Setting up effective, local security forces

[davidbfpo]

I only rarely catch Modern War Institute @ West Point articles, but this one aroused my interest. As the opening passage says:

The United States has invested more than $100 billion in training and equipping security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past sixteen years. The result? ISIS swiftly defeated the Iraqi Army in 2014, securing large swaths of land, and requiring international intervention. Since the US presence began decreasing in Afghanistan in 2015, the Taliban have steadily forced the Afghan Security Forces out of rural areas, gaining control of vast portions of the country. An additional 3,500 US service members will soon be en route to reverse this trend. The $100 billion spent to date is a milestone, not a final bill.

It lists five lessons:

Lesson 1 – Effective advisory missions rely on high-caliber, well-trained, and committed individuals who demonstrate competence as advisors; furthermore, the advisory mission must endure long enough to ensure success.
Lesson 2 – The advisory force cannot be general purpose—it must be tailored for the specific environment into which it will deploy.
Lesson 3 – The highest degree of competence and effectiveness that an advised force can achieve when operating independently is better than any level of readiness that relies on US assets (to a degree).
Lesson 4 – On a larger scale, the advisory mission cannot rely solely on military and security forces.
Lesson 5 – Like all military endeavors, the advisory mission must be undertaken with a clear objective in mind, with consistent and reasonable intermediate metrics to determine effectiveness over time.

Link:https://mwi.usma.edu/fourth-time-cha...rations-right/

Elsewhere on SWJ Blog there is an article on Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and the MWI article asks:

The current evolution of the SFAB generally marks the fourth attempt at tackling the advise-and-assist mission set since the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fir...in-four-months

[JHR]

The current issue (10/17) of the Marine Corps Gazette has an article pertinent to the West Point study. The Godfather Doctrine by LtCol. Douglas Luccio calls for more organized and committed security force assistance training including generating a publication similar to The Small Wars Manual, updated and focused on today's conflict locations.

[davidbfpo]

The current issue (10/17) of the Marine Corps Gazette has an article pertinent to the West Point study. The Godfather Doctrine by LtCol. Douglas Luccio calls for more organized and committed security force assistance training including generating a publication similar to The Small Wars Manual, updated and focused on today's conflict locations.

The article cited in the Gazette is behind a registration / payment wall, but an earlier edition (29 pgs.) is available via:http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1037564

[davidbfpo]

An excerpt from a book and here is a "taster":

Yet the U.S. track record for building militaries in fragile states is uneven at best. The United States generally approaches the problem of building militaries in fragile states by emphasizing training and equipment, and by distancing itself from key political issues. This method wastes time, effort, and resources. Examples spanning Europe, Asia, and the Middle East illustrate the flaws in the traditional way of working with foreign militaries.

Link:https://taskandpurpose.com/book-exce...challenges-us/

Curious that one example is the success in Greece post-1945, which is rarely covered and IIRC there is a thread in the Historians arena. It is on the insurgency, not n the US mission:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2463

No reviews yet:https://www.amazon.com/Building-Mili...ds=mara+karlin

[davidbfpo]

Another set of lessons and memories from an Australian team on a visit to a Papua New Guinea infantry battalion, which is not only long established they are allies and friends - so no "over watch" needed.

There is a short blog from the team IC, which ends with:

I would follow the same principles – being a good human – and make sure I take the best possible team, but being adaptive and flexible is part of the journey. It’s the personal relationships that allowed us to be responsive. It was being humble and respectful that ensured my Team earned equal respect and allowed us to support our regional partner, to crouch down side by side, and help achieve their missions and their goals, and share their successes.

Link:https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/a...out-mentoring/

Plus a longer report (sixteen pgs):

with more detail about the exercise, and views from a number of members of the Mentoring Training Team. Importantly, the report includes tips and advice from some of the more junior members of the team.

Link:https://www.cove.org.au/wp-content/u...New-Guinea.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Not sure what to make of this. It is a short Q&A with the brigadier that mainly concerns leadership and selection.
Link:https://thearmyleader.co.uk/speciali...ry-leadership/

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to MWI @ West Point for the pointer to this article in JFQ and from MWI's pointer:

This highlights a substantial problem with Western SFA: it is too focused on building an army in the absence of a viable state that has the institutional capacity and political willpower to sustain that army.

Link:https://mwi.usma.edu/cant-build-army...ce-assistance/

Link to JFQ:https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/...gdp0w4FR7UKGk/

[davidbfpo]

A small number of threads, many stand alone posts, have been merged here. Several threads refer to the theme, but have been left alone.