Syria in 2017 (April-December)

[Azor]

The following testimony was presented to the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 27, 2017, by Charles Lister

http://www.mei.edu/content/article/t...policy-options

Selected excerpts and my comments - Part 1/2:

Whereas the U.S. decision not to act in August 2013 was justified at the time by a Russian-facilitated deal to remove and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, events in Khan Sheikhoun demonstrated starkly that that deal had been a ruse. Israeli intelligence now assesses that Bashar al-Assad has secretly retained at least three tons of Sarin nerve agent, enough to kill many thousands more people, should he choose to do so. This was not much of a secret. Officials in the U.S. government and all of our principal allies have known as much for years.

In August 2013, Assad had at least 1,000 tons of chemical weapons, including several hundred of Sarin. According to the DOD (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42848.pdf), securing Assad’s stockpiles by force would have required the deployment of up to 75,000 soldiers, including thousands of regular and special forces on the ground in Syria, and an air and naval campaign far larger than the 60 aircraft and 7 ships required for Operation Odyssey Dawn in 2011. Not only did the 2013 “Framework” destroy or remove nearly all of Assad’s CWs, it dismantled their infrastructure and delivery systems. The deal prevented Assad’s formidable arsenal from being transferred to Hezbollah for use against Israel, or falling under Al Qaeda or Daesh control, which U.S. military intervention may not have been able to achieve. Unfortunately, the deal ensured Assad’s survival and continued war against his own citizens, with increased Iranian and Russian support.

The Syrian crisis is immensely complicated – I have spent virtually every single day since March 2011 trying my best to understand it. Despite this very clear complexity, one thing ought to be simple: the continued presence of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus as Syria’s self-proclaimed President does not promise any semblance of hope for the country’s future…the single biggest push and pull factor for both Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria, is the Assad regime’s continued survival and the brutal violence it unleashes upon its people.

I agree. Yet behind Assad is Iran, much as Iran was behind Maliki’s efforts to marginalize the Sunni Arabs of Iraq. Therefore, we arrive at the second humanitarian compromise in order to minimize the threat of WMDs: permitting Iran to pursue a sectarian war in Iraq and Syria in return for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

In April 2017, the Assad regime finds itself sat more comfortably in Damascus than at any point since the start of the crisis in the Spring of 2011. Its use of banned chemical weapons a few weeks ago is almost certainly a result of that confidence.

I doubt Assad is comfortable, as he sits only at the pleasure of Teheran, whose calculus may well change. His recent use of Sarin was an unambiguous test of the new U.S. administration’s interest in Syria and resolve.

It is also important not to forget history. To claim that Bashar al-Assad was never our enemy would be to brush over his extraordinary and widely documented role in empowering ISIS’s predecessor movements in Iraq, who fought against and killed American soldiers for years on end.

This is in addition to Syria’s invasions of Israel and Lebanon, ties to U.S. adversaries Iran and North Korea, support for designated terrorist group Hezbollah, and attempt to develop nuclear weapons.

So what now? Clearly the status quo is not working…Major foreign intervention in search of regime change, however, carries far too many risks and promises only further chaos. What is needed is a policy that sits in-between. Determined U.S. leadership backed up by the credible and now proven threat of force presents the best opportunity in years to strong-arm actors on the ground into a phase of meaningful de-escalation, out of which eventually, a durable negotiation process may result.

Specifics will be needed. Is the U.S. supposed to partition the country into ethnic and sectarian enclaves and then use force to prevent one group from aggressing against another? What about the mixed areas on the frontlines? Should the U.S. be neutral except where Al Qaeda and Daesh are concerned, but ignore the foreign Shia mercenaries marauding on behalf of Assad? How can the U.S. ensure compliance from Iran and Russia? Currently, the regime is determined to reconquer the country, despite being reliant upon foreign funding, manpower and materiel to do so. How can its calculus be changed without changing the regime itself?

More punitive military strikes and other assertive acts of diplomacy will be inevitable, but if anything is now clear, it is that the U.S. has more freedom of action in Syria than the Obama administration was ever willing to admit. Opponents of limited U.S. intervention who have long and confidently pronounced the inevitability of conflict with Russia are now faced with the reality that Moscow failed to lift a finger when American missiles careered toward Assad regime targets. This is not to suggest that Russia plans to sit back and watch the United States threaten or undermine its proxy, Assad.

Exactly. Moscow will tolerate a slap on the wrist that does not materially alter the balance of forces, but not a decapitating blow.

Beyond Russia though, Iran is arguably a far greater challenge and obstacle to progress…Keeping Assad in place also secures Iranian hegemony through Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut and into the Palestinian Territories. Beyond being a great victory for Iran, that also represents a major defeat to American interests and influence in the region. It also risks inflaming further, existing great power competition involving Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Agreed.

Russia’s intervention in Syria saved Assad from possible defeat, that is clear. However, the more secure Assad feels, the less he appears restrained by Russian instruction. In other words, Russia’s leverage over Assad may be declining…As one prominent Russian in Moscow recently told me in Europe, even Russia’s own Spetsnaz special forces have come to respect one such Iran-backed terrorist group — Hezbollah — more than the Syrian Army itself.

Russia is likely interested in a negotiated settlement and a partitioned country with a “frozen conflict”, whereas Iran is determined to secure total victory over every inch of Syria.

As things stand today, Syria can be divided up into dozens of semi-contained conflicts, every one of which is individually unique. Assad may be more secure than ever, but he is a very long way from a full territorial re-conquest of his country. That objective may take a decade, or not even be possible at all. Despite this dissolution into multiple conflicts, the solution to Syria is not to be found in partition. In fact, that is one of the only issues that the opposition and the regime currently agree on. Despite the intensity and complexity of conflict, Syrians on both sides of the conflict still share a shared sense of Syrian identity. Although hard to see through the bullets and gas, this is a crucially important realization. Syria’s non-jihadist opposition, as varied, complicated and imperfect as it is, remains a force of 80,000-100,000 heavily-armed men. A substantial majority of these men, and their sons, are not considering giving up their struggle anytime soon. That is also a crucially important realization. It will only be by addressing these kinds of realities that we will begin to define a meaningful policy.

They may not have a choice. The Sunni Arab majority will not accept minority Alawi rule; neither will the Alawis, Christians and Druze accept a possible tyranny of the majority by way of democracy (such as in Iraq). Moreover, the Kurds are not about to surrender a de facto independent Rojava, which ideology aside is not dissimilar to Iraq’s KAR.