Firstly, the fears that Trump would cut off support for the FSA (the CIA’s Operation Timber Sycamore) and give Russia a freer hand in Syria have not materialized. Russian intervention has continued at the same level as during the Obama Administration, and certainly Trump is much more willing to confront Iran and its auxiliaries than his predecessor. Even were the CIA to withdraw support for the FSA, the lack of involvement and oversight may then permit unfettered support from Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Secondly, Trump has attacked Assad for using Sarin and this week attacked a pro-Assad convoy to protect a FSA unit. No such U.S. activity against pro-Assad forces occurred from 2011 through 2016. Thus far, Trump’s election is a net benefit to the FSA when compared to Obama’s tenure. It is no doubt less than ideal for the FSA, but it is a major improvement.

Thirdly, Trump inherited U.S. cooperation with the PKK from his predecessor. As Aaron Stein at the Atlantic Council recently noted:

This [Turkish] plan was never feasible. The Turkish feeder program has not generated enough forces to take Raqqa, while Ankara’s proposed contribution was viewed with skepticism inside the coalition.

In reality, the Trump administration had the option to siege and take Raqqa with more U.S. conventional forces, or to undertake a much broader effort to train and equip a rival force from Syrian Arabs. Either of these two options could have helped to address Turkish concerns.

However, it would have slowed the campaign against the Islamic State and would have gone against the advice of the commanders on the ground. The slowing of the campaign would also contradict Trump’s own campaign pledge to speed up the war against ISIS. Therefore, the outcome was all but predetermined, with the SDF serving as the only capable ground force currently ready to fight ISIL in an urban environment. All that was needed was to grant the authorities to arm the YPG.
Overall, we are witnessing the same policies with some positive incremental changes. I say incremental because I did not find the punitive strike in response to the Sarin attack to be a major deviation. Had Assad used Sarin in 2016 or with a Clinton Administration, he would have probably been punished in a similar fashion.

There will never be a "war to end all wars". Using the PKK as a tool to defeat Daesh as a conventional force will not end the Sunni Arab insurgency, and will likely inflame Kurdish conflicts with Turkey, Iran and Syria. Whether Syria continues to be under minority Alawi rule or whether it comes under majority Sunni Arab rule, the Syrian government and the breakaway region of Rojava will come to blows. Whereas no-fly, no-drive and Turkish approval created a de facto independent Kurdish statelet in northern Iraq, a repetition will not be possible in northern Syria.