Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
A best guess based on expertise and experience rather than actual analysis. The Joint Staff, the services and the combatant commands have sophisticated force requirement models and methodologies which they used. Shinseki just came up with a figure based on his expertise and experience.

The question is: Why why did these processes generate force requirements that we now know were wrong? It all comes down to assumptions--the most fragile part of any strategy. To over simplify, administration officials forced CENTCOM to accept assumptions such as a benign environment once the regime was removed, acceptance by the Iraqis of the emigre leaders like Chalabi, international support, etc.

Having spent much of the last four years looking at Iraq decisionmaking, I break the culprits down into two categories: the actual architects of disaster, (Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Feith, and, of course, the President), and the passive contributors--those who could have stopped it but didn't (Powell, Rice, Meyers, and Franks).
Well said. A great paper or book there.
To bring Ricks back into it, I think he was correct in stating that the threat from Iraq was presented with a worst case scenario, and what it would take to fix the problem was presented with a best case scenario. The fact that Shinseki could be wildly ON the mark with just an experienced guess, compared with all of the analysis coming from everyone else, is truly embarrassing.