Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
"Iraq isn't going to be in the current state much longer, nor is Afghanistan. The potential for another commitment needing such capability in large numbers anywhere in the next few years is slight."

Gotta disagree here. I see a very large requirement for continued advisory capacity among GPF.

First, I'm not convinced that the Iraq and Afghanistan missions are going to end any time soon, at least not the advisory portions.

Secondly, when I look across the horizon, I see numerous countries that are important to us, threatened by disruptive forces of various ilks. Developing their indiginous capability to protect themselves is the only long term solution to their stability. The requirements of the future outstrip the capacity of my friends with the funny green hats.

Thirdly, we don't have sufficient tools in the rucksack to perform the required advisory functions. Train and equip doesn't work unless you're working with a sophisticated, capable ally -- sellin F-16s to NATO partners, T&E works. Other traditional security assistance also falls short. Shortly after the Nixon Doctrine was announced, stating that we would in fact bolster host nation capabilities to look after themselves, congress placed heinous restrictions on the programs to ensure that they would not be effective (AECA 76 (as amended)).

We now have an opportunity to move forward and develop truly effective means of organizing, training, eqiupping, (re)building and advising foreign security forces. The requirement to do so will remain large for the forseeable future.
Re: my quoted statement, you'll note I said that the two nations were not going to be in their current state much longer. That doesn't say or imply that the missions will end soon; I believe we'll be in both for many years. It does mean that the types and numbers actions are changing daily and that the situation will differ in the near and distant future. Yes, there'll be an Advisory requirement but it can be met by the 1st ID model with a MAAG add-on.

So, first, we'll be there and the advisory effort will continue. The question is does that require a 'dedicated' advisory corps or such like. My answer would be no. The GPF are capable of doing the job in the ME with minimal extra training.

I've been a MAAG Adviser in the ME and in SEA and worked elsewhere with Advisers including some from other nations who have a far, far, smaller but more effective foot print than we do. I've been to Iraq and my guess is that the number of Americans that would gain real traction there as Advisers is microscopic. The capability to fully integrate and be effective in that job is a crap shoot; it's personality dependent and whether or not your counterpart likes and trusts you -- or to what extent he does those things. Culture, religion and traditions all have a very significant effect on the abiltiy to establish real rapport and lacking that, the Adviser is only marginally effective -- and may even do harm. In that light, the conventional wisdom says that long advisory tours are preferable. I disagree, short tours are better to offset the personality disconnects that are bound to occur -- that and the Stockholm syndrome effect...

Secondly, I agree with your view. The question is will Congress agree with it? Another question is how many of those nations are likely to invite us in any significant numbers? Some will take Advisers -- but only to insure the benefits and equipment with which we bribe them to take an Advisory Team (or for the money a MAAG will spend in country), such nations Armed Forces tend to be very polite to the advisers and yet change their processes only slightly. I think 1st SF Gps efforts in the Phillipines and elsewhere offer a far better model than the large Advisory Team effort.

Recall I said "for the next few years." That is, IMO, due to Congress and the fact that we're on the world's nasty list right now (not a problem, we have been before and I don't think it's as bad as it was during Viet Nam) and will be for a bit. We have to time to think and do something smart instead of just jumping into a large structure that will be underemployed for a while; say in the 2010-2015 period.

Thirdly, you're correct -- and I seriously doubt a large advisory effort will improve our ability in this regard. I also doubt Congress will relax those restrictions to any significant extent in the near future. A more important point is that other nations have seen that failure to implement the Nixon Doctrine, watch the current disconnect in Congress and have significant doubts about our ability to stay the course. Justifiably, I might add...

I submit the number of invitations to us for help (other than $$ and goodies) will be slim for a few years. A small footprint may be accepted; few will want a large one.

Don't misunderstand me; I agree we need to work on the Advisory bit, reinvent that wheel as it were and I agree that the effort is important. I am, however, saying that the "Advisory Corps" is massive overkill and is unlikely to be approved by either DA or Congress in any event. The 1st ID effort is a fair start and an adequate base and the SF model in Asia has more merit than it is given credit for, it's been successful and the Army cannot say that either the Afghan or Iraqi campaigns have been. Yes, that's partly due to some factors from outside the Army but we did not do it well. Thirty plus years of ignoring the developing nation issue were the Army's fault. That damage will not be repaired by over reacting in trying to jump back into the ball game willy nilly. My fear is that we will do the age-old American thing and swing too far as we oscillate from virtually no involvement with developing nations to attempting to overdo said involvement.

As to your conclusion, we can disagree on that