The Iran nuclear deal was sold in the “narrowest possible terms” as an arms control agreement, but there were “grander ambitions” behind this well-orchestrated public diplomacy. The reality is that the Iran deal was a facilitation mechanism for a U.S. drawdown in the region. In place of U.S. hegemony would be a self-enforcing concert system. To get there, however, the nuclear issue would have to be neutralized with a paper agreement. Hence, it was Tehran that always seemed to hold the upper-hand in negotiations; the U.S. needed a deal as a gateway to its real ambitions and the Iranians did not.
The real-world consequences of this policy were that the Iranian revolution was granted “equities” that had to be respected—specifically Syria, which meant building a viable alternative to Iran’s proxy regime was off the table—and the U.S.’s Gulf allies were told to find a way to “share” the region—by definition empowering the Islamic Republic, and Russia into the bargain, which moved to underwrite this Iranian sphere of influence, returning to the Middle East after its eviction in the 1970s.
The fall of Aleppo to the pro-Assad coalition is by no stretch of the imagination the end of the war, but the objectives of the Syrian revolutionary forces, which the U.S. claimed were its allies and which allied governments supported, have now been defeated. This means that—whatever Donald Trump’s inclinations—Obama has severely limited the President-elect’s options. One wonders only if Obama takes that as an indictment or a compliment.
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