Hi Steve,
This was part of our frustration as we realized the task org and training of the ISF in Mosul (IPs and IA) were not ideally suited to the threat. I outlined some of that in the article in SWJ VOL 8. The more I think about it, the more I think we the uniformed services can and should do it, but we need the tools to think outside of our immediate conventional experiences and at some level leadership that is willing to accept the risk of standing up para-military like HN forces. Obviously there is political and organizational risk which we have a hard time qualifying since such organizations are outside our culture. What we have to do is reconcile our misgivings and insecurities about such organizations by admitting that just because we don't have them, does not mean they will not be needed by other states facing different security concerns, or perhaps that we will not need them in the future.

As for training, we would probably find this difficult to outsource to another credible ally since not too many states wish to incur the political penalties for sending troops to Iraq. PMCs are an option, but personally I think they should only be used in a limited role and duration - in other words - don't use them for a capability we see as a mission of long term consequence - they are not a valid stake holder. This sort of leaves us holding the bag. How about a security agreement with a state like Spain, Italy or Romania that does have a good model where we send a cadre to be trained?

To me this makes sense since the failing or failed states which AQ & like organizations are attempting to destabilize will be more likely to suffer from domestic generated terror (aided by external support) then from conventional threats. Being able to go out and advise effectively means we must be able to identify with the security problem as it is, not the one we'd prefer to handle. If you can't do that then you will not have credibility for long, will be unable to request the right resources, be unable to inform the CoC, be unable to help shape the environment and policy, and as such - will not be relevant.

Other OGAs might be able to do it on a very limited basis, but we may be talking large scale that exceeds Iraq - we need to consider that. Certainly OGAs can provide assistance, but they do not have scale.

I'd also add that many of the problems we see abroad are starting to come to the homeland - take a look at Zeta on the Mexican / US border. What did the former CSA say today about the convergence of the Trans National Crime, Narco-Terror, WMD and extremism? We have to ID and develop capabilties for threats that are constantly morphing and growing. Providing these types of advisory capabilities and then providing a mechanism by which the experience get back out into the force is perhaps the best way to stay relevant on this issue.