Iraqi Insurgent Media: War of Images and Ideas

[Steve Blair]

I would tend to agree with this, Steve. Most folks I've come into contact with overseas might want parts of the "American Experience," but that doesn't mean they want the whole thing. Our political system is pretty much unique to us, and many of its concepts do not translate well to other locations. The same thing goes for our social systems and networks. People ARE different, no matter how much we may wish it were otherwise, and not everyone aspires to "Be Like Mike" or whatever slogan you choose. The demise of history education in our schools may have something to do with this, combined of course with the cultural jingoism that has haunted America almost since its beginnings. There's also, I think, a distinct feeling of inferiority (not spoken of but certainly there) when dealing with other powers and countries, especially those in Europe.

The "War of Ideas" as it exists now is, to me, very Ameri-centric and deals with flawed assumptions. It's also incomplete. By way of a muddled example, when I was in Germany in the early 1980s "Dynasty" and "Dallas" were both immensely popular on German TV. Many of the people I met there were convinced that all Americans were rich, slept with each others' wives or close relations, and were always scheming about something. These days they get their "informed views" about America from MTV, Jerry Springer, and Desperate Housewives, not to mention our movies (there's an old Tank McNamara cartoon that ties to this...he reassures Japanese visitors to the LA Olympics by telling them that Harry Calahan is in charge of security). Most of our IO stuff doesn't even seem to acknowledge this, let alone understand it.

[SteveMetz]

I would tend to agree with this, Steve. Most folks I've come into contact with overseas might want parts of the "American Experience," but that doesn't mean they want the whole thing. Our political system is pretty much unique to us, and many of its concepts do not translate well to other locations. The same thing goes for our social systems and networks. People ARE different, no matter how much we may wish it were otherwise, and not everyone aspires to "Be Like Mike" or whatever slogan you choose. The demise of history education in our schools may have something to do with this, combined of course with the cultural jingoism that has haunted America almost since its beginnings. There's also, I think, a distinct feeling of inferiority (not spoken of but certainly there) when dealing with other powers and countries, especially those in Europe.

The "War of Ideas" as it exists now is, to me, very Ameri-centric and deals with flawed assumptions. It's also incomplete. By way of a muddled example, when I was in Germany in the early 1980s "Dynasty" and "Dallas" were both immensely popular on German TV. Many of the people I met there were convinced that all Americans were rich, slept with each others' wives or close relations, and were always scheming about something. These days they get their "informed views" about America from MTV, Jerry Springer, and Desperate Housewives, not to mention our movies (there's an old Tank McNamara cartoon that ties to this...he reassures Japanese visitors to the LA Olympics by telling them that Harry Calahan is in charge of security). Most of our IO stuff doesn't even seem to acknowledge this, let alone understand it.

Well, *my* life is pretty much like Dynasty and Dallas--you mean yours isn't?

What we should have done is forced any foreign television network that wanted to broadcast Dynasty and Dallas to also broadcast Roseanne.

In some ways, the dissonance is even deeper. At the most basic level, we value personal freedom among almost everything else. In Arab cultures one could make an argument that justice, honor, and dignity are far more important. Then we couldn't understand why the political system we designed for them, which optimized personal freedom rather than justice, honor, and dignity, didn't take root the way we expected.

[Steve Blair]

Agree completely about the basic differences, Steve. But we (and I mean the collective policy-maker 'we') can't even seem to grasp the more obvious differences I mentioned, let alone the deeper stuff.

[MountainRunner]

What I see is a confusion of what IO, and public diplomacy, are supposed to be out. Public diplomacy took a left turn years ago, a turn made sharper by Joe Nye's book promulgating a passive approach that reinforced the "if we sell the US, they'll buy" approach.

The method and madness of the insurgent media is based on a "struggle for the hearts and minds of men"* and isn't always based on soft, feel good stories. In fact, the war-time propaganda emphasizes the power of the insurgent, the weakness of the enemy (the US, Shi'i, and the Iraqi gov't in this case, and the problems you'll face if you don't side with them. The last point is, according to the report, is generally restricted to domestic propaganda aimed at Iraqis themselves, while the other points are aimed globally.

I mean absolutely no disrespect, but I find it amusing, sad, and ultimately expected that a discussion about American IO goes back to telling the world about us and our commercial products every must want. This is, afterall, the "public diplomacy" America has come to "trust" over the last couple of decades, completely forgetting the roots of the term and the concepts it was based on. The concepts of which, the insurgent media understand.

Shouldn't we refocus our global IO as really psychological warfare that aims to influence people not passively, but showing the failures, inconsistencies, and atrocities of the enemy while laying blame for incidents, failures, etc where it is due: on the enemy. We must appeal directly to "the people of the media, speakers and writers. [We] must tell the truth and cast [our] arrows at falsehood, for media is half of the battle."**

It seems we're doing better at local, tactical IO, in Iraq, but still failing to see the larger picture is not about buying soap.

* Presidential candidate Eisenhower in a 1952 campaign speech on foreign policy.
** May 2, 2007, proclamation signed by the Iraqi Army of Iraq (IAI), Mujahidin Army, and Ansar al-Sunnah

[Steve Blair]

I would agree to a point, MR, but I'd also point out that in this age of "sensitivity," many government outlets will shy away from more aggressive techniques for fear of being accused of being racist or anti-Islam. That's a level of spin that puts many on the automatic defensive these days, with the responsibility for proof being put on those who are accused instead of the accuser.

We do need an aggressive IO campaign that points out every atrocity, flaw, and failure of our opponents, but I fear that we don't have the fortitude on an institutional level to get it done the way it should be done.

[SteveMetz]

Let me toss out an idea here. I think that in Islamic cultures in general and Iraq in particular, we are NEVER going to be effective at information operations. My reason for this is sort of conceptual, psychological, and philosophical, but I'll take a stab at it.

Coming from a Western, rationalist tradition, we assume that there is some factual "truth" disconnected from personal perception and belief. It has an independent existence. No one individual may have a perfect and complete understanding of it, but there are methods which individuals and groups can use to come close to the truth--open debate and discussion, elections and polls, etc.

In other cultures, though, reality and the truth have no independent existence. They cannot be separated from the individuals who perceive them. Hence when there are alterantive stories or explanations for something, the decision on which to accept is not based on which account is the "ground truth," but which of the two individuals giving different accounts one feels the most affiliation with. Phrased differently, there is no "objective" reality, only human-linked, subjective realities.

I know that in Iraq, this greatly frustrates Americans, particularly those in the military. They are perplexed, even angered when accounts of events which they are certain are factually wrong are accepted as truth by the population. To give an example (which is made up in this case, but which, I think, replicates a common occurrence), when some civilians are killed and the American military said that insurgents did it but other Iraqis say that the American military did it, the Iraqi public does not decide which story to believe based on which one is the closest to the "objective" truth, but whether they feel the deepest affiliation with the Americans telling the story or the other Iraqis telling the story.

This all leads me to believe that we will never "win" a cross cultural "war of ideas."

[MountainRunner]

This all leads me to believe that we will never "win" a cross cultural "war of ideas."

But we don't need to. This isn't about "democracy", whatever flavor it might be (US, UK, German, or, gulp, French, etc if western liberal at all) it's about peace and stability, ultimately.

The "truth" doesn't have to be a higher metaphysical ground, but the simple issue of who's doing what, where, and why. Exposing the lies and falsehoods is key.

It seems one of the big hangs ups is the reality that who we are is defined by what we do and not what we say. This goes to the "affilation" point you raise, Steve (Metz). An essential problem we seem to be finally overcoming as the primacy of information becomes internalized is what we do has defined who we are. We have inadvertently supported and feed the enemy IOs by our actions, while doing nothing to dispell the myths that get built up except by saying "that's not who we really are." That isn't cultural, that's just human nature.

We do need to insert ourselves more into other cultures to understand the listening we're creating. Giving away soccer balls directly to children, for example, didn't help improve our image as it imasculated the fathers. Giving the soccer balls to IP to give to the fathers to give to their children, that indebted the fathers to the IP.

This example highlights the need to understand local IO requirements. The first scenario, balls to kids, was Machiavellian: heap "honors on [his advisor], enriching him, placing him in his debt...so that he sees that he cannot do better without him." Attempting to buy off somebody.

The Arab Machiavelli, Ibn Zafar, in contrast, understood the different kind of indebtedness in Islamic culture: Amongst faithful and far-sighted counselors, he is most deserving of attention whose prosperity depends on your own, and whose safety is tied to yours. He who stands in such a position, exerting himself for your interests, will likewise serve and defend himself while fighting for you.

I don't see understanding and employing those differences in our IO isn't a culture clash. It should be easy to create these links, if we simply tried.

Steve (Blair), from where I sit in the cheap seats, it seems it's a combination of a lack of appreciation of the value of information (assumption being: "they should know we're good, we're from the USG, we're here to help"), in addition to fortitude.

[Dominique R. Poirier]

I would agree to a point, MR, but I'd also point out that in this age of "sensitivity," many government outlets will shy away from more aggressive techniques for fear of being accused of being racist or anti-Islam. That's a level of spin that puts many on the automatic defensive these days, with the responsibility for proof being put on those who are accused instead of the accuser.

We do need an aggressive IO campaign that points out every atrocity, flaw, and failure of our opponents, but I fear that we don't have the fortitude on an institutional level to get it done the way it should be done.

Well said, Mr. Blair. I’m wondering exactly the same question and I am inclined to wonder, since some years already, whether there might not be room for abstract considerations such as: Does the concept of mutual deterrence may take place in information warfare?

I explain.

We are getting familiar with certain form of influence such as movies, since some times. But while we may correctly assume that a movie such as Fight Club, for example, corresponds to the expression of a general concern about actuality, then we may wonder whether many other movies like Twelve Monkeys, Dances with Wolves, The Matrix, A Lathe of Heaven, or even the latest sequel of Pirates of the Caribbean owe equally to the same concerns?

In all these movies and in many other else I didn’t name here the enlightened and the specialist will easily find some unmistakable patterns belonging to far leftist underground conspiracy, terrorism “ethically justified,” and Romantic-inspired forms of violence and subversion, and else.

In revenge, as you suggest it, we may express some difficulties in our attempts to find similar forms of retaliations from those who are aimed at. It is surprising since it seems so obvious that there is matter enough to make a movie featuring in a burlesque manner the daily lives and destinies of would-be terrorists and slovenly naïve conspirers, for example. This way of doing things would exert ovious devastating effects and influence upon the mind of those who feel concerned, I believe. It would instill doubt in the mind of many. It would downplay and de-dramatize the way people perceive them. If ever some think that I may be wrong in my assumption, then let me cite for a while Brian Jenkins who made these two interesting statements about al-Qaeda:

“For bin Laden, rejection and ridicule would be worse than death. He berates those who do not heed God’s call to jihad. Denunciations of jihadist attacks that kill Muslims—even from militant groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas—cause him concern. (….)

We in the West sometimes seem to pay more attention to bin Laden’s latest screeds than do those in the community he addresses. It is hugely entertaining for the Muslim world to watch the jihadist torment the tiger, but to many Muslims, even those angered by U.S. policies, bin Laden is a crackpot.” - Jenkins, Brian Michael. - Unconquerable nation: knowing our enemy, strengthening ourselves – Rand Corporation, 2006, Pages 105-107.

What do we fear about to be so hesitating?

I understand your point Mr. Metz. We have some difficulty to adapt our communication to non-occidental cultures, and I acknowledge that I tend to focus my attention on those who live outside the Arabic area.

[SteveMetz]

I understand your point Mr. Metz. We have some difficulty to adapt our communication to non-occidental cultures, and I acknowledge that I tend to focus my attention on those who live outside the Arabic area.

My concern is that Americans, because of our history as a cultural "melting pot" and because we do not have an imperial history, are particularly bad at understanding and operating within other cultures, yet we have been cast into an imperial role. I think we can see this in American grand strategy which is based on the assumption that the terrorism threat will end when other cultures become more like us. I also believe that we do not realize the extent to which our counterinsurgency doctrine and the Foreign Internal Defense approach are culture specific. They may work in Western cultures (El Salvador) but are unlikely to in others.

In my 20 years with the U.S. military, I have come to recognize that there are people who, for psychological reasons, are able to quickly understand, adjust to, and operate within other cultures, but they are rare. The military does not select for people with this talent, instead working on the belief that with training and education, it can make anyone able to understand, adjust to, and operate within other cultures.

To tell you the truth, I'm becoming more and more sympathetic to Andy Bacevich's argument that Americans are never going to be successful imperialists, so the best strategy is stop trying to play the role.