What struck me about this was the necessity to understand the strengths of the forces you are working with and then accentuate them. I have been in too many countries where one of 2 things happens (or sometimes both) in assistance programs (civil and military).

a. we try to build them into a Mini-me look alike. the absolute worst assistance effort I ever saw was not a USAID initiative but was a US Senator directed through USAID program to "give" slightly used Wisconsin dairy cattle (meaning give them the cows but deduct the costs from available monies) to the Egyptians. There were 50 cows and they lasted less than a year (the bill was 6 figure as I recall). The Egyptians were less than pleased; the USAID mission was less than pleased; but the Senator's home state dairy association was overjoyed and wanted to do it again. We do this militarily. We gave the Sudanese 10 M60A3 tanks in the mid80s; the first thing they did was drive one through the wall of their tank shed. A Major whom I respect stopped them from opening all the tool kits, spare parts, etc in the middle of a sandpile only by threatening to cut off future assistance. To this day, I do not understand why we would sell 10 tanks to Sudan; the country had a huge parking lot of Soviet equipment that had been passed down to them from the Egyptians.

b. They want to be a Mini-me; demands for high tech equipment are fueled by a sense of status. The classic for this was Zaire (now DR Congo) and PR Congo(CongoBrazza). The Soviets backed Congo-Brazza and we backed Zaire. The French and the PRC backed both. Billions of dollars went into this effort and produced nothing. I met a Zairian Fighter Jock whose sole claim to fame was that he had pranged 2 fighters and lived though the second crash resulted in some nasty burns. There was an Italian Macchi ground attack bird out at NDjili airfield and one day I noticed it was being pushed from the military side to the civilian side. There it was refueled and then pushed back. I asked my "Maverick" what that was all about. I only knew of one A/C in the Zairian Air Farce that was still flying, a Puma that tended to wag its tail like a dog. He told me not to worry; the jet was inop due to lack of oxygen, charges on the ejection seat, and other faults. The "ground crew" would push it over every few weeks, gas it up, and then push it back so they could then sell the fuel.

c. is of course where we try to clone ourselves and our clones like it. then you can really get into Alice in Wonderland bizarreness.

Our saving grace in the Cold War was that the Soviets did the same damn thing. I would recommend 2 books about this:

Andrew Buckoke, Fishing in Africa, a Guide to War and Corruption and
Mohammed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East

I guess that is what I found so refreshing about the RPA in Rwanda. They valued training over all else but they wanted to make sure it fit their needs. They were realistic in their approach to technology and they were frugal. One of my SF guys told me one night at the Embassy bar, "Sir they can't do push ups for Sh@#. They can't do situps worth a damn either and they don't like to run. But they can walk up the side of a mountain like it's not even there..."

And therein is the real lesson of Lawrence: use the strengths and the proclivities of the locals to suit your ends...

Then again Lawrence was not very popular until he was both out of the British Army and dead.

Best
Tom