While a national debate regarding strategic direction is certainly required—and long overdue—such a debate cannot really exist without first conducting serious discussions regarding the desired end state vis à vis Iraq. All talk of strategic options prior to the determination of political goals is not only premature; it is counterproductive. Any meaningful debate of strategy is essentially amorphous since there is nothing of substance on which it can adequately focus. Current discussions regarding proposed strategic directions are only appropriate if the political aims as identified in the White House’s NSVI remain unchanged. However, discussions regarding the continued viability of those objectives have been completely overshadowed by discourse that has focused almost exclusively on strategy.
Not pedantic at all. The issue of objective or end state has always been at the forefront. The difficulty of course is that the end state has shifted repeatedly--and not in a linear fashion. WMD containment to democracy is quantum. The problem in the current debate is that we are trying to generate a strategy that rests on a fundamental assumption: that the Iraqis are a people who are willing to set aside sectarian and tribal goals and motivations in favor of greater national objectives, like those you listed in your post. So far that assumption has proved wishful.

Best

Tom