Syria in 2017 (January-April)

[OUTLAW 09]

CSIS Panel: Russia's Intervention in Syria: Lessons Learned (January 13, 2017)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtCYXk9R95I

Panelists:

1. Ruslan Pukhov – Director, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow
2. Michael Kofman – Global Fellow, Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.

On Russia’s adventure in Syria

Pukhov:

• The Russian Navy has undergone “Kalibr-zation” given that the use of sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles was deemed a major success
• Rather than relying upon elite pilots, the Russian Air Force has rotated as many pilots as possible (50%) to Syria for training and experience
• Collateral damage has been caused by the fact that Russian bombs, both smart and dumb, are too heavy (500 lbs or more)
• Basically, Russia will take a second look at the US SDB and smaller ordnance for urban situations
• There was also difficulty hitting moving targets from the air, and often pilots had to simply ignore them
• A major problem has been a lack of targeting intelligence, which apparently plagued France and Italy during Operation Odyssey Dawn
• Initially, the Russians relied upon Israeli targeting intelligence and then sourced it from Iran
• Russia is very concerned about the challenged posed by “lean and mean” air forces such as those fielded by Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands
• Overall, the Russians assess that their use of PGMs/smart weapons is on par with Operation Desert Storm, and they recognize that they are 20-years behind
• Russia relied upon Israeli-supplied UAVs, but US pressure has cut off that supply
• The Wagner Group is not a PMC “in the Western sense”, but a “hybrid” organization channeling “people outside of the regular military who wish to fight”
• Russia has had no experience working with allies, and coordinating with the Syrians, Iranians and Iraqis (he specifically mentions Hezbollah and Quds) was “invaluable”

Kofman:

• Very few PGMs were used, and those that were weren’t precise
• The SVP-24 only improves accuracy at low altitudes, but MANPADs forced the Russians to fly at medium or high altitudes
• Primarily, Russia is relying upon 1950s-era dumb bombs, even from the Tu-22s which were launched with only a 25% loadout
• There were no accidents with the fixed-wing assets of the air force, but various helicopters “fell out of the sky”, especially the Mi-28
• 3-4 Russian naval aircraft were lost off the Kuznetsov
• The “Syrian Express” relied upon LSTs 25-50-years old, but bringing in commercial transport was a useful adaptation
• 50-100 Russians were killed who were part of PMCs, including Wagner
• Russia still lacks domestic UAV capabilities
• Russia was able to produce sortie rates on par with the US-led coalition in Iraq and Syria
• “What percentage of the time did the Russian Air Force actually know what it was hitting? That’s very debatable…”
• The breakdown of allied coordination at Palmyra was embarrassing as was the diplomatic furor over the brief use of Iran’s Hamadan Air Base. However, working with allies is difficult even if they speak the same language and use similar equipment

Other Comments of Interest

Pukhov:

• Russia’s main lessons have been learned in Ukraine not Syria
• Russia undertook “5 waves of mobilization” to intervene in Ukraine, and the poor results necessitated changing the structure of the army (e.g. the reactivated divisions)
• The “return of Crimea” was a return to normalcy ("macro-historical norm")
• The desire of Yeltsin and then Putin initially for Russia to be a partner of the West was an aberration, which the Americans dismissed out of hand (especially Robert Gates, who Pukhov had admired)
• “Putin’s speech at Munich in 2007 was a cry from the soul…he said in 2001 why not be in NATO? He thought the same as Yeltsin, but thought that he could do it smarter and better…”
• “Kaliningrad was largely de-militarized and our main concern was Islamism in Algeria…”
• Now, Kaliningrad is militarized, and Russia fears regime change from the West and to a lesser extent conflict with Japan over the Kuriles or with China, however, there is a bias toward the European theater

Kofman:

• “Ranking the order of threats to Russia from their perspective: 1. Ukraine, 2. NATO…it will be over Belarus…it’s not the Baltics…Russia cares about Belarus…3. Central Asia…all of the best commanders are in Central Asia, so that tells you something, and they all make it to the top of the general staff…4. the Pacific…the US and Japan…but Russia assumes that this would be the horizontal movement of a conflict that started in Europe…”

Pukhov:...he is actually wrong.......the French and Italians had not a single issue with targeting...in fact the core problem was ...eventually a lack of targets forcing tanks to become targets.....and then drones were largely used and one drone was credited for killing a SAM 8 site....