We can differ on the relevance of any intelligence cooking or manipulation. Yes, "...creating linkages using doubtful intelligence and dubious sources is a matter of record." but that does not pass the 'so-what' test. You know as well as I do that intel is not the be all and end all, at that level it is totally understandably rarely precise and that the Boss (historically far beyond Bush) can pick and chose what's presented to suit himself.
The so what comes from the decider himself when he declared on more than one occasion that bad intelligence was to blame -- the infamous Tenet "Slam Dunk" remark. I agree that the Jan 2002 remark was telling in its timing and its rare clarity.

Going north after DS would have been interesting; probably been far easier then than it was in 2003. We certainly had more people and a better tail and Saddam would have been far less prepared in all aspects. The Arab Armies would not have gone with us, they would have loudly objected to the invasion of a Muslim nation (but cheered us on under the table) and, regardless of what happened in Iraq, if we had gotten all the way to the Turkish border and then said "You guys take over"...
Having sat on the NIE sessions and the debates between the military and everyone else on this issue, I would say you are probably correct on the ease of military action and absolutely dead wrong on assuming support (under or over the table) from the Arab states. The Army lead the debate in favor of action against Iraqi forces in Kuwait when DIA, the CIA, and State were pretty much unnanimous in declaring the sky would indeed fall if we attacked. this debate ultimately led to Powell's "we are going to cut them off and kill them" brief.

I offered the comparison of 90-91 to 2003 because the intelligence picture are actually quite close, especially after related 2003 estimates were recently released which called what was likely to happen in the near term fairly close. I would say that is not an exercise in "what if" but a relevant comparison to make, given the lack of transitional planning.

Over many years I've seen many intelligence failures and many failures to heed intelligence. My WAG is that the ratio of failures due to those two factors is pretty close to 50:50 overall with a distinct preponderance toward pure failures of intel to provide the picture at the strategic level, about par at the operational level and with considerable variance at the tactical level, situation and personality dependent. That is not to fault the Intel guys, obtaining info is not easy, analysis is talent dependent, personalities intrude; lot of factors impede the perfection we would all like.
Agree on the WAG. Tracks with my experiences. The devil in the intelligence world is in the assumptions of both analyst and listener.

Again good discussion

Tom