Look at the battlefields in Ukraine and you will find what was essentially an unreformed 1980s Soviet Army (Ukraine’s), engaged in artillery and tank duels against a proxy force that Russia supplied with comparable 1980s Soviet equipment. Indeed, in the early phases of the conflict when Moscow sought to retain the veneer of deniability, they supplied only that which could be plausibly captured from Ukrainian forces. Actual Russian forces use capabilities that are head and shoulders above what Ukraine is able to field. The Russian approach has been to supplement proxy forces with regular units as necessary, and to the minimum extent possible...
...In Ukraine, the Kremlin was seemingly attempting the ridiculous, trying to use a tiny amount of force to regain a say over the strategic orientation of the largest country in Europe. Russia lacked the force, the money, and the military experience to attempt any large-scale operation. Yet, they coerced Kiev into giving up Crimea without a fight. Later, Moscow got Kiev to sign the Minsk agreements which locked them into Russian terms for settling the conflict. Russia did even better with Washington, often convincing prominent Hill leaders like Sen. John McCain and the op-ed commentariat that a large military campaign was in the offing to establish a “land bridge to Crimea.”
Every few months, the newspapers still ring with expectations of a Russian offensive. Like Pavlovian conditioning, Russia barely has to move a few units around and watch a Western media fueled panic. Moscow has trained the West so well that if every Russian soldier were to depart Ukraine, or Syria, there would be immediate concern that it is only to invade elsewhere (perhaps a “land bridge to Kaliningrad”).
It would be fair to observe that since the signing of Minsk II, the politics have bogged down, and Russia’s coercive credibility has slowly faded. Ukraine’s confidence on the battlefield seems to support this perspective. Nobody has established sufficient leverage over anyone in that conflict. Moscow appears to be playing a waiting game in Ukraine, eroding Kiev’s support among Western countries. Still, if Minsk II continues to go nowhere, it is quite probable that Russia will reapply a brief but hefty dose of force this year...
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