy or population centric in Kilcullen's approach/

Part 2: During Vietnam the JFK Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC) ran a military advisors course called MATA. At the same time, MI had a well received program for Foreign Area Specialists (FAS). General Sam Wilson, an intel guy and SF who commanded JFKSWC noticed that FAS and MATA each had 3 components, two of which were common to both programs - language and in-country training. FAS had a masters degree as its third element while MATA had the advisors course. In Wilson's mind the masters program would be good for advisors and the advisors course would be good for the intel types. So he combined the programs as FAO with the important caveat that either the masters or advisors (now FAO) course could be waived without prejudice. This workded pretty well until 1986 when General Bill Odom (any relation Tom?) made a play to bring FAO under MI. He didn't get it but the enhanced FAO program dropped the FAO course making it practically the same as the old FAS program. The result - along with OPM 21 - was to take the non-SF community out of the advisor business almost completely.

And, then, along came Iraq and Afghanistan....

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ski,
I left something out in answering your question. The advisory mission in Iraq is a little different then the tradional FID mission assigned to ODAs. I think our idea of what FID is has morphed from say building an indigenous capability in say OEF 1 or maybe as a guerilla force that compliments U.S. forces operating in the area to one of building a force capable of functioning independently and indefinately to meet host nation security needs. Jedburgh could shed allot of light on the changing role of FID, if in fact there is one.

However, look at the advisory team composition changes as proposed by LTC Nagl:

Advisor Team Composition
Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Offi cer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Offi cer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Offi cer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Offi cer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25

It is different from an ODA. This composition has a heavy influence on developing the staff capabilities that sustain, synchronize and focus combat operations.

Below is an excerpt from the JP on FID

From Joint Publication 3-07.1
Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US foreign
internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation’s
(HN’s) program of internal defense and development (IDAD).
These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by emphasizing
the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of
society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely
to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these
needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. The
United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic,
economic, informational, and military instruments of national
power in support of these objectives. Military assistance is often
necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the
above efforts to become effective.

Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Wow John, I just got smarter I was writing while you were posting. I did not know the history behind it - seems like we always manage to short sheet ourselves. Regards, Rob

[Steve Blair]

Hi Rob and Ski--

Rob certainly has a part of the story but there is more to it.

Part 1: SF, since its founding, has not less than 3 esthos, based on the dominant mission of particular groups. 10th SFG was founded to conduct UW behind Soviet lines in ways similar to the Jedburg and other OSS/SOE teams in WWII. Training partisans was their thing. 5th SFG made its name in Vietnam where it conducted mucho direct action (DA) missions. The high point of its history was the Son Tay Raid - DA all the way. 7th SFG focused largely on LATAM and the FID mission; it was highly successful in El Salvador. All the other groups fall somewhere in between dpending on their peacetime and wartime experience. My sense is that 3rd Group is pretty close to 7th based on discussions with them during Operation Uphold Democracy. In any event, SF reflects many of the divisions within the regular forces on the best way to fight COIN. Obviously, it is far more complex but I really suspect that Group ethos is reflected in the degree to which particular SF Groups are more enemy or population centric in Kilcullen's approach/

The 5th started out doing quite a bit of advising work for the CIA (if memory serves) with the Montagnards in Vietnam and earlier in Laos with some of the elements there. It was after Operation Switchback in 1965 that they got more into DA, but that was due to pressure from the Army at large who saw the CIDG program (and others) as a quick source for light infantry and not a local defense force as originally envisioned by the CIA (and most likely the 5th Group as well). And, of course, once SOG got ramped up (and the Greek programs run directly by the 5th Group) they got hauled heavily into DA and never looked back.

[John T. Fishel]

Steve and Rob--

As Rob says, "I've [just] learned something." Again, there is nearly always more to the story. That said, why do we keep having to learn the same lessons over and over?

Rob, look at John's proposal: it is an adaptation of an ODA (which in turn was an adaptation of an OSS/SOE concept. These things need to be adapted because one size does NOT fit all. Still, a good idea is one that can be modified to fit different circumstances.

Cheers

JohnT

[hostagecow]

I was embedded as a journalist with a Marine MiTT advisor team near Habbaniyah, Iraq in 2006 and was shocked by the lack of logistical support for the team and the slapdash nature of their preparation. They were the best group of Marines I'd ever seen in operation but they were desperately short of gear and support. Nagl's concept should be adopted asap.

[Ski]

Thanks for the info.

I still believe that SF - not SOF - but SF, should be used to train indiginous forces as a primary mission.

The DA stuff should be left to the Rangers, MARSOC and other black SOF elements. If we need more DA capabilities, it seems to this treadhead that it would be easier to grow them (what is the difference between these SOF elements and the Marine Raiders/Army Rangers of WWII?) then Special Forces capabilities, which are admittedly much more difficult to grow.

It's very interesting to see the history behind how DA has been incorporated into the SF Groups...but I wonder if it really the way it should be.

Then again, no one asked my opinion! LOL!

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for the info.

I still believe that SF - not SOF - but SF, should be used to train indiginous forces as a primary mission.

The DA stuff should be left to the Rangers, MARSOC and other black SOF elements. If we need more DA capabilities, it seems to this treadhead that it would be easier to grow them (what is the difference between these SOF elements and the Marine Raiders/Army Rangers of WWII?) then Special Forces capabilities, which are admittedly much more difficult to grow.

It's very interesting to see the history behind how DA has been incorporated into the SF Groups...but I wonder if it really the way it should be.

Then again, no one asked my opinion! LOL!

Just finished working a long project on advisors and thanks to guys on here it will soon be out. But in the course of that effort, I had an in-depth conversation with a senior officer who was a key player in the MiTT effort in Iraq. We agreed that yes this is an SF mission but SF is not built on the scale necessary to get the job done. As for RC components taking on the mission, they just do not have the correct tools for the job. They are structured to train conventional reserve units in conventional tactics and they share the same culture. And culture is bar none the key consideration in whether one of these advisory efforts works or fails. I see the need for an advisor functional area like FAO that adds a greater manpower pool to those available for such duties--AND THEN REWARDS THEM FOR IT. Forgive the caps but without rewards, this goes no where beyond the ever growing stack of good idea PPT presentations.

Best

Tom

[Old Eagle]

Spot on. However, the effort has to be HUGE, based on the magnitude of the mission. Not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but many other locations now and in the future.

Good luck.

I'd like to see what your presentation looks like. Maybe a PM?

[MASON]

What will the umbrella organization look like?

This seems like a Dept of State mission in some ways and a military mission in others. ??? Civil affairs work with Agricultural, Police, engineering, educational, medical , business and financing etc expertise required depending upon situation faced locally. Long term 5-10 yr + assignments.

[John T. Fishel]

I finally had a chance to read all of John's monograph. It is, as always, thought provoking and imaginative. As I noted in an earlier post, the advisor team is an adaptation of an SFODA, OSS?SOE Jedburghs and Ops Groups. I have no real quarrel with its size or general composition - I'd probably add a commo specialist in trade for something else. And, like SF, I'd work hard to see that team members were cross trained.

I do have several concerns at the higher levels of command. First, combat advisors are not solely and Army function. Marines, sailors, airmen all act as advisors. The guys from other services all made major contibutions to the MILGP El Salvador advisory effort and two of the three advisors who died in El Sal were from the Navy and the AF. So, perhaps, the advisor corps should be a joint activity.

I also think that much of the expertise - especially the institutionalized expertise - is found in the sOF community. FID is an SF mission but there are not enough SF to do it all, as John points out. Thus, I think that proponency for the advisor corps ought to be in USSOCOM - perhaps delegated to SF Command - and the organizational structure built around a sub-unified command concept. This would both give it joint capabilities and an education/training structure where the expertise - including basic language - resides.

For the army, then combat advisor would be a specialty with all the promotion opportunities that John recommends.

[TROUFION]

Don't know if it has been mentioned before but inside MARSOC is the FMTU-foriegn military training unit. The structure is based on SF, the missions are designed for operating everywhere except Afghanistan and Iraq, I think they are conventionally minded currently but the structure and trainingcould be shifted. Unfortunately I don't know that much about them, it is too new to have any real history.

[FascistLibertarian]

Hello
I have read the article. I personally think it is a good idea. I have a few questions (feel free ignore them if they are pointless).

1) Would the Corps deploy with all 3 divisions or would they have 1 division at a time deployed?
2) Where are the people who speak the native language going to come from and how would they fit into the structure? (ie this would vary depending one where the Corps was deployed)
3) Does anyone think if this works a reconstruction corps would be a good idea? (for winning hearts and minds and for construction).
4) Do you think a smaller model (brigade or battalion size) could work for smaller countries? (im thinking the Anglo-Sphere).

I really enjoyed the article!

[Rob Thornton]

This seems like a Dept of State mission in some ways and a military mission in others. ??? Civil affairs work with Agricultural, Police, engineering, educational, medical , business and financing etc expertise required depending upon situation faced locally. Long term 5-10 yr + assignments.

I think what we are discussing is really just the Military or Security Force aspects of what might be a larger effort. In itself that is a very large question and a departure of magnitude. Consider that LTC Nagle is advocating using at least part of the force increase to sustain an Advisory Corps, while maintaining fill levels of the BCTs. This is a big idea in and of itself.

Security (derived from some flavor) is a pre-condition to stability, There is nothing to say that the Army Advisory Corps could not become a component of a DIME effort, but it does not have to fulfill (nor is it organized to) the other DIE advisory functions. Even if you assigned it to them it is unlikely they could meet the requirements of advising in areas they are untrained to, or un-trainable to - ex. agriculture engineering, etc. That does not mean you could plug those into the COCOM, or under the umbrella of the COCOM's designated hitter. I do think there are certain functions that can benefit from being Joint, and inter-agency, but to do so makes the manning issue harder since the other services and agencies may not be getting the backfills required to maintain the parent organizations needed to meet their other missions.

If we are talking outside of known points (Iraq and Afghanistan) I think the first thing might be to do a macro assessment on the state we are assisting to determine what needs work to bring about sustained stability and then tailor the advisory assistance package to meet those needs. The assessment could be done by the diplomatic mission since they have the on the ground long term relationship and the resident DIME expertise to do so (if lacking they could request augmentation to do the assessment), then sent up to have it approved. The parts of the package could then generated and sent out in an advisory TF sort of package with a clear CoC that kept it headed in the right direction.

Our (the Military's) first step should be in determining how we are going to meet the request. Will it be from an established organization with the capability to train, equip and organize for success? Or will it be on an ad-hoc basis that tasks and is seen as temporary? I think the difference is between swimming and treading water. I think it largely depends on if we believe that we are going to be advising the host nation forces of failed, failing or reborn states to help them regain or sustain security and stability in order to prevent groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and AQ from establishing sanctuaries and recruiting grounds for further terrorist activities, and subversion that leads to instability.

If we believe that this is as critical a mission as almost any other then we might expend the effort, if we believe that more BCTs can do the job as well by either tasking for personnel and equipment, or by adding to their METL, then we will probably go that way.

The level of importance we place on the means to achieve the ends will determine how we spend the money. We need to ensure that however the additonal troop increase is used, it helps the military (in this case largely the Army - within the context of the article) meet the strategic policy goals set forth by the U.S. Government

[John T. Fishel]

There is another issue here and that is: would the Army really be willing to create an advisor corps on its own? The Army has gotten rid of Rangers and almost did SF in until El Sal came along and saved it. What would have happened without Cohen-Nunn, SO-LIC, and USSOCOM under GEN Jim Lindsey, I shudder to think about. And the costs of the "enhanced" FAO program have been significant resulting in less advisor capability than before "enhancement."

This is what brings me to the idea of SF proponency - JFKSWC has the training skills - and a sub-unified command of SOCOM. Many of the ideas John proposed derive from the old Security Assistance Force concept and its development as a FID Augmentation Force (FIDAF) concept. Putting this together with a PRT and a JFC with JTFs makes some sense to me.

[Rob Thornton]

John,
Spot on. I thought about it, but decided I'd edge around it indirectly. Service cultures are not known to make big departures - it has to do with not getting it too far wrong, even if it means giving up something that might get it right. To get LTC Nagl's proposal (and the logical extensions of it) taken seriously, will require us to decide what is really important to us in terms of capabiliites that match not only existing requirements, but deciding on which future requirements are most likely. You have to measure what you get by investing in more of the known quantities, vs. the semi-experimental. A couple of bonuses to an organization such as an Advisory Corp would be its utility, Inter-Agency flexibility, potential as a combat multiplier, the rotational commitment (i.e. its not a either-or seperate branch, but rather a new skill set) and that the mission strengthens the skills of the individual in ways that will benefit MTO&E & TDA units - there are somethings you cannot build any other way in as condensed a period as when you immerse someone.

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Rob--

I hope that nobody is mistaking my point - you certainly are not - for I do believe that John Nagl's proposal has merit. I just don't think that the Army as an institution will buy it and I believe that an advisor corps is inherently a joint organization. Moreover, USSOCOM, in its Title 10 institutional role, seems to be the ideal vehicle to raise, train, and equip the advsor corps force. SOCOM, in that role, also has the clout to force the services to support with manpower and common equipment. It was, in part, I believe the power that USSOCOM wielded that provided the impetus for the creation of SF branch. (I could be wrong on this but it seems a logical deduction for a partial explanation.)

The sub-unified command proposal that I made in the previous post would be crafted from Nagl's structure with modifications to fit both the joint nature of the beast and the input of both the SOF and conventional communities. It is a really interesting prospect and 20k is not all that many troops.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey John,
yep, I knew where you were headed. The good thing about SOCOM is they seem more flexible in their mainstream thinking. However unless you are talking about ear-marking increases for an Advisory Corps you'd probably get resentment and foot dragging, especially if we're talking about putting them under a different service HQs (well in that they get their own budget anyway). That would really spark resistance and probably raise more civil-military tension.
I would like to see Joint, it would provide a base of skills sets that we cannot provide. I would like to see Inter-Agency for the same reason. I think that may have to be more of an external decision though, since its unlikely that any of the services are going to want to pony up (historically), particularly one that sees itself as giving up the lionshare of people. If the U.S. were to pursue that, then it might be a reasonable idea to just go ahead and look at Trufioun's proposal and make a new entity with all the capabilities we'd mentioned. The downside we'd mentioned before (starting from scratch can be awfully hard), but the up side would be allowing the services to preserve their lanes, and their people (right after a few had been lifted), and the new organization would have its own budget, you can design it from the ground up with civil-military functions, and it walks in with a semi-clean slate. Expensive up front though, very expensive - plus ugly $$$$ fights on the Hill - plus you would not gaurentee Joint, or Inter-Agency - just another 3 letter agency/organization.

I go back to the need to define the problem as one that is not going away, but will expand (?), gain consensus about a solution, and then provide some clear guidance about who provides what to whom for how long, etc. There needs to be (and there may already be) a dialogue between the ends, ways and means legs of the stool. It may be for the reasons that we discussed that SOCOM is the way to go, but it would be a big rock in their rucksack, and some of the other services would probably see themselves as losing needed resources to fulfill their missions.

For simplicity's sake, I can see an argument for LTC Nagl's pitch "as is" because there is not allot of wake to it since the Army gets its folks back and benefits. I'd also say they are currently fielding the bulk of the numbers (not proportionally, just sheer numbers) because they have the mass to absorb it (even though its a tasker to many units). It may also be easier given the exposure of senior leaders to OIF and OEF to understand and implement a big step like this, without requiring direction from the Hill, but rather an OK - in the Title 10 wiggle room. I don't think they'd get as much pushback from the other services since this is a resource intensive proposal. It also has what I see as a huge benefit of increasing the skill set and maturity of the individual soldiers as they rotate through. The loss however is the other BCTs form the increase.

If we start doing the math of how much it will take to form, equip, train & sustain the additional BCTs vs. the value raised by doing I think we'll have the stuff decisions are made from. I think there is a solid argument that an Army Advisory Corps would be a very efficient and effective way to meet important current and emerging needs, increase the proficiency of the force through individual experience and training, and be able to focus limited monies to reset the existing BCTs with their equipment. The mission benefits because it is institutionalized and becomes a part of professional development, the MTO&E & TDAs win because they have predictability and focus. In those regards it also sounds pretty safe as a way not to get our capabilities sturcture too far wrong.