Yemen 2016 onwards: an intractable war?

[CrowBat]

I see, thanks.

To clear any uncertainities: 10,700 cited by Yemen Post is the number of death certificates that should've been issued for civilian deaths - and then by 'Houthi authorities' only.

Re. your questions:
[*]How many coalition troops are in Yemen?

Right now: no clue. I've heard that at the height of their deployment (that was in September-November 2015), they might have totalled about 45,000.

It should be much less now, because the YNA alone (the 'National Yemen Army' established for Hadi by Saudis and Emiratis) should be back to about 30,000.
[*]How many aircraft are participating in the airstrikes?

Depends on intensity of fighting and how are various non-Saudi contingents rotated in and out. They're usually holding anything between 8 and 48 strikers 'stacked' in holding patterns above different part of Yemen, plus a few interceptors (usually F-15Cs). Add the 'usual suspects' like E-3As, tankers, UAVs (which are used ever more massively, foremost by Saudis and Emiratis), and you've got the picture.

Of their allies: Egyptians (F-16C/Ds) have meanwhile withdrawn; Sudanese (i.e. their Su-24Ms) seem to have completed their second 'tour of duty' in theatre; there are no news about Moroccans... Kuwaitis and Bahrainis probably have up to 12-16 aircraft deployed in KSA at any time. Emiratis are nowadays largely operating out of their new base near Masawa (Eritrea).

[*]What is the Houthi strength?

'Houthis' as such, perhaps 20,000. It's the Yemen army units (i.e. those that sided with the Houthi-Saleh coalition) that are making most of forces there. Given the Yemeni military had up to 400,000 before the war, and up to 60% of it sided with that coalition... well, guess, you've got the 'picture'.
[*]What are the Houthi casualties?

I do not know any source clearly citing these. But wouldn't be surprised if they are around 10,000 meanwhile. Alone two of Houthi battalions and elements of three YA brigades that assaulted Aden were decimated (though not so much by fighting as much as by the Deng fever, lack of food, water, medical facilities etc.). Then they suffered significant losses during the battle for Anab AB (September 2015), and then in Ma'rib. Not to talk about the Emirati/Bahraini/Kuwaiti ops in Bab al-Mandeb area (Houthis/Saleh would've never withdrawn from there without being really beaten), or this bitter and protracted battle for Ta'iz (which seems to have 'gulped' several 'brigades' on both sides).

Even some of ex-Republican Guards/ex-Presidential Guards units have been seriously hit by coalition air in Ma'rib (gauging by all the knocked out M60s, BMP-2s, and similar stuff seen on various photos).

[Azor]

I see, thanks.

To clear any uncertainities: 10,700 cited by Yemen Post is the number of death certificates that should've been issued for civilian deaths - and then by 'Houthi authorities' only.

Re. your questions:
[*]How many coalition troops are in Yemen?

Right now: no clue. I've heard that at the height of their deployment (that was in September-November 2015), they might have totalled about 45,000.

It should be much less now, because the YNA alone (the 'National Yemen Army' established for Hadi by Saudis and Emiratis) should be back to about 30,000.
[*]How many aircraft are participating in the airstrikes?

Depends on intensity of fighting and how are various non-Saudi contingents rotated in and out. They're usually holding anything between 8 and 48 strikers 'stacked' in holding patterns above different part of Yemen, plus a few interceptors (usually F-15Cs). Add the 'usual suspects' like E-3As, tankers, UAVs (which are used ever more massively, foremost by Saudis and Emiratis), and you've got the picture.

Of their allies: Egyptians (F-16C/Ds) have meanwhile withdrawn; Sudanese (i.e. their Su-24Ms) seem to have completed their second 'tour of duty' in theatre; there are no news about Moroccans... Kuwaitis and Bahrainis probably have up to 12-16 aircraft deployed in KSA at any time. Emiratis are nowadays largely operating out of their new base near Masawa (Eritrea).

[*]What is the Houthi strength?

'Houthis' as such, perhaps 20,000. It's the Yemen army units (i.e. those that sided with the Houthi-Saleh coalition) that are making most of forces there. Given the Yemeni military had up to 400,000 before the war, and up to 60% of it sided with that coalition... well, guess, you've got the 'picture'.
[*]What are the Houthi casualties?

I do not know any source clearly citing these. But wouldn't be surprised if they are around 10,000 meanwhile. Alone two of Houthi battalions and elements of three YA brigades that assaulted Aden were decimated (though not so much by fighting as much as by the Deng fever, lack of food, water, medical facilities etc.). Then they suffered significant losses during the battle for Anab AB (September 2015), and then in Ma'rib. Not to talk about the Emirati/Bahraini/Kuwaiti ops in Bab al-Mandeb area (Houthis/Saleh would've never withdrawn from there without being really beaten), or this bitter and protracted battle for Ta'iz (which seems to have 'gulped' several 'brigades' on both sides).

Even some of ex-Republican Guards/ex-Presidential Guards units have been seriously hit by coalition air in Ma'rib (gauging by all the knocked out M60s, BMP-2s, and similar stuff seen on various photos).

Thanks.

So it seems that the Saudi-led coalition is doing better than the media and think tanks would have it...

The Saudi military is certainly gaining much-needed experience in Yemen, especially given the increasing confrontation with Iran. In comparison, Iran's adventure in Syria seems more of a waste of resources. IRGC veterans and foreign militias are being ground down and may not be available if Israel has a go at Iranian nuclear facilities...

[CrowBat]

So it seems that the Saudi-led coalition is doing better than the media and think tanks would have it...

Let me say it this way: when Dr. Knights of WINEP was working on that three-part article on Yemen War, I told him (in essence, can't recall that statement word-by-word any more): Saudi military is actually functioning great in this war, but people like Asiri (Saudi military spokesperson), and all those advising and ordering him and that military, should get fired on the spot.

I know, I tend to be undiplomatic and drastic in my statements and demands, but that's the shortest description possible.

Namely, it was already during the 2009-2010 Saudi 'involvement' (or 'intervention'), that the Saudi military organized a Joint Command for all the branches of its military and security, went to great extension to provide (almost literally) every single of its grunt with timely intel and CAS etc. It didn't work that well back then because it turned out there were too many princes and whatever other sort of opportunists in the military, back then. But that was 'solved' through court-martialing and inprisoning up to 5,000 of such characters and then a complete reform of the military.

Result is that the Saudi military as it went into the Yemen War of March 2015 was probably in its best and most effective condition ever.

Sure, PRBS like videos showing 'a gang of rag-tag militiamen named Houthis' (read: Yemen Army special forces units that sided with Houthi-Saleh coalition) attacking various Saudi border-posts, smashing M1s and whatever other hardware there, showing Saudi troops fleeing, captured uniforms of Saudi generals etc. are all indicating a 'typical failure'.

...especially to people who have never taken a look at the map of the Saudi-Yemeni border.

Namely, even if the entire Saudi military would deploy to that border, Saudis would still not have enough troops to effectively guard all of it. That's why they relay on a number of actually very isolated and small strongpoints. It's easy to attack these. But, Saudis fail to explain this in the public. Guess, their advisors - whether at home or in the UK and USA - told them making such admissions in the public would be a sign of weakness....

Similarly, it would be (to use a favourite British term for such situations) 'rather inconvenient and unfortunate' - no doubt about this - when they would admit that sometimes the same 'Houthis' (read: Yemen Army special forces units that sided with Houthi-Saleh coalition) not only by-pass their border posts, but drive up to 35km deep into Saudi Arabia. Indeed, that these are sometimes 'blocking' sizeable swats of Saudi territory for various periods of time (unless the Saudi military reacts with all of its fire-power).

But foremost, it would be 'rather inconvenient' for Saudis to admit that their royals screwed up when they bought the idea that all of the Yemeni Army wouldn't move its small finger if they would launch this war with intention of returning Hadi to power in Sana'a.

But it would be not the least 'inconvenient' - though a big admission of own failures - to say it clear: 'f..k, our 20K troops, third of our navy, and about a quarter of our air force regularly involved there are up against hundreds of thousands of Yemenis'.

Which means: the entire affair it's a political-, intelligence- and a PR-failure, but military-wise there is very little the Saudis and allies could do any better - nor could anybody else do anything better if in their position.

One of very few exceptions would be: better cross-examination of targeting intel provided by various informants within areas controlled by Houthi/Saleh coalition. That would reduce tragic civilian casualties.

In comparison, Iran's adventure in Syria seems more of a waste of resources. IRGC veterans and foreign militias are being ground down and may not be available if Israel has a go at Iranian nuclear facilities...

The issue of the IRGC in Syria and then a possible confrontation between Iran and Israel are actually two different pairs of shoes.

Even after spending something like US$120 billion in the last five years to help Assad survive, the IRGC in Syria considers its involvement there a 'very economic' enterprise (and mind: this is based on chats with about a dozen of active IRGC officers, so it's really a 'first hand' information). Yes, they pay a lot to Assad so he can pay his thugs and remain in power; yes, some of them despise Assad more than Syrian insurgents, actually. But, on the other hand, they have established themselves in power over all of the Middle East from Beirut to Tehran. Nobody - not even Israel - can ignore this any more.

And Israel? Right now: perhaps 'sometimes in the future', but right now absolutely no factor in all of this.

Israelis are meanwhile so busy with self-confirmation of their own arrogance and prejudice (precisely in same fashion like everybody in the DC...and this to such a degree that I wonder how much of the latter is actually caused by Israel), that they completely fail to understand what a fundamental change took place in Syria (and Iraq), and what a brilliant opportunity they've missed in that country.

But then, considering traditional 'highest national interests' of Israel, this is not even 'little surprising': more likely, somebody there decided ignoring what the IRGC is doing there is of 'highest highest national interests'...

[Azor]

So basically, you have noticed a major improvement in the Saudi armed forces in Operation Decisive Storm compared to Operation Scorched Earth in 2009-2010.

However, in 2009 the Saudis had the support of Saleh and most of the Yemeni military, whereas now they don’t. If I am reading you correctly, the Saudis are going to have to have a “come to Jesus” moment and negotiate with Saleh. Yet Saleh is divisive and excels more at playing spoiler and rendering Yemen ungovernable without his imprimatur, than he does at governing without unrest. But Riyadh will have to make hard choices and prioritize. Is confronting Saleh’s coup d’état worth Iran gaining a foothold on the Saudi-Yemeni border?

What would make Iran find the intervention in Syria costly? Obviously Johnson’s idea of cost differed from Minh’s in the 1960s…

As for Israel, I think it is satisfied that the Sunnis and Shias are killing each other and not fighting the Jewish State.

[CrowBat]

Re. 2009 and 'support from Saleh': I wouldn't describe it that way. I would describe it as 'Saudi university of warfare'. They something like 'went through a high school' back in 1991, learned some lessons but that wasn't enough - yet. They continued buying equipment, but weren't training well enough, didn't care about plenty of things. In 2009-2010 they learned how to organize on their own, how to train, how to fight, what equipment works and what not etc.

What happened during that war was that Saleh launched that Operation 'Scorched Earth' - and had the backsides of his military returned to him by Houthis on a silver plate. The 'Sa'ada Axis' (de-facto a corps-sized unit of some 8-9 brigades) was largely smashed, with some of its best units either overrun or at least besieged by insurgents.

Then the Houthis made a mistake and - I still don't know why - 'invaded' Saudi Arabia. That is: they attacked some border post, and captured a few peaks. What happened next was not related to Saleh's war against Houthis - no matter how much the Saudis declared it as such.

Saudis thought they are so good, that 'rag-tag gang of terrorists' would fold and run away on sight. They rushed a hodgepodge of various units that were nearby - supported by one of para/commando battalions and another of marines. These eagerly assaulted - only to get smashed by insurgents fighting from well-concealed positions (Saudis suffered over 200 KIA in the first few days of that war).

That taught the Saudis to plan their ops, to organize etc. They set up a joint HQ for all branches, deployed all of their means of intelligence gathering, carefully reconnoitred the area and then began smashing Houthis, bit by bit. That took much more time (and was particularly expensive in terms of PGMs), but after a few months of experiencing a sort of an onslaught Houthis never experienced before, they agreed to give up. From their POV, there was no point in continuing to expose themselves to Saudi pounding, if their actual opponent was in Sana'a...

In 2015, Saudi military was better prepared than ever before. But, their political masters fell for Hadi's 'promise' that the Yemeni military would do nothing (especially not side with Houthis) - supposedly because Houthi re-formed that military and purged all the Saleh-loyalists - and that Houthis could be defeated in similar fashion like back in 2010.

That was not a 'bad' but 'stupid' idea. Actually, it's so that there is no way Saudis can force anybody in Yemen to accept their terms any more.

If I am reading you correctly, the Saudis are going to have to have a “come to Jesus” moment and negotiate with Saleh. Yet Saleh is divisive and excels more at playing spoiler and rendering Yemen ungovernable without his imprimatur, than he does at governing without unrest. But Riyadh will have to make hard choices and prioritize.

Yes and no.

One of things I think one should consider about this war is that various 'assessments' and 'estimates' about the composition of the local population usually published in the West (or at least in English language) are simply BS. Somebody there is implanting entirely wrong data in this regards.

Namely... sure, there's no doubt that Saleh is a master in political intrigue and maintaining himself either in power or in a position of influence. And, there's no doubt that over the time he cooperated with nearly every political entity there can be in Yemen (including AQAP, Islah, all sorts of tribes and whoever else). But, that's still no explanation how comes that he - as a Zaidi - won two ('quite fair', even if 'not perfect') elections by quite a wide margin. I don't think this would be possible if Zaidis make 'only' about 30-40% of the Yemeni population, as usually explained.

Now comes the particularly 'problematic to explain' part. Namely, Saleh managed to win elections 'although' he was at odds with Houthis, who are Zaidis too. And although the Houthis have destroyed large parts of various tribal federations - including several of particularly powerful and famous ones - over the last 6-8 years.

That's why I do not find the usual explanations about 'secret of his success' being something like Saleh's ability to convince various Shafi (Sunni) tribes and the Islah Party to cooperate with him, and why I'm not convinced usual publications about the composition of Yemeni population are correct.

Anyway... the Saudi-led military intervention had an additional effect of turning additional parts of Yemeni population against Saudis (and allies, including the USA). Sure, you'll not get to hear a lot about this in English-language. Reason is that English is spoken and social media used by those Yemenis that can afford such luxury. Most of these are (relatively wealthy) businessmen, who were against Houthis and Saleh all the time. But, they are few in numbers - especially in comparison to masses of impoverished Yemenis, most of whom are meanwhile on the side of Houthi/Saleh.

All of which means: even if Houthis would withdraw from Sana'a literally within the next 5 minutes - which is the core demand of Hadi, Saudis & Co KG GesmbH AG SPA - there is absolutely no guarantee anybody could install a new Hadi government there again (indeed: I wouldn't bet 5 bucks on Hadi surviving his 'return' to Sana'a, just for the start).

Is confronting Saleh’s coup d’état worth Iran gaining a foothold on the Saudi-Yemeni border?

There was no 'coup' as such by Saleh. He simply sided with Houthis, and this resulted in about 60% of the military following in fashion.

Iran had absolutely nothing to do with this. In total context of this war, the few IRGC/Hezbollah advisors that did train something like two battalions of Ansar Allah - and thus any kind of 'Iranian involvement' - are actually not worth mentioning. Despite all sorts of Saudi and IRGC's PRBS, Houthis are anything but 'Iranian proxies'. I really recommend dropping that thought completely to anybody who wants to understand this war.

What would make Iran find the intervention in Syria costly? Obviously Johnson’s idea of cost differed from Minh’s in the 1960s…

I do not really like to compare different conflicts, but I might make an exception in this case. If there is any experience from the Iran-Iraq War, then the one that the IRGC has no problem with 'endless wars'. Although anything but suicidal - as often, and entirely wrongly described - the IRGC can't care less about losses (on the contrary: the more martyrs the better; it does not care the least about such issues like costs, economic or material damage; it does not care about enemy's superiority in arms and firepower etc. Means, one can't defeat it in classic sense, like through a war of attrition etc. Only though a synergy of multiple effects, a combination of all of them.

That means: one would not only have to defeat it on the battlefield; not only have to cause devastating losses in order to demoralize it; but this would have to be combined with a complete isolation of the country on the international plan, severe damage to the Iranian economy (like through air or missile strikes), and demoralization 'at home', in Iran.

As for Israel, I think it is satisfied that the Sunnis and Shias are killing each other and not fighting the Jewish State.

Sure. But a very short-sighted policy too.

[CrowBat]

Here some 'educated gueswork' if you like, about how the Houthi-Saleh coalition got its Burkan-1 SSMs (or 'Extended Range Scuds'): How Did the Houthis Manage to Lob a Ballistic Missile at#Mecca? Let's do some educated Gueswork

One thing that didn't get through the editing-phase of work on that article is that the attack with which this article was opened, was actually the third deployment of Burak-1 so far:

First launch, aimed at Taif AB, 1-2 September 2016;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLNLQHvgrXI

Second launch, again at Taif AB, 10 October 2016;

Third launch, aimed at Mecca, 27-28 October 2016.

Video showing three Burkan-1s - as officially presented by Houthi-Saleh authorities:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1uCgZjgmBM

Since... well, let's say I 'guess' they've got only 3 Burkan-1s, 'that's it'. I.e. I do not expect them fire any further ones.

[davidbfpo]

A curious NYT report that starts with, with my emphasis:

Photographs recently released by the Australian government show that light anti-armor weapons seized from a smuggling vessel near Yemen’s coast appear to have been manufactured in Iran, further suggesting that Tehran has had a hand in a high-seas gunrunning operation to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
(Then later) The consultancy also documented weapons manufactured by China, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and perhaps in North Korea in seizures from the dhows.The consultancy also did not suggest that the evidence indicated a direct handoff of weapons from the dhows to Houthi forces. Rather, it said, the weapons appear to be offloaded in Somalia and transferred to smaller vessels for smuggling into southern Yemen.

The report is based on a TECHINT report:http://armamentresearch.com/iranian-...iles-in-yemen/ which then was followed up in:http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/salw/...arget-164.html

Link:https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/world/middleeast/yemen-iran-weapons-houthis.html?