Russo-Ukraine War 2016 (April-June)

[OUTLAW 09]

The drama over American accusations of Russian INFT violations since 2011 is very interesting...

Over time, we have come to learn that the violations surround Russian testing of the new RS-26 ICBM and R-500 GLCM:

• The RS-26 was initially tested as an ICBM, but subsequent testing at intermediate ranges and with MARVs typical of the pre-INFT IRBMs have raised suspicions that its intended deployment is at intermediate ranges. However, the INFT does not prohibit the parties from using ICBMs for shorter ranges, and Russia is accounting for the RS-26 under New START.
  
• The R-500 appears to be an evolved ground-launched variant of MKB Raduga's KH-55 ALCM, which also inspired the RK-55 GLCM later banned under the INFT. Although apparently tested at a range of more than 2,000 km (as with the ALCM), the Russians claim that the R-500 is actually limited to 500 km per the INFT.
  
• The real concern is whether the Iskander, which is capable of launching nuclear SRBMs, will be able to launch nuclear IRBMs.

For Russia's part, it has announced dissatisfaction with the INFT as early as 2007, due primarily to Chinese missile developments.

The delay and then gradual approach to American censure of Russian INFT violations was apparently due to the length of time it took to determine that the cruise missile being tested was a dedicated GLCM, rather than an ALCM or SLCM which are obviously not covered in the treaty.

Yet we see US officials conflating issues and indeed treaties. Frank Rose provides no detail as to Russia's INFT violations, but then discusses how Aegis Ashore is no threat to Russia's ICBMs. The deployment of Iskanders to Kaliningrad frequently are discussed in the context of the ABM Treaty (which the US withdrew from) and the INFT, which in fact does not cover SRBMs.

If Russia is violating the INFT, it may in fact benefit the United States:

• If Russia abrogates the INFT first, the US can follow suit without blame and then develop weapons to counter China
  
• Russian violations pose a threat to NATO, however, there are far less US assets at risk in Europe than in 1987. The risk is overwhelmingly to non-US NATO forces
  
• Further Russian development and expansion of their ALCM and SLCM arsenal would be much more threatening to the US and indicate a more offensive or expeditionary intent. In contrast, GLCM and IRBMs are constrained by range and more associated with a defensive approach
  
• The US is developing both a new dual-capable ALCM and a LRASM. These systems have commonalities and it can be safely assumed that there is a new dual-capable SLCM in the works...
  
• From my perspective, the INFT was about the Soviets eliminating a disruptive American capability, rather than eliminating two equivalent threats
  
• The other nuclear powers need to be brought into new multilateral nuclear warhead and delivery system agreements, or else New START and the INFT will become obsolete
  
• China is Russia's primary threat, and GLCMs are an efficient way to provide A2/AD exclusion over Siberia, given the impossibility of naval support and the difficulties of ALCM-carrier coverage

Azor....actually agree with your comments...my concern is the announced Russian parking tactical nuclear capable missiles right next to the NATO borders coupled with their de-escalation nuclear first strike is in fact a serious threat and it eliminates any warning time even for the US/NATO missile defense systems and the flight times are in seconds not minutes as with ICBMs.....and BTW the Russians fully know the Ageis system has never been against Russian ICBMs....which they even occasionally admit...

[OUTLAW 09]

An interesting statement and it clashes with the current Russian "narrative"....on how and why Crimea was taken....if a "peacekeeping operation" then who against and WHEN will they leave?????

Russian propaganda claims soldiers who invaded Crimea were “peacekeeping mission”
http://khpg.org http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1466118961 …

[OUTLAW 09]

The best analysis on #russianpropaganda so far by Finnish experts.
http://bit.ly/1XiKXQe

[Azor]

Azor....actually agree with your comments...my concern is the announced Russian parking tactical nuclear capable missiles right next to the NATO borders coupled with their de-escalation nuclear first strike is in fact a serious threat and it eliminates any warning time even for the US/NATO missile defense systems and the flight times are in seconds not minutes as with ICBMs.....and BTW the Russians fully know the Ageis system has never been against Russian ICBMs....which they even occasionally admit...

Well, firstly, unless the Russian military is planning to establish a demilitarized area within Russia's western borders, any Russian missile deployment would inherently threaten NATO. Russia's heavily fortified Western Military District borders 5 NATO members and also protects Saint Petersburg, Moscow and most of Russia's large cities.

Secondly, Russia's nuclear saber-rattling is very concerning, although I believe that it is an attempt to mask conventional weakness. No nuclear war planners were ever able to create a restricted or limited nuclear war scenario either during or after the Cold War. If Russia's Iskanders in Kaliningrad launched nuclear R-500s at NATO bases in Germany and Poland, the Kremlin would have roughly 10 minutes to gloat over their cunning before Trident IIs arced in from the Barents Sea.

Thirdly, Russia is serious concerned about American BMD developments, especially given the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Kremlin is well aware that its delivery systems are less reliable than American ones and that the US has a range of ABM systems that Russia does not have. According to CSIS, Russian wargamers concluded that if Russia launched an all-out first strike on the US, the US would retain a second strike capability of some ~200 warheads. If the US did the same to Russia, Russia would be left with ~120 warheads; suddenly, the US' less-than-strategic BMD systems become very important as they whittle down this number below 100, and malfunctions reduce it even further. Russia has made a poor case of its concerns, and Obama has not substantially changed NATO BMD policy in Russia's view.

The rationale of NATO BMD is questionable. Iran has no motivation and very little capability to target Europe, especially when its adversaries are Israel and the GCC, which can be targeted with SRBMs and cruise missiles. Moreover, all of Western Europe already lives in the shadow of Russia's nuclear arsenal and yet there are no plans to develop countermeasures along SDI lines.

Certainly, the US should be on guard for DPRK nuclear blackmail and PLA's growing inventory of ballistic missiles, but this would either require new multilateral agreements (as per my previous post) or withdrawal from the INF Treaty as well...