Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[davidbfpo]

Below are my interview notes and I have added in italics some comments. The officer was genuine and had been recommended to me by a Rhodesian Army officer who knew his role.

1. Around 1977 moral doubts started, as did the corruption
2. We were not prepared to win, our terms of reference dictated that in the last eight or nine years. Referred to Taber’s ‘War of the Flea’.
3. Politically, including Ian Smith, majority rule was not ruled out – they were searching for a suitable black role. But they did not understand the African mind, the majority will always support the violent man and unless you are tough you will lose.
4. They (the guerrillas) never needed to win a contact, the economic aspect of the war, which accounted for 50%, was lost they just keep on coming in and spread us about, thereby increasing the costs.
5. The Africans knew that somebody was always watching them.
6. We, the Rhodesians, just did not realise the signs were there. The choice was quite literally to win make the country a desert.
7. Reid-Daly’s concept was a stroke of genius, a fusion of brains and brawn. He was an ideal W.O.1, but he believed he was an “all rounder”. The brains were provided by Chief Superintendent Mac McGuiness, with about seven others, of the (Police) Special Branch who formed S.B.S.S. (A Google search found the SB officers were called Liaison Officers). It was devised as a tracking unit and became one to terrorise the other side.
8. The unit was 60% captures in the field, about 800 Africans, who were turned within a week and put on operations. There was total trust between us; I personally can recall one “fire fight” where I was the only one with ammunition left, they stayed and did not run. The entire staff at Inkomo Barracks (Google shows this as 40km from Harare near Darwindale) were similar in composition, but they were not combat fit. (This is the only reference I can easily find to the extent of recruitment from captured guerrillas, an interesting topic in itself).
9. (Their motivation?) Sometimes they perceived as the strong guys, but most were dupes really only concerned with their living conditions.
10. Such was the terror we instilled our main camp was never attacked (Google refers to Inkomo Camp as a major ammunition dump was sabotaged in 1981 by the South Africans and ex-Rhodesians).
11. What happened was that our credibility failed, I remember articled clerks at Price & Waterhouse (multi-national and global accountancy practice) saying in 1977-78 ‘All you’ve got to do is win the war”.
12. Our primary role was an intelligence gathering unit – 80% of our time was devoted to reconnaissance. I was a de-briefing officer for all returning “sticks” from each contact.
13. We adapted the ‘Supersonic’ radio so scouts could speak into the speakers (I think this implies the users were covert and within the population. This radio was in widespread use in the TTL or communal areas and would not stand out).
14. We did our job so well, in a professional manner – when we went into the “bush” de-bussing, back tracking and remaining stationary once in place. So much so that the Air Force had near total confidence in targeting a “Fire Force” without our actual seeing opponents. It was applied behavioural science, why did an old lady go for a “pee” at 0900hrs and counting kraal usage (This is lost on me now and I suspect refers to unusual behaviour being spotted).
15. There was a $50 per head reward; many of the regiment became quite wealthy.
16. For our opponents it was the “life of Riley”, drinking beer, getting girls from the kraals, the occasional shooting – let alone a “contact”.
17. Personally I weighed up the balance for Rhodesia, debits and credits – it was overwhelmingly in favour.
18. I personally was driven mad by the rejection that we should paralyse neighbouring economies; remember Mao’s dictum “Maximise the enemies losses, minimise yours”. We needed a “handle” on their sources of supply and finance. For example we distributed ultra-violet marked bank notes and with the banks help established relationships.
19. The cross-border operations i.e. attacking camps was not in the national interest.
20. We infiltrated their supply chain. I’m not saying who did this though. Their clothing was poisoned or defective equipment introduced, for examples half-second grenade fuses or plastic explosive AK47 rounds. All this had a potent effect the guys who were poisoned would attack those who had last fed them!

(Google search on poisoned clothing + Rhodesia finds many references to this activity; accounts appeared later in Rhodesian memoirs and became very controversial, for example view http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1347508 and http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep3_2006.html )

1. A shocking blind spot in our effort was counter-intelligence; given the fact any African could be a spy. For example in the attack on Chimoio we found sheaf’s of papers and plans of the Armoured Car Regiment Barracks – what they could not believe was that the ammunition was stored in a squash court, they thought it was behind the rifle butts.
2. I began to doubt whether personal sacrifice was warranted and started to ensure my personal safety.
3. The attitude evolved that politicians were not to be trusted and especially since we knew any war-winning strategy was unacceptable.