Controversial article about parachute operations

[jcustis]

I'll also offer up what I picked up from a Corporal in the 3d Royal Australian Regiment just a week ago while participating in Exercise Talisman Saber 07. His company performed a twilight jump of 60+ troops into a DZ opposed by LAR Marines I was OCing for. We crossed paths at the end of ex and he stated that the jump would have been larger, but the remainder of his already understrength company (roughly 50 folks) were either injured from previous training or transferring.

Morale of the story is that a Golden Knight can do many things, but once loaded down with a fighting load, pack, weapon, and reserve chute, the physics of a controlled fall from the sky change drastically.

[Rifleman]

But what astonishes me is that here and in another forum a couple of days ago the people focused so much on the rooftop landing stuff and largely ignored the assertion that division-sized air assaults are quite illusionary.

I mean that this assertion is more worth a debate and that such a debate would be much more interesting.

Lastdingo,

That may be true but remember that the U.S. dropped six infantry battalions, plus support, - three ranger battalions and a brigade combat team from the 82nd Airborne Division - in the Panama operation.

That the Panama operation might have been successful without a large airborne operation is irrelevant, I think. A large night mass tactical drop was the best way for a rapid buildup of combat power.

I didn't agree with about 90% of Meyer's article. The one part I did find interesting was his idea of small scale tactical airborne operations - something akin to fireforce operations, if you will. Most of the world isn't Rhodesia, so it won't be feasible in many areas. But then again it might in some. And rough terrain jump gear, unlike rooftop landings, is probably not beyond the capability of a basic parachutist.

[Lastdingo]

OK, I buy it that the diversion effect of large-scale airborne capabilities is useful in conventional war. The enemy needs to keep reserves far to the rear.
That's not exactly what you want him t do when you intend to do some old school maneuver warfare, but in other cases it's desirable.

The other point that many seem to raise is the deployability by air and the virtue of having a brigade ready for immediate deployment to everywhere.

Well, that's not a requirement that only an airborne (sorry about mixing the terminology, wouldn't have happened in my native language) can fulfill. 101st and 10th should be able to do that as well. It was even quite what was proposed in the Stryker brigade concept.
Anyway, 82nd is still ill-prepared forf that role as far as I know for it lacks foreign language negotiation capabilities and heavy weapons for both irregular as well as regular warfare missions immediately after deployment.
Operations in english or spanisch speaking countries with ill-equipped/ill-trained opponents are within its abilities (basically carribbean adventures).
Again, as far as I know.

Well, my own feeling about airborne forces is that they should prepare for airborne operations of battalion to slightly smaller than brigade sizes. They should not have heavy weapons like M777 in such actions as air support should be assured if you were able to use transport planes in the first place. Quick reinforcement with heavy or air deployable units should always be assured.

The other orientation that I'd propose is being especially proficient in forest and urban combat. They could be added as motorized units to heavy divisions which certainly lack infantry component in several possible terrain types.

Finally, they could be used as air-deployable forces (as well as other forces should be air-deployable to a really high degree, up to two divisions overall in the case of the USA, imho). In that case, they can make good use of an air-deployable but not airborne support element. Artillery like truck-mounted Caesar, for example (not HIMARS because of its logistical inefficiency). This would be the classical tripwire and ally reassurance mission, or without much fire support a very quick reaction force for cases like Rwanda genocide.

[jcustis]

The other orientation that I'd propose is being especially proficient in forest and urban combat. They could be added as motorized units to heavy divisions which certainly lack infantry component in several possible terrain types.

Do you realize that when the 1st Marine Division went back into Iraq in 2004, that it relieved the 82nd AB in Al Anbar, where they had been operating for some time without parachutes?

[Lastdingo]

Do you realize that when the 1st Marine Division went back into Iraq in 2004, that it relieved the 82nd AB in Al Anbar, where they had been operating for some time without parachutes?

I know that 82nd was used several times in the Iraq occupation as normal infantry division, but fail to understand why you mention that.

[RTK]

OK, I buy it that the diversion effect of large-scale airborne capabilities is useful in conventional war. The enemy needs to keep reserves far to the rear.
That's not exactly what you want him t do when you intend to do some old school maneuver warfare, but in other cases it's desirable.

If I plan within the enemy's capability without him afforded an airborne option, then I can more easily mass forces where I expect him to operate. Airborne operations can take place anywhere, even thick jungle. My operational and intelligence estimates are then out the window.

Well, that's not a requirement that only an airborne (sorry about mixing the terminology, wouldn't have happened in my native language) can fulfill. 101st and 10th should be able to do that as well. It was even quite what was proposed in the Stryker brigade concept.

How do you think Strykers get where they need to be? They need a secure airfield. One of the METL missions for both the 82nd and 75 Ranger Regiment is airfield seizure. It gives us the inherent ability to use any airfield out there for our own logistical resupply.

Anyway, 82nd is still ill-prepared forf that role as far as I know for it lacks foreign language negotiation capabilities and heavy weapons for both irregular as well as regular warfare missions immediately after deployment.
Operations in english or spanisch speaking countries with ill-equipped/ill-trained opponents are within its abilities (basically carribbean adventures).
Again, as far as I know.

Look, I'm not going to give you lessons in economics. Please extend me the same courtesy in my trade. You don't need to know the operational limitations or strengths of our Divisions. They're perfectly capable. Thanks for your concern.

Well, my own feeling about airborne forces is that they should prepare for airborne operations of battalion to slightly smaller than brigade sizes. They should not have heavy weapons like M777 in such actions as air support should be assured if you were able to use transport planes in the first place. Quick reinforcement with heavy or air deployable units should always be assured.

Speaking as someone who's commanded in combat, I'm skeptical of those who wish to handcuff a ground commander by taking away his indirect fire support. Especially someone who doesn't have to do my job. Your last name isn't Kennedy, is it?

The other orientation that I'd propose is being especially proficient in forest and urban combat. They could be added as motorized units to heavy divisions which certainly lack infantry component in several possible terrain types.

We've got people that do this. No one who has worked with the 82nd will question their abilities in urban combat.

Finally, they could be used as air-deployable forces (as well as other forces should be air-deployable to a really high degree, up to two divisions overall in the case of the USA, imho). In that case, they can make good use of an air-deployable but not airborne support element. Artillery like truck-mounted Caesar, for example (not HIMARS because of its logistical inefficiency). This would be the classical tripwire and ally reassurance mission, or without much fire support a very quick reaction force for cases like Rwanda genocide.

How is the Caesar going to be more efficent logistically than the HIMARS? The HIMARS is on a common chassis to other vehicles in the Army inventory. The Caesar is not. I doubt the artillery community would want the Caesar if the rounds were different, so the logistical footprint for the Caesar would be about the same as it would for the HIMARS. I'm not sure where you figured this one out.

[Lastdingo]

"How do you think Strykers get where they need to be? They need a secure airfield. One of the METL missions for both the 82nd and 75 Ranger Regiment is airfield seizure. It gives us the inherent ability to use any airfield out there for our own logistical resupply."

An airfield secured by a battalion or brigade is no logistical hub in conventional war as it's easily in range of artillery. There's no way how paratroopers could control a 80+ km diameter circle around the airfield.
If otherwise the threat isn't that bad, it doesn't need a whole division at all, a couple of companies could seize an airfield until air-deployable reinforcements arrive. The lack of a need for large airborne unit deployment was part of the topic here.

"How is the Caesar going to be more efficent logistically than the HIMARS? The HIMARS is on a common chassis to other vehicles in the Army inventory. The Caesar is not. I doubt the artillery community would want the Caesar if the rounds were different, so the logistical footprint for the Caesar would be about the same as it would for the HIMARS. I'm not sure where you figured this one out."

Rocket artillery is generally less efficient in logistical terms than guns of comparable sophistication. The physics of the propellant are inherently less efficient concerning volume and weight. 155mm munition + propellant provides more firepower per ton than MLRS sixpacks do.
The responsiveness to different missions (different munitions) is also better, and accuracy is better for unguided munitions. Minimum range is smaller.
I meant this for the 30 km range, without BB or RAP.
By the way, Caesar uses standard NATO 155mm calibre, compatible to M777.
Finally, I mentioned Caesar as an example. It's a quite simple job of a couple of weeks to adapt the system to another 6x6 truck.

"Speaking as someone who's commanded in combat, I'm skeptical of those who wish to handcuff a ground commander by taking away his indirect fire support."

Well, there are still mortars. A larger quantity of incomparably lighter 120mm mortars is less prone to be the victim of Murphy's law in airborne operations than few heavy guns that don't outrange enemy artillery anyway, are as unable to shoot & scoot as the mortars and generally less responsive to battalion's needs than organic mortars (especially in disorderly operations such as airborne operations were in history).
I've seen the M777. It's a stupid design for a division that would in case of an airborne operation need 360° coverage. Even old D-30's and gun models of the mid to late 40's are better in that regard.


It's interesting to see this repeating pattern everywhere. Uniformed personnel of armies that hadn't to fight first-grade enemies for decades tend to be really confident in their army's capabilities and proficiency (even when it's failing in the meantime and despite in a clash between two first-grade armies there can only be one superior).
The French general in charge of an infantry division at Sedan in may 1940 was very confident in his troops and dismissed the remarks of a shocked congressman as layman's incompetence, for example. Just a few days later his division was routed by an attack that didn't involve much more than air attacks and a regiment crossing the river with force.
Such stories are available on a scale that cannot be considered as anecdotical anymore.
Being inside is no guarantee for always knowing better. It only offers a better information base.

Heck, I've even encountered Swiss soldiers that thought their army was up to date and combat experienced just because of some peacekeepers somewhere.

[RTK]

An airfield secured by a battalion or brigade is no logistical hub in conventional war as it's easily in range of artillery. There's no way how paratroopers could control a 80+ km diameter circle around the airfield.
If otherwise the threat isn't that bad, it doesn't need a whole division at all, a couple of companies could seize an airfield until air-deployable reinforcements arrive. The lack of a need for large airborne unit deployment was part of the topic here.

It's called a foothold. It's a basic principle of warfare. And why would they have to secure 80km? We don't need runways that long. Fundamentals of reconnaissance and security in addition to engagement area development would never necessitate something like that. Again, if this is one of the large sticking points, revist the two or three posts about maintaining a readily deployable Brigade sized element 24/7/365 over a period of years. This argument is pointless. It's much the same as saying the Marines don't need a capability for beachhead operations anymore.

It's a quite simple job of a couple of weeks to adapt the system to another 6x6 truck.

With the politics involved in aquisitions I'm fully confident the Army could drag that process out at least a year or two.

Well, there are still mortars. A larger quantity of incomparably lighter 120mm mortars is less prone to be the victim of Murphy's law in airborne operations than few heavy guns that don't outrange enemy artillery anyway, are as unable to shoot & scoot as the mortars and generally less responsive to battalion's needs than organic mortars (especially in disorderly operations such as airborne operations were in history).

A 120mm mortar system is exactly easy to breakdown in the dismounted mode. Remember that the artillery pieces in the Airborne aren't dragged around the battlefield by 15 soldiers hooked up to it like pack mules. And you're restricted by the amount of round you carry around. I'm not going to build my indirect fire plan around that for a prolonged period.

I've seen the M777. It's a stupid design for a division that would in case of an airborne operation need 360° coverage. Even old D-30's and gun models of the mid to late 40's are better in that regard.

I'd agree, if we were dumb enough to point them all the same direction. Have you ever seen a well trained light artillery battery shoot gunnery?

It's interesting to see this repeating pattern everywhere. Uniformed personnel of armies that hadn't to fight first-grade enemies for decades tend to be really confident in their army's capabilities and proficiency (even when it's failing in the meantime and despite in a clash between two first-grade armies there can only be one superior).

No different than the pattern of armchair quarterbacks with no operational experience. Plus I've seen how we do at Bright Star, Fowl Eagle, and any number of multi-national exercises against a bunch of armies that still fight with white light in the dark. If the insinuation is that we lost our ability to fight the high intensity conflict, I'd invite you to NTC any given week. Or see one of our many tank ranges here at Fort Knox.

[slapout9]

Lastdingo,During the period that I was in 72-75 we practiced many of the operations that you say can not be done as a matter of routine procedure. The establishment of an "Airhead" or Foothold as RTK said is Airborne Warfare 101. For all 3 years we had a Combined Arms Exercise called the "Exotic Dancer" series where the 82nd would jump about 20 miles inland and the Marines would land at Onslow Beach and we would link up to establish what is known as a "Salient" (secured and defended area)to allow for heavy follow on forces.
We jumped with our own DIVARTY 105mm and we also had what was known as TAC air support assigned to us. At that time we also had a light Armor capability. Plus and this was where I met a lot of Marines who had what they used to call ANGLICO's or something like that, they were ARTY forward observers for Naval gunfire....big gun fire. 18th Airborne Corps also has big guns 155mm. Defending an airfield would not be a problem for an Airborne Brigade. That was just one of our bread and butter type jobs. I was also what was called fully climatized meaning my unit the 2/504 had been trained in Cold weather Ops, Desert Ops,and Jungle Ops.

[Lastdingo]

The problem in defending an airhead such that an air force would dare to send lots of transport aircraft to land on that airfield is the artillery threat.

I don't know why exactly you trained that, but certainly not for conventional warfare with medium to high force densities.
Aircraft are extremely vulnerable on ground and the mere possibility that an enemy shoots a rocet salvo over 50km distance that scatters ICM on the whole airfield would let the air force generals veto such a plan.

It's possible against lesser enemies, btu even then you need to assume that this enemy is incapable to hold the airfield or at least an area nearby. You basically assume that the enemy fails to do his job. That's overly optimistic against competent enemies.

Well, you could of course just attack practically defenseless countries and end up with COIN warfare.

By the way, artillery range was much lower in the 70's, effective artillery range of mainstay guns has almost doubled in the meantime and longer-range tactical missiles are no longer exotic equipment.

There's no way how shoot & scoot missile artillery can be suppressed - even in fancy RMA scenarios in desert areas you end up with the capability to destroy them AFTER they shot their salvo, compromising their identity as MRL and not standard logistical or civilian trucks.

I'm waiting for an air force guy to describe what AF officers would think about sending C-130 or C-17 onto an airfield that's periodically hit by ICM.
They could for example say that dud removal from the runway alone would require minutes after each single incoming rocket - if several several specialist mineclearing vehicles were flown in early and not lost to air defense or artillery.

[jcustis]

The problem in defending an airhead such that an air force would dare to send lots of transport aircraft to land on that airfield is the artillery threat.

I don't know why exactly you trained that, but certainly not for conventional warfare with medium to high force densities.
Aircraft are extremely vulnerable on ground and the mere possibility that an enemy shoots a rocet salvo over 50km distance that scatters ICM on the whole airfield would let the air force generals veto such a plan.

It's possible against lesser enemies, btu even then you need to assume that this enemy is incapable to hold the airfield or at least an area nearby. You basically assume that the enemy fails to do his job. That's overly optimistic against competent enemies.

Well, you could of course just attack practically defenseless countries and end up with COIN warfare.

By the way, artillery range was much lower in the 70's, effective artillery range of mainstay guns has almost doubled in the meantime and longer-range tactical missiles are no longer exotic equipment.

There's no way how shoot & scoot missile artillery can be suppressed - even in fancy RMA scenarios in desert areas you end up with the capability to destroy them AFTER they shot their salvo, compromising their identity as MRL and not standard logistical or civilian trucks.

I'm waiting for an air force guy to describe what AF officers would think about sending C-130 or C-17 onto an airfield that's periodically hit by ICM.
They could for example say that dud removal from the runway alone would require minutes after each single incoming rocket - if several several specialist mineclearing vehicles were flown in early and not lost to air defense or artillery.

LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

[RTK]

LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree to say it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than would an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

J,

You got the fight. I'm breaking contact and bypassing.

[Lastdingo]

LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree to say it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than would an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

OK, one after another.

- Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Algeria, North Korea, Colombia, Venezuela, Brasilia, Chile, Peru, Mexico. Just to name a few. It doesn't take more than standard artillery and motivated men.

- The South African Valkiri is a MRL that cannot be recognized as MRL in travel mode. Towed versions of BM-21 MRL could easily be camouflaged as normal trailer. The military components of a BM-21 can be removed and put onto a civilian truck in a backyard repair shop. It's easy to cover that launcher.
Long-range MRL can be scattered over such a large area and still reach out to the airfield that securing the Iraqi borders is easy in comparison to finding such a vehicle.
It's also not that difficult to aim with a MRL. All you need is your position and the airfield position on a 1:50,000 map plus a meteological rocket shot into the air and observed with optics as well as a bit meteorological information that helps you guess the wind between the MRL and the airfield in the relevant altitudes. That's no high-tech, it's barely Korean War level tech.

The U.S. military knew that Iraq had no functioning Scuds left in 2003. The whole rocket fuel issue prevented that. The fuel degrades within weeks, and they had no supply for years. Besides that the U.N. had found almost all examples and documented their destruction.

- ICM dud neutralization is not difficult once they're spotted, but that's something different if stones from nearby explosions are scattered over the runway as well and if you want to clear a runway of almost a km length and 30+ m width within less than the couple of minutes as I mentioned. Artillery ICM is also usually much smaller than bomb submunitions are.
And even if you simply shot the dud with a .50cal, you would likely still be required to clear the runway of sharp metal fragments. One such fragment is no problem, dozens on every take-off or landing are a problem.


The whole idea that C-17 alike aircraft would land on an airfield that's only secured with a safety distance of a couple of miles is simply unrealistic. That's good for very nice propaganda pictures when congress needs to be convinced to pay for the C-17, but no air force in the world would do that, not even the Russians.

[Lastdingo]

80 km = 40 km to left and 40 km to the right, enough safety distance to most enemy artillery. That's where 80 km diameter comes from. Of course nobody needs 80km runway. But just securing an airfield to use it while under artillery fire is BS.

M777/LW155 batteries (why batteries in the first place with modern tech?) set up facing in different directions. The gun has a traverse of +/-400 mils, 360° is for Americans 640 mils, so you'd need 8 batteries (guns) to cover all 360°, probably 7 if some range is wasted and emplacement optimized for traverse coverage.
Anything beyond that +/-400mils traverse requires to move the spade out of the ground (never gets stuck, of course!), turn with manpower, ram it again into the ground and fire. Requirement for that was 2-3 minutes. For an action that some other towed gun designs do in 10-20 seconds since about sixty years.

[/quote]And I thought MRL systems were Korean War-simple, yet you make them out to be inefficient as it suits you:

The responsiveness to different missions (different munitions) is also better, and accuracy is better for unguided munitions. Minimum range is smaller. I meant this for the 30 km range, without BB or RAP.

Are you reading all of this out of your copy of Jane's, or a Tom Clancy novel?[/quote]

I don't read Clancy, and I don't need Jane's A&A for such fundamentals.
Artillery aiming is relatively simple in comparison to much of today's other military activities, unobserved indirect artillery fire is more than 100 years old. A target like a long runway can easily be hit and even more easily be threatened.
Yet at the same time rocket artillery cannot as quickly respond to different missions as howitzers and mortars, as you cannot simply in a couple of seconds unload the DPICM rockets to load WP and switch to HE for some cratering or else. A military professional should not doubt such facts.
But maybe you can actually prove that anything in above quote (well, my part of the quote) was wrong instead of resorting to polemic?

Well, anyway. Why should I care. As long as it's not my people I shouldn't care if other armies try missions like seizing an airhead and using it with 250 million $ airplanes loaded with dozens of soldiers while under artillery fire.

Airfield operation under artillery fire has been done before. It eliminated much of the Luftwaffe's transport aircraft inventory in winter 1942/1943 near Stalingrad.
Of course, no enemy that the USA will attack in the next years will be as sophisticated as the Red Army in 1942/43...operating rocket artillery is too challenging... the enemies are too dumb... Murphy's Law doesn't exist... no one would emplace mines below the runway to blow it up in time... U.S. presidents have the guts to send thousands of relatively lightly armed troops behind enemy lines... no one would simply build some concrete obstacles on the runway or blow it up in advance as the own air force cannot use it anyway... no one would pre-register artillery or even mortars on possible infiltration points...howitzers have a longer minimum firing distance than a MRL...MRL unguided rockets have less dispersion than howitzer rounds...HIMARS is fine for obscuration missions...whatever. I learned a lto today.


I'll tell you something. All I'd need to make any airfield useless and unacceptable for forced entry missions is to cover parts of it with garbage. Ah, and I'd set up some snipers with IR sights and passive IR movement sensors to cover it.
The uncertainty if the runway could be made usable in time and if it's even left or already blown up would make the whole airfield useless for the planners.

Sorry for double posts, the forum first showed me page 3 as last page and I bet one post of double length wouldn't be an easier read.

[jcustis]

I'll tell you something. All I'd need to make any airfield useless and unacceptable for forced entry missions is to cover parts of it with garbage. Ah, and I'd set up some snipers with IR sights and passive IR movement sensors to cover it.
The uncertainty if the runway could be made usable in time and if it's even left or already blown up would make the whole airfield useless for the planners.

By all means Napoleon, have at it. You win! You sunk my battleship!?! Maybe I'll trump your sniper with my AC-130 Spectre? Oh wait, I forgot that those snipers will be wearing their invisibility cloaks...no...aw crap, that's the Harry Potter stuff...

Gotta remember to take my eldest to the midnight freakshow at Borders so she can pick up her copy.

[Lastdingo]

OK, then we quit both. This is not going to convince anyone anyway.

The article wasn't great and no better than an ordinary forum post somewhere in the vast internet and it's not worth to argue like this about details.

[RTK]

Check it out. For guys like me and JCustis, this isn't our hobby.

This is our job.

Let go of our ears. We know what we're doing.

[Rifleman]

I never meant for this to turn into a flame war. I just thought it was basically a goofy little article, poorly thought out and articulated, with only one (to me) interesting point: greater possible use of small scale tactical parachute operations.

People were sounding the death knell of the Airborne way before I graduated jump school in 1984. Yet, just post Vietnam we've seen Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, northern Iraq, and one operation called off in Haiti where the invasion force had already gone "wheels up." Now throw in numerous small operations in Africa conducted by the French, Belgians, Rhodesians, and South Africans. Mass tactical airborne operations are far from "no longer relevant."

Let's Go, Falcons!

[slapout9]

Rifleman, you forgot the Yom Kippor war in Israel where the USSR threatened to send in troops to support Egypt. I was 1 hour away from boarding the aircraft to go to the ME. When the USSR found this out they backed down. It was largest 82nd alert outside of the 1962 missile crisis at the time. This all happened during the backround of the first Arab oil embargos. They were interesting times to say the least.

[Jedburgh]

General Orders No. 10
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 25 September 2006

UNITS CREDITED WITH ASSAULT LANDINGS

I—GENERAL.

1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 600-8-22, paragraph 7-25, the units listed in section II below were designated by the Senior Army Commander in the theater operations as having participated in a parachute (to include free fall), amphibious, or helicopter assault landing.

2. When entering individual credit on the Enlisted Record Brief or Officer Record Brief, this general orders may be cited as authority for such entries for Soldiers who were present for duty as a member of or attached to a unit listed herein and actually participated in a combat parachute jump, free fall combat jump, helicopter assault landing, combat glider landing, or amphibious assault landing at the place and time during the period indicated. A Soldier must actually exit the aircraft or landing craft to receive assault landing credit.

3. Under the provisions of AR 600-8-22, paragraph 7-25, the designation of a combat assault landing is determined and approved by the Senior Army Commander in the theater of operations. Eligibility of individuals to wear the bronze arrowhead on the designated campaign medal (Global War On Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Iraqi Campaign Medal, or Afghanistan Campaign Medal) is established by this approval. This approval also authorizes eligible Soldiers to affix a bronze service star to their Parachute Badge or the Military Free Fall Parachute Badge, denoting completion of a combat parachute jump or combat free fall jump.

II—LIST. The following units were designated by the Senior Army Commander in the theater of operations as having participated in a parachute (to include freefall), amphibious, or helicopter assault landing.

....

b. Helmand Desert, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1845Z-0014Z hours, 19 October 2001 to 20 October 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C, Detachment

c. In the vicinity of Alimarden Kan-E-Bagat, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1800Z-2334Z hours, inclusive, 13 November 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

d. Near Chahar Borjak, Nimruz Province, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1345Z-1445Z hours, inclusive, 25 February 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company C, Detachment
504th Infantry, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

.....

w. Bashur Drop Zone in Northern Iraq (Parachute), 1700Z to 1737Z hours, inclusive, 26 March 2003.

1st Special Forces, 10th Special Forces Group, 2d Special Forces Battalion, Detachment
74th Infantry, Detachment
173d Airborne Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
173d Support Company
250th Medical Detachment
319th Field Artillery, Battery D
501st Support Company
503d Infantry, 2d Battalion
508th Infantry, 1st Battalion
4th Air Support Operations Squadron (United States Air Force)
86th Contingency Response Group (United States Air Force)

x. Northwestern Desert region of Iraq, in the vicinity of the town of Al Qaim, near the Syrian border (Parachute), 1830Z to 2230Z hours, inclusive, 24 March 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

y. At H1 airfield in western Iraq, west of the Haditha Dam and the town of Haditha (Parachute), 1835Z to 1200Z hours, 28 and 29 March 2003.

27th Engineer Battalion, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

z. Southeastern region of Afghanistan (Free Fall), 1735Z to 1800Z hours, inclusive, 3 July 2004.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment, Team 3