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A few thoughts on developments in Kurdistan this week:


  • 1. Collapse of Peshmerga took many by surprise. It shouldnt. Yes Kurds claim Kirkuk as their Jerusalem
  • But Kirkuk and other disputed territories remain deeply divided and contested among various ethnic and religious groups
  • It matters if you are fighting to defend your home or not. It's the same story as with the “Iraqi army” defending Mosul in 2014
  • Simply put: tribal troops don’t fight well outside their tribal areas, which brings me to the second point



  • 2. The performance of the Peshmerga & Kurds in general since 03 has blinded many to the weakness of modernity & strength of tribal identity
  • Same blindness is evident when scholars approach Egypt. Blinded by the superficial modernity, they think Egypt is different from region.
  • They assume it is a modern state and that sub-national identities don't matter dismissing tribal and family frameworks
  • I am happy to repeat this a million times until it gets through. The region, all of it, is just Tribes with Flags.
  • In Kurds case, they arent even one tribe. Not disputing Kurdish nationalism. If someone identifies as a Kurd, who am I to tell him otherwise
  • But Kurdistan is a deeply divided society even beyond KDP/PUK divide. You can’t build a state with 10 different militias.
  • Just as intra Arab fights were more powerful than fight with Israel, intra Kurdish fights more important than Kurd vs. Arab



  • 3. People have assumed that the Kurds have learned from history. They have. They built a better place than rest of Iraq after 2003
  • There was some attempt at nation building, investment in education, but internal divides that plagued Kurdish history still same.
  • It's easy to dismiss this as x betrayed y, or cast blame on one of the militia leaders, but this is beyond individual choices



  • 4. Kurds & especially KDP have miserably failed to read DC. It's remarkable how this happened despite contacts with official & unofficial DC
  • Yes, many in the US appreciate the role Kurds have played, but that is not a policy, its feelings.
  • The US is committed by its very nature to existing states in the region. It's a long discussion why this is the case, but its not surprising



  • 5. The time to get a deal was in 2014 when the US was most desperate. Assuming that the US will appreciate anti ISIS role is meaningless
  • I am reminded of a story about Sadat expecting Kissinger to reward him for kicking out Soviet advisers.
  • Kissinger's reaction was why should I reward him for something he did for free. Had he offered it before he would have gotten a deal.



  • 6. Kurdish actions in the disputed territories hardly encouraged non-Kurds to throw their lot with them
  • attempts to control Christian and Yazidi villages, appoint new mayors and leaders reminded everyone of historical examples



  • 7. The "Iraqi government" may think it has won, and it certainly did this round, but the sight of Kurds fleeing tells you all you need
  • The idea of an Iraq was never a serious one & nothing that happened this week strengthens that idea



  • 8. Assyrians that I know are divided. Half are cheering & half crying. I don't blame them. I wouldn't want to be in their shoes.
  • But Assyrians thinking Shia militias are their savior will get bugged by reality soon, just as those who thought Kurdish militias were
  • In both cases, the small minorities have made same mistake as Kurds: failed to cut a deal when the time was right & expect to be rewarded