"How do you think Strykers get where they need to be? They need a secure airfield. One of the METL missions for both the 82nd and 75 Ranger Regiment is airfield seizure. It gives us the inherent ability to use any airfield out there for our own logistical resupply."

An airfield secured by a battalion or brigade is no logistical hub in conventional war as it's easily in range of artillery. There's no way how paratroopers could control a 80+ km diameter circle around the airfield.
If otherwise the threat isn't that bad, it doesn't need a whole division at all, a couple of companies could seize an airfield until air-deployable reinforcements arrive. The lack of a need for large airborne unit deployment was part of the topic here.

"How is the Caesar going to be more efficent logistically than the HIMARS? The HIMARS is on a common chassis to other vehicles in the Army inventory. The Caesar is not. I doubt the artillery community would want the Caesar if the rounds were different, so the logistical footprint for the Caesar would be about the same as it would for the HIMARS. I'm not sure where you figured this one out."

Rocket artillery is generally less efficient in logistical terms than guns of comparable sophistication. The physics of the propellant are inherently less efficient concerning volume and weight. 155mm munition + propellant provides more firepower per ton than MLRS sixpacks do.
The responsiveness to different missions (different munitions) is also better, and accuracy is better for unguided munitions. Minimum range is smaller.
I meant this for the 30 km range, without BB or RAP.
By the way, Caesar uses standard NATO 155mm calibre, compatible to M777.
Finally, I mentioned Caesar as an example. It's a quite simple job of a couple of weeks to adapt the system to another 6x6 truck.

"Speaking as someone who's commanded in combat, I'm skeptical of those who wish to handcuff a ground commander by taking away his indirect fire support."

Well, there are still mortars. A larger quantity of incomparably lighter 120mm mortars is less prone to be the victim of Murphy's law in airborne operations than few heavy guns that don't outrange enemy artillery anyway, are as unable to shoot & scoot as the mortars and generally less responsive to battalion's needs than organic mortars (especially in disorderly operations such as airborne operations were in history).
I've seen the M777. It's a stupid design for a division that would in case of an airborne operation need 360° coverage. Even old D-30's and gun models of the mid to late 40's are better in that regard.


It's interesting to see this repeating pattern everywhere. Uniformed personnel of armies that hadn't to fight first-grade enemies for decades tend to be really confident in their army's capabilities and proficiency (even when it's failing in the meantime and despite in a clash between two first-grade armies there can only be one superior).
The French general in charge of an infantry division at Sedan in may 1940 was very confident in his troops and dismissed the remarks of a shocked congressman as layman's incompetence, for example. Just a few days later his division was routed by an attack that didn't involve much more than air attacks and a regiment crossing the river with force.
Such stories are available on a scale that cannot be considered as anecdotical anymore.
Being inside is no guarantee for always knowing better. It only offers a better information base.

Heck, I've even encountered Swiss soldiers that thought their army was up to date and combat experienced just because of some peacekeepers somewhere.