Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
The British Indian Army was not always a happy place nor an effective combat force. The "Indian Mutiny" notably, albeit when not under Crown control; a small number of mutinies afterwards, such as one IIRC in Singapore in 1916 and the WW2 defections after surrendering to the Japanese to an ostensibly nationalist Indian National Army.

It performed well in very difficult circumstances in France in 1914-1915, through the winter; less well - with some newly formed units - in Malaya when the Japanese landed in 1941. The WW2 4th Indian Infantry Division, earned plaudits:
Link:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_In...vision_(India)
Not always, but usually good enuff for guvmint work.
It is true that the more flamboyant characters (and the tougher victories) were in the EIC army days; the British Indian army was relatively conservative: steady and able to get the basics done without being spectacular... Still, they COULD get it done, even against European powers (they were almost always able to get it done against any non-European power). And while there were a few mutinies as you mention, these were very rare and exceptional events, while there were many examples of units fighting well, even against overwhelming odds (e.g. the Sikhs at SaragaRhi). Though other than Slim's campaign in Burma, there is no example I can think off the top of my head where they conducted a really outstanding large scale offensive campaign. So yes, they were not the German (or the Soviet) army, but they were generally reliable.
I have heard the argument that at least in the 20th century the British Indian army (or even the British army for that matter) lacked offensive elan at the higher levels. And that this carried on to their daughter armies. Actually there are a couple of examples of initiative and elan in the Kashmir war of 1948 (especially General Cariappa's attack to capture Kargil, operation Bison) but in the larger 1965 war both the Pakistani and Indian armies proved inept at large scale operations. In the 1971 war the Indian army's conquest of East Pakistan was spectacular (especially General Sagat Singh's performance in command of 4 corps) but it was also made easier by Niazi's weakness and the total support of the local population against a relatively demoralized and professionally compromised Pakistani army. On the Western front, neither side did much of note (General Iftikhar Janjua's capture of Chamb being a relative exception).