A little like in the first circle of hell: not too far from the trouble but not in the heart of the fun. 
Reply With QuoteTwo RAND documents have been cited here at SWC in a number of posts. They are:
1. Counterinsurgency, A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962:
(direct to pdf). Rufus Phillips (a participant) refers to this in the SWJ brief cited by M-A. From the participants' bios, Galula was the only Marine (of any country) participating.This report is based on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency held at RAND’s Washington Office during the week of 16 April 1962. The purpose of the symposium was to bring together those with first-hand experience of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare for informal exchanges of information that might lead to fresh insights and a detailed body of expert knowledge. The subjects discussed include patterns and techniques of counterinsurgency, effective organizational and operational approaches, political action, psychological warfare, intelligence and counterintelligence, and requirements for victory. This new release of the report includes a new foreword by Stephen T. Hosmer that elucidates the relevance of this symposium to contemporary guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.
2. Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958 (1963) (by Galula):
(direct to pdf). Polarbear1605 likes this book (especially the "oven roast ruse").When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he confronts the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking, and lessons can be extracted from French successes and failures in its drive to contain and manage the Algerian uprising. A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times.
Galula's Introduction begins:
A fair inference (from what Galula says) is that the "certain theories" had been shaped (in some measure) by "Chinese affairs" and "the war in Indochina".I left Hong Kong in February 1956 after a five-year assignment as military attaché. I had been away from troop duty for eleven years, having specialized in Chinese affairs since the end of World War II. I was saturated with intelligence work, I had missed the war in Indochina, I felt I had learned enough about insurgencies, and I wanted to test certain theories I had formed on counterinsurgency warfare. For all these reasons I volunteered for duty in Algeria as soon as I reached France. When my four-month leave was over, I was assigned to the 45th B.I.C. (Colonial Infantry Battalion) to which I reported on August 1, 1956. I was to spend two years in Algeria, first as a company commander until April 1, 1958, then as a deputy battalion commander until August 1, 1958.
No reference is made to his service in Greece - perhaps the omission says more than a brief mention. Of the three situations (China, Vietnam and Greece), Greece was more similar to Algeria - both being military wins for the "COIN".
To fill a gap in my ignorance, did Galula file any reports (which are available) re: his service in Greece as a UN military observer ?
Regards
Mike
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