The Advisory or Advisor Challenge

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Jon--

Take a look at the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1940 for an American approach to the problem. The difficulty is the disconnect between the trained military.constabulary/security force and the political/governmental capacity of the client state. In what became India, it worked pretty well, not so in what became Pakistan or (for the US, Central America and the Caribbean).

This does not negate the need nor the notion that the intervening power is responsible for developing local security forces. It simply highlights the fact that security is tied directly to governance.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey all,
I wanted to return to the issue of more BCTs vs. an Advisory Corps because I think it is essential to developing force capabilities that meet our current and future needs. Keep in mind, I'm not advocating one over the other (yet), but I am acknowledging that the two take a different approach and offer advantages and disadvantages to addressing our current and future needs.

Attached is a JPG I adopted from a .ppt brief on Joint Systems from the AWC. It goes over the linkages from the NMS to capabilities. However I have deleted the capabilities and replaced it with a question mark to foster the discussion since the capabilities listed were constrained to current force structure. What is left is the NMS' military objectives linkage to the missions and tasks. I also placed Green/Yellow/Red Color Codes over the top reflecting Significant Increases/ Insignificant Increase or Loss/ Significant Loss respectively in terms of capabilities to start the discussion about advantages and disadvantages between BCTs and an Advisory Corps.

This is a first glance assessment of what an Advisory Corps over more BCTs would bring. It does not mean that one done on the BCTs would be exactly the inverse. The context of the missions should be somewhat universal - ex. in the Protect the U.S. its arguable that BCTs provide the structure and response to respond more quickly and effectively then a advisory BN or BDE, however, the TTs might be able to provide Staff liaison and planning functions to facilitate inter agency coord better then a BCT which must also C2 its own lower echelons. Under Prevent Conflict and Surprise attacks its yellow - an Advisory Corps would not be able to deter much - but might be able to improve HN deterrence, however by being on the ground can gather good HUMINT through the HN force lessening the chance of surprise. Some I think are clearly green (others may disagree) , such as eliminating safe havens since a long term persistent presence on the ground can better shape (more effective and efficient) the HN environment then say a BCT rotating through.

I think that if you compare this one with one done on the BCTs it might show that an Advisory Corps and the existing BCTs compliment each other. It might also allow supplementing the exisitng BCTs with SSTRO capabilities that are currently being taken out of hide - ex. more MPs, CA, PsyOps, Medical and other LOG.

What I'd say is any discussion that challenges accepted notions about how we spend our money (in this case - force structure increases) must show how those changes would provide advantages, and what disadvantages we'd gain/lose by doing so.

Thoughts?

[Tom Odom]

Rob,

My thoughts are quite simple on this one.

the SF team was structured so that a 12 man team could put a battalion (or more) of local forces in the field. An advisory corps that has that mission and keeps it at center focus is more efficient in the COIN--stability realm than BCTs. In fact you cannot win a COIN effort without some kind of advisory effort; if you could, we would not need to be there in the first place.

The BCTs must be there for the rest.

That means we have to do both. Not pick one and wish the other away --which we have always done with the advisor corps or effort.


Best

Tom

[Old Eagle]

Assuming that the personnel plus-up stays on track, the question is what ought those personnel be doing? I think that the answer is advising, whether or not a "corps" is the force structure answer.

Reasons:
1. Too many failed/failing/incompetent states that desperately need assistance bolstering their security capacity. This can be done after a MCO or even better, before and ILO.

2. Indiginous forces are the only ones that can truly be successful in small wars of the future. OBTW idig civil governance capabilities also need to be developed/improved, but let's stay focused on security forces.

3. U.S. and major allies have reduced ground forces end strength to the point where we are incapable of going it alone without coalition partners. These partners, whether host nation or allies, need to be capable, ergo need to be developed. After Vietnam, we pushed our advisory capacity into SOF. Now SOF is overwhelmed by the magnitude of the advisory mission AND busy performing the sexy, hi-pri SOF missions: DA, CT, SR, etc.

4. Current security assistance and FID restrictions limit our ability to do the advisory piece half vast worth a darn.

Mission is critical. Resources are scarce. Need to find a peace dividend. We're in trouble.

[Tacitus]

Gentlemen,
Fascinating discussion going on here. So where do you find the men to make up this corps of advisors. Based on my own experience in the US Army, I really doubt they are going to just be able to find these people in the ranks. If an order to produce an advisor for some faroff country came down to the first sergeants I remember, they probably would have just grabbed an NCO that they didn't want in their unit, for some reason or another. I doubt there would have been many volunteers, since the kind of guy who'd be naturally interested in this kind of work would already be in, or have his sights set on Green Berets. I just don't think there are many T.E. Lawrences of Arabia in the ranks of conventional units waiting to excel in that kind of mission.

I'd suggest thinking about recruiting perhaps a different kind of soldier, if they are serious about this over the long term. How about immigrants, or sons of immigrants, from the nations they think this might be needed? Instead of beating the bushes for guys in small towns of east TN, for example, you might ought to look in these first generation immigrant neighborhoods and really explain what you are trying to do. This immediately helps you to deal with the language and cultural barriers that must be overcome, if you think that really matters (which I do).

We are a nation of immigrants, with people from everywhere on the globe. It is a great resource if used intelligently.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Tom, OE, Tacitus, John, Ski
Hope nobody thought I meant we could not have both, in fact I also think we need both. What I was driving at is the question of if we need more BCTs within the proposed force increases, or should invest differently to build more specialized capabilities into the force. Building BCTs with the increase gives us more generalized flexibility. Building something like and Advisory Corps, adding more CS & CSS structures, and increasing the numbers of professional functional area officers would provide more assets/flexibility for the SSTRO side of the house. To frame the question I think we have to ask what are the pros and cons as they pertain to Army & Military responsibilities. I think this ties in with the Military Support to SSTRO JOC thread as well.

I do think there are some Tenn. fellows who can do the advisory piece though - being one of them. Our team was a mix match of USAR, USARNG and AD. We had a variety of MOSs often doing jobs that were outside of their professional experience. It was mostly a question of attitude and team work. You'd be surprised what you can do if you just decide you are going to do it. Overcoming cultural barriers - yea it matters, but you can also find a great deal in common with the folks you are advising while you are learning abut your differences. The real payoff for the Army in this would be exposing soldiers to this job and then having them rotate back into the force. While volunteering is nice, its not really a pre-requisite. Many guys come down on recruiting duty for example that did not volunteer - in fact I just had a buddy opt for the PTT advisory gig vs. take a recruiting assignment in Compton, CA.
Many guys are not physically able to go for the green beret, or for the officers don't want to make the permanent transition to the 18 series side of the house, but many would like to have an SF like experience at least once in their career - ex. I had a buddy on our team who sales life insurance in his real world job, he has a wife and family and cannot return to AD, but jumped at the chance to do the MiTT gig - guy had a blast. Another thing I did not mention was that the diversity of our team enhanced its effectiveness, we were able to discuss issues we might have missed if we'd all been AD.

I saw Gen Casey on Fox this morning discussing the future of the Army. Gen Petreus was on Fox Sunday and mentioned stabilizing Iraq as an 8-10 year gig. Both the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism make state builiding up HN security force capacity as one of the keys to denying AQ and AQ like organizations sanctuaries to recruit, train and draw resources from states they wish to destabilize. FM 23-4 also lists US advisory functions as critical to establishing HN systems:

"“Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.”1 Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them"

I think if the Army says we are or are not going to do something like this, which requires a significant investment of resources from the Army and Joint community at a minimum, then everyone from OSD to Congress (including lobbyist who are protecting their interests) are going to want to compare what we get for it, or why we don't have this capability that we've said is so important in our strategy documents and doctrine. I think by discussing it on this forum we can help - because many of the participants here are going to be tasked with answering the tough questions from people who will be biased, short sighted, or unwilling to challenge the status quo for a host of reasons. If something like this evolves many of the folks on this site will be tasked to develop the doctrine (because they are already in those type jobs), work out the details, and make it work. These forums are kind of a work group of online collaborators in that regard - people dedicated to thinking about this stuff and engaging in discourse so that the thoughts get developed. We benefit from a very diverse audience that is candid and informed on a number of issues.

[Ken White]

On the broadly irrelevant side; the then 77th and 1st SFGs did the Laos mssions, the 5th was pretty well restricted to SVN (and NVN, the edges of Cambodia and Laos only for some of the projects). Their direct action folks were by design the Mike Forces, not the CIDG who were pretty much local patrollers and defenders. While broadly irrelevant, I mention all that because those CIDG and other elements that got more involved in the direct action missions did so mostly because of their commanders at the time, not due to any Army policy. However, the fact that the Groups have distinct personalities is definitely correct and those personalities are as much or more due to the Commanders ideas and goals as they are to history.

Kicking in doors is more fun than local patrolling and training people. That's still true. So is the fact that a commanders personality and desires can influence missions.

The capability to train most infantrymen to do direct action missions well certainly exists and is proven -- but then consider that if the lowly grunt can do this, particularly on "high value" targets, it may adversely affect someone's budget and missions. The relevance of all that is that the roles and missions argument is not at all simple and the parameters change constantly...

Strategic vision and the power to provide definitive guidance and force compliance is the issue. The existence of USSOCOM, for all the good it does, effectively and very severely complicates that roles and missions effort. Unity of command, like initiative is a tenet of US doctrine. Both get squashed pretty heavily and routinely.

While I personally agree that internal defense and indigenous force training is a proper SF mission, it carries little glory, attracts little money and just isn't fun...

Tacitus has a point in that good working relationships with indigenous folks is not everyone's cup of tea; some people do it far more effectively than others and immigrants are a good pick. Not a little of the early success of SF was due to all the Lodge Act enlistees -- and Officers -- that populated the Groups in the early days.

Having said all that, I doubt you'll be able to get SF involved at this time in any serious way and I strongly doubt either the Army leadership or, more importantly, Congress, will buy the Advisory Corps idea, good as it is, for the Active Army -- the USAR is perhaps a possilbility.

Agree that the USAR Training Divisions as currently constructed and trained are not a good choice, the skills don't transfer well. There is the potential of restructuring and retraining one or more of them to do the Nagl suggested Advisory mission -- and the rank structure won't interfere with DOPMA and HRCs grand designs.

Too much rank in too small a package and the Congroids will ask "what if there's not another Iraq or 'Stan?" 'Course, I could be wrong, have been before -- I'd have sworn the Army would see the handwriting on the wall in the 70s and work hard at counterinsurgency...

In any event, it seems the realistic near term approach is to better train Joe and his leaders and prepare them to do the job on an ad-hoc basis. They really seem to be doing it reasonably well.

[Ski]

Some additional thoughts:

I like the idea of putting the Advisory Corps under SOCOM, simply because it can draw personnel from all services. It does, however, highlight the need for a true umbrella organization, perhaps even a 6th service that can also draw required personnel from not only the differing military services, but also from other governmental agencies such as State, USAID, CIA, etc...

The problem I see with an advisory corps is similar to the dilemma that's faced SF. You can't cover down on everything, so you need to be able to forecast where the problem countries are and then tailor the force to meet the specific language, cultural, and societal issues. I remember the initial stages of OEF where Pashtu and Uzbek speakers were being drawn into SOCOM from all over the military because there weren't enough language experts. I see the same thing happening again in the future, perhaps it can be mitigated to a greater degree.

I still think that SF should be the base of the program, but with less emphasis placed on direct action. It's going to take a cultural change to be sure.

The bottom line to an Advisory Corps is gauging the legitimacy of the government that we are assisting. It doesn't matter what kind of organization we create (if it even gets that far) because if the populace of Country X doesn't think their government is worth a duck's ass, then we will have massive difficulties. That again requires good foresight and not necessarily American domestic political desire.

Finally, I'd avoid using the Reserve Components as currently constructed because the skill sets aren't there. The USAR suffers at the lower Officer level or NCO level because many of their trainers have not been in an AC or ARNG MTOE unit and simply don't have the credibility or expertise required. We asked them to do a extremely difficult mission - training Iraqi and Afghan troops to conduct counter-insurgency operations - when they themselves have not done so. Some can succeed, no doubt, but it is difficult at best.