With the recent incidents in the South China Sea (again), it is worth reviewing what the Rebalance Strategy is all about. Kurt Campbell's "The Pivot, The Future of American Statecraft in Asia" is an excellent start. It is basic enough to provide a good introduction to those not familiar with the policy and the region, and advanced enough to provide nuanced insights for those very familiar with the strategy and the policy.

https://www.amazon.com/Pivot-Future-...1967956&sr=1-3

The book advances two overarching arguments. First Asia should be placed more centrally in the formulation and execution of American Foreign Policy, and second, that the U.S. should pursue a comprehensive and flexible strategy in Asia to keep credible its alliance commitments, and sustain Asia’s operating system.

Campbell describes the strategy for pursuing this strategy using the familiar ends, ways, and means approach. Each explained in detail.

Ends: Selling shirts (free trade), saving souls, spreading liberal values, and protection of American Territory in Asia. Ways: The hope is that if Asia does not fall under the domination of another power, trade will flow more freely, religious freedom will grow, liberal values will flourish, and US territory will be safe from menacing powers. And the means: Diplomatic efforts, economic statecraft, and military force

Throughout the book he makes a clear case on why the Asia-Pacific must be central in U.S. policy for economic, political, and security interests, and while the USPACOM AOR (different than State's East Asia Pacific region) has 36 countries and China is the elephant in the room, the pivot thankfully rejects the “China First” approach to Asian diplomacy, and instead embeds China policy within a much wider and more inclusive regional framework.

The book provides an insightful tour of the region, our diplomatic engagement history (worth the price of the book by itself), and detailed explanation of the strategy to pivot (Kurt's term) to the Asia-Pacific. It also provides historical details of our relationships with our regional allies and key partners in the region.

Some interesting points from the book:

The US adopted its initial military posture in the region to protect its economic and missionary interests, not to protect colonial outposts like the UK. This made the U.S. a welcome partner by many nations in the region, especially by China.

The discussion on Japan's rise and how that led to WWII in the Pacific eerily parallels in many ways what we see with China today, although Campbell never said that in his book, but readers familiar with China will see the parallels.

Nixon's policy of Vietnamization was intended to reduce America's active commitment in the world by supporting self-reliance of regional military forces, which downgraded the American security guarantees that had underpinned security in Asia. It was seen as an American retreat.

We lack an adequate number of Asian experts, and repeatedly surge and retreat from the region. An example of the risk incurred by not having sufficient experts was the Chairman, JCS during the Korean War. GEN Bradley said the Russians were not ready to risk global war over Korea; therefore, there would be no Soviet or Chinese intervention in Korea. This view was held because the U.S. viewed the USSR and the PRC as one collective block. So even though China signaled it would invade via diplomatic channels through India if the coalition crossed the 38th parallel, we remained surprised when they did.

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