The General's Report
Didn't see this anywhere. It is Seymour Hersh. But his sources are pretty much all on the record and identified in this one:
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2...5fa_fact_hershOn the afternoon of May 6, 2004, Army Major General Antonio M. Taguba was summoned to meet, for the first time, with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his Pentagon conference room. Rumsfeld and his senior staff were to testify the next day, in televised hearings before the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees, about abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq. The previous week, revelations about Abu Ghraib, including photographs showing prisoners stripped, abused, and sexually humiliated, had appeared on CBS and in The New Yorker. In response, Administration officials had insisted that only a few low-ranking soldiers were involved and that America did not torture prisoners. They emphasized that the Army itself had uncovered the scandal.
If there was a redeeming aspect to the affair, it was in the thoroughness and the passion of the Army’s initial investigation. The inquiry had begun in January, and was led by General Taguba, who was stationed in Kuwait at the time. Taguba filed his report in March. In it he found:
Numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees . . . systemic and illegal abuse.
Taguba was met at the door of the conference room by an old friend, Lieutenant General Bantz J. Craddock, who was Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant. Craddock’s daughter had been a babysitter for Taguba’s two children when the officers served together years earlier at Fort Stewart, Georgia. But that afternoon, Taguba recalled, “Craddock just said, very coldly, ‘Wait here.’ ” In a series of interviews early this year, the first he has given, Taguba told me that he understood when he began the inquiry that it could damage his career; early on, a senior general in Iraq had pointed out to him that the abused detainees were “only Iraqis.” Even so, he was not prepared for the greeting he received when he was finally ushered in.
“Here . . . comes . . . that famous General Taguba—of the Taguba report!” Rumsfeld declared, in a mocking voice. The meeting was attended by Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy; Stephen Cambone, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.); and General Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, along with Craddock and other officials. Taguba, describing the moment nearly three years later, said, sadly, “I thought they wanted to know. I assumed they wanted to know. I was ignorant of the setting.”
In the meeting, the officials professed ignorance about Abu Ghraib. “Could you tell us what happened?” Wolfowitz asked. Someone else asked, “Is it abuse or torture?” At that point, Taguba recalled, “I described a naked detainee lying on the wet floor, handcuffed, with an interrogator shoving things up his rectum, and said, ‘That’s not abuse. That’s torture.’ There was quiet.”
..................
Taguba, watching the hearings, was appalled. He believed that Rumsfeld’s testimony was simply not true. “The photographs were available to him—if he wanted to see them,” Taguba said. Rumsfeld’s lack of knowledge was hard to credit. Taguba later wondered if perhaps Cambone had the photographs and kept them from Rumsfeld because he was reluctant to give his notoriously difficult boss bad news. But Taguba also recalled thinking, “Rumsfeld is very perceptive and has a mind like a steel trap. There’s no way he’s suffering from C.R.S.—Can’t Remember ####. He’s trying to acquit himself, and a lot of people are lying to protect themselves.” It distressed Taguba that Rumsfeld was accompanied in his Senate and House appearances by senior military officers who concurred with his denials.
“The whole idea that Rumsfeld projects—‘We’re here to protect the nation from terrorism’—is an oxymoron,” Taguba said. “He and his aides have abused their offices and have no idea of the values and high standards that are expected of them. And they’ve dragged a lot of officers with them.”
.........................
At the time, Taguba was working for Major General Mike Myatt, a marine who was the officer in charge of strategic talks with the South Koreans, on behalf of the American military. “I needed an executive assistant with brains and integrity,” Myatt, who is now retired and living in San Francisco, told me. After interviewing a number of young officers, he chose Taguba. “He was ethical and he knew his stuff,” Myatt said. “We really became close, and I’d trust him with my life. We talked about military strategy and policy, and the moral aspect of war—the importance of not losing the moral high ground.” Myatt followed Taguba’s involvement in the Abu Ghraib inquiry, and said, “I was so proud of him. I told him, ‘Tony, you’ve maintained yourself, and your integrity.’ ”
Taguba got a different message, however, from other officers, among them General John Abizaid, then the head of Central Command. A few weeks after his report became public, Taguba, who was still in Kuwait, was in the back seat of a Mercedes sedan with Abizaid. Abizaid’s driver and his interpreter, who also served as a bodyguard, were in front. Abizaid turned to Taguba and issued a quiet warning: “You and your report will be investigated.”
“I wasn’t angry about what he said but disappointed that he would say that to me,” Taguba said. “I’d been in the Army thirty-two years by then, and it was the first time that I thought I was in the Mafia.”
.....................
In January of 2006, Taguba received a telephone call from General Richard Cody, the Army’s Vice-Chief of Staff. “This is your Vice,” he told Taguba. “I need you to retire by January of 2007.” No pleasantries were exchanged, although the two generals had known each other for years, and, Taguba said, “He offered no reason.” (A spokesperson for Cody said, “Conversations regarding general officer management are considered private personnel discussions. General Cody has great respect for Major General Taguba as an officer, leader, and American patriot.”)
“They always shoot the messenger,” Taguba told me. “To be accused of being overzealous and disloyal—that cuts deep into me. I was being ostracized for doing what I was asked to do.”
Taguba went on, “There was no doubt in my mind that this stuff”—the explicit images—“was gravitating upward. It was standard operating procedure to assume that this had to go higher. The President had to be aware of this.” He said that Rumsfeld, his senior aides, and the high-ranking generals and admirals who stood with him as he misrepresented what he knew about Abu Ghraib had failed the nation.
“From the moment a soldier enlists, we inculcate loyalty, duty, honor, integrity, and selfless service,” Taguba said. “And yet when we get to the senior-officer level we forget those values. I know that my peers in the Army will be mad at me for speaking out, but the fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare in Abu Ghraib. We violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention. We violated our own principles and we violated the core of our military values. The stress of combat is not an excuse, and I believe, even today, that those civilian and military leaders responsible should be held accountable.”
Originally Posted by oblong
I read the first installation of this and Taguba comes straight out and names names. He was a straight shooter and, like Shinsheki, the Pentagon went after the messenger. This is a disgrace to the honor of the Army that could have been avoided. Rumsfeld and the other non-serving civilian neo-cons (Feith, Wolfowitxz, Cambone, etc) decided that the honor of American armed forces was the price to pay in the GWOT. What rot! If I had been in that first meeting where Rumsfeld ridiculed his name and investigation in a mocking tone, I would have pulled my anchors off and resigned on the spot. I have so much respect for Taguba now. He's an old-school WWII-style General that met the new school politics-at-any-cost chickenhawks. Any other time in history and he would have been respected for his work and promoted rapidly -then again maybe not. I suggest it be read. Rumsfeld, Meyers and the senior staff's treatment of his duty was nothing short of disgraceful.
Putting Foot to Al Qaeda Ass Since 1993
Hear, hear
Concerning the article -- what a dismal state of affairs.
Has anything been written about Meyers, and his role as CJCS? I mean, I met the guy -- at the SMH in Kansas -- and he seems nice enough, but I think he may have been the worst Chairman ever. Especially given the time of his tenure, it seems like a perfect storm sort of scenario, him plus the 9/11 attacks and subsequent military actions, colliding to create a disaster of epic proportions.
Jill
The system is unforgiving of those
who point out blemishes. Unfortunately...
About 15 years ago, a fairly new Lieutenant had an article in Army magazine. He'd earlier worked on a chicken farm and at a kennel. He compared a pack of Dobermans who will help each other and are solicitous of a pack member who's injured to a flock of Chickens wherein all will gather to peck an ailing flock member to death. His point was that the Army had a tendency to go the Chicken route and he opined the Doberman route might be more beneficial to everyone.
I didn't have the heart to write him and tell him that it had been that way for years.
Taguba did his job and did it right but he was guilty of telling the system something it didn't want to hear; that's a no-no. It will bite you if you do that unless you're pretty slick in the way you do it. No matter that he was right and the system was wrong. Way wrong.
Abu Gharaib was an aberration but it was the system's fault. Untrained MPs; sustained and heavy indirect pressure from above to get info "with the gloves off;" failure to supervise by senior NCOs and Battalion and below Officers; failure of anyone in the chain to stand up and say "This is not right. It was an invitation to a cock-up -- and we got one. Serves us right.
As an aside, a Company Commander from the 82d on external security at the prison did make waves early on as did his Battalion Commander but it died when it got to V Corps, they didn't want to hear it...
Back to the Doberman bit -- in 1961, if I told my boss I was ready to go to war and it turned out I wasn't, I'd have gone to jail. By 1965, nobody cared whether I was ready or not as long as I was prepared to say on my USR that I was ready. If I did not, I 'd be pecked to death. Unless I got slick and was very careful not to blame my boss's boss...
That's about the same time that what the boss wanted became more important than what was right, that political correctness and the "turn on the weak" attitude got going and it has accelerated since. The pressure and competition for promotion are inimical to absolute integrity; we're just lucky that there's as much as there is and we're fortunate that very few commands would have failed as badly as did that MP Brigade -- but we've yet to acknowledge that the system around it contributed. He or she who points out such failures is likely to get pecked a lot.
I hit my second retirement in 1995 but I've got a serving son and things don't seem to have improved -- fortunately, they don't seem to be much worse. We really need to make them better, a lot better.
To those of you still working at it and keeping the faith; Thanks.
I was Meyers' escort for a visit to the Army War College a few years ago and had the exact same impression. If anything, though, Pace may be worse.
Pace and Meyers seemed to be empty suits. They just parroted the party line over and over. Maybe that's what the politicians want for a CJCS.
"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"
The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
I believe they are both men of tremendous honor, personal integrity, and intellect. It's just that both held a view of civil-military relations that stressed complete subservience. That combination is precisely why they were selected but, from an historical standpoint, they were the wrong guys at the wrong time. --the nation needed frankness, not subservience. To some extent, I'm withholding judgement because it is at least possible that they were brutally frank with Rumsfeld in private but felt their duty was to be subservient in public. But that remains to be seen.
The bigger (and more important) question is whether our system can generate senior leaders who do NOT fit this mold. Can one get four stars without being totally subservient to civilian leaders?
Of generals and generals
Abu Buckwheat is spot on - except that neither Rumsfeld nor Cambone are neo-cons (putting them in the same pot gives neo-cons a bad name). Cambone's rep at NDU - before he went over to the Pentagon - was that he was just a nasty jerk.
Woodward writes quite a bit about Myers in State of Denial. While there is some sympathy, I have to agree with Sargent.
I heard a lot about Pace being unwilling to stand up to Rumsfeld over the last several years. But I recall seeing him contradict Rumsfeld in public over the issue of Iraqi insurgents - Rumsfeld was refusing to use the term and Pace simply said it was the only accurate one. So, what are we to conclude about Pace? Back to you, Steve...
I don't disagree with you Steve. You don't become a 4 Star without brains at the very least.
But as you state, they were completely subserviant in a position where they shouldn't have been. We are paying for their lack of moral courage, at least from their public personas.
To answer your question, I think the answer is no, as long as political leaders continue to use the military as the primary instrument of foreign policy. Because of the political pressures derived from military force, these 4 Stars in the future will be even more scrutinized than they are today. If a future President shifts foreign policy back into Diplomatic or Intelligence spheres of influence, then its possible that a 4 Star who questions authority may indeed rise. But I remain skeptical...
"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"
The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
The key word in Steve's question seems to be "totally." It's a matter of degree -- we want our military leaders to be subordinate to civilian control, but we also want them to provide sound advice and counsel to the civilians who are the constitutional leaders. We certainly don't want our four stars (or any other leaders) to be totally subservient... but, at the end of the day, we also want our military leaders to stand up and salute when a decision has been made by the civilian leadership -- hopefully after the military's sound advice and counsel has been considered.
The Taguba article brings home the additional consideration -- when leaders (civilian or military) act in such a way that is illegal or immoral. This is the time for subordinates to depart from subservience and to stand up for what is right and moral. The Taguba article ends with such a situation:
Taguba went on, “There was no doubt in my mind that this stuff”—the explicit images—“was gravitating upward. It was standard operating procedure to assume that this had to go higher. The President had to be aware of this.” He said that Rumsfeld, his senior aides, and the high-ranking generals and admirals who stood with him {Rumsfeld} as he misrepresented what he knew about Abu Ghraib had failed the nation.
“From the moment a soldier enlists, we inculcate loyalty, duty, honor, integrity, and selfless service,” Taguba said. “And yet when we get to the senior-officer level we forget those values. I know that my peers in the Army will be mad at me for speaking out, but the fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare in Abu Ghraib. We violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention. We violated our own principles and we violated the core of our military values. The stress of combat is not an excuse, and I believe, even today, that those civilian and military leaders responsible should be held accountable.”
I think what we're seeing (again) is a CJCS that is very similar to what we had in Vietnam, at least in terms of the lack of open dissent when it comes to policy.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I've asked H.R. McMaster who he thinks will write the next Dereliction of Duty. He just smiled.
Paul Yingling I hope
Civ-Mil Literature
I think it is important to remember that just five years ago, it was very in vogue to believe that there was a "crisis in civil military relations" and that public, or perhaps even emphatic private, disagreement with "civilian" leadership (left very unspecified as to just who this included) was disloyal, or "shirking."
I state this not to absolve those indicted by Paul Yingling, but rather to expand it to include those who promoted academic theories that encouraged flag officers to view their informed professional opinion as just another policy preference.
I'm certain this was not the intent of the academics. There was considerably more nuance in the original books and articles than what percolated into the conventional wisdom of policy circles, but ideas have consequences.
Doug
Shattered Mirrors
Doug,
You are correct and that was very much in play when SecDef Rumsfeld set about busting Pentagon broncos--at least that is how it was played out by him in the press. It bears remembering how important it was to suddenly rename the CINCs of the Unified commands to Combatant Commanders because the SecDef was in his own words "in command". This entire theme played out in the planning for OIF and the lacvk of planning for the aftermath--at which point the "in command" SecDef suddenly became less in charge and more of a self-described advisor.
The bottom line in this at least to me is that at the end of the day one has to be able to look at oneself in the mirror and answer, yes, to the question, "did I do my duty truthfully, honorably, and professionally" without the mirror shattering in disgust.
There is much food for thought in this Hersch piece on the SOF side as well, especially the linkages between SOF and the agency. The ends justifies the means school of thought soon gets coupled with the secrecy covers all sins. Ultimately it is the military partner that gets left twisting in the wind when things get out of control.
Tom
I hate to be seen defending Rumsfeld, but in this matter, I don't believe this is a correct statement of the facts as regards the CINC -> combatant commander issue. As I recall it, and we had memos up for about a year in the workplace from the SECDEF explaining the change, his point was that there was only one "Commander in Chief" in the US Armed Forces, and that's the President. Hence the name change for the unified commanders. I actually think his reasoning on this one was correct.
This does not absolve him of the atrocious errors of judgment that marked his tenure nor his meddling in the business of said combatant commanders, but this issue is not really a part of that.
He cloaked himself in a veil of impenetrable terminology.
Thanks for that. It is the first time I have heard that this change came from below. In any case, would you agree that he seemed to see the military as minimally non-compliant if not openly defiant?I hate to be seen defending Rumsfeld, but in this matter, I don't believe this is a correct statement of the facts as regards the CINC -> combatant commander issue. As I recall it, and we had memos up for about a year in the workplace from the SECDEF explaining the change, his point was that there was only one "Commander in Chief" in the US Armed Forces, and that's the President. Hence the name change for the unified commanders. I actually think his reasoning on this one was correct.
Tom
Last edited by Tom Odom; 06-18-2007 at 06:30 PM.
I personally see him as being very similar to McNamara in terms of his relationship with the military. Both men viewed the military as being very resistant to change of any sort, especially when they viewed that change as necessary.
Not totally related the question, but possibly worth considering.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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