A new Journal article, with many references to sources cited in this thread.
The author cites several times a hitherto unknown article, which has very few references cited, but on a quick read has points of interest:The author concluded:Monick, S.; Victory in Hades: The Forgotten Wars of Oman 1957-1959 and 1970-1976, Part 2A: The Dhofar Campaign 1970-1976; Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 12, Nr 4; Saldanha, South Africa; 1982Link:http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac...e/view/600/605Precisely because of its dual COIN-conventional aspect, the lessons derived from the Dhofar war are peculiar to each individual dimension of warfare, as well as being common to both. They are thus both extensive and complex and, to do them justice, detailed discussion is reserved for a succeeding, final paper
(Section B).
The SWJournal author does not refer to Monick's 'Section B, which was published in 1983 and it appears the author had written on Rhodesian COIN. It is more concerned with any potential application to South Africa, then in the midst of several campaigns, internally and in SW Africa / Angola.
In his conclusion is one good passage:Link:http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac...e/view/591/596This clearly exemplifies a fundamental characteristic of all insurgencies; success is far more dependent upon the reaction of their adversaries (i.e. the established government and security forces) than upon any inner impetus within the revolutionary movement itself.
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