First, the Moral Repugnance response in Foreign Policy. The author's argument that commander's own the ROE, therefore, it wasn't the lawyers who hampered operations. Partially true, but commanders at what level? The tactical commanders slugging it out with the jihadists had the overly restrictive ROE imposed upon them by higher echelons of command far removed from the fight, who developed ROE based on their COIN Zen readings. I could provide multiple examples, but will simply remind those of the ridiculous escalation of force ROE for challenging a suspicious vehicle approaching your vehicle. First use a laser to get their attention, then small arms warning shots, and then if you're not destroyed by the IED, employ your 50 cal. There were certainly times when this was permissible and prevented innocents casualties, yet when a vehicle charges across the medium at you, and you have seconds are less to act, you won't survive the escalation ROE proscribed.

Second, I agree with the critique that comparing today's conflicts with WWII and even DESERT STORM is false argument. However, the author's argument weakens when he asserts without any supporting evidence that the military can achieve its political object without attrition. That may be true sometimes, but it does apply in all cases. Going back to the false comparison as an example, the Japanese and Germans during WWII were hyper-nationalistic, and to break their will it was necessary to kill and destroy in large measure. Bringing it back to the reality of civil wars, insurgency, and countering terrorists, it still depends upon multiple factors. When the interests of both belligerents are so strong that political settlement is not feasible, then one side must apply sufficient force/violence to compel the other side to bend to their will. One relatively case in point was the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Tamils and Singhalese were not going to comprise with one another, and the war dragged on for years due to the West pushing the Sri Lankan government to take half steps. When the Sri Lankans were resourced (by the Chinese) and they took the gloves off, they finally defeated the Tamil Tigers. They were condemned by the Western media for so called war crimes, yet there was no context, such as was the peace that followed for both sides worth it, or would it be better to drag the fighting for an additional decade?

The author's point about Vietnam and Afghanistan were also flawed. While we certainly killed a lot of people in Vietnam, we didn't sustain the pressure (I'm not arguing that we should have, just questioning the author's assertion that killing doesn't work). In Afghanistan, we haven't killed that many, but more importantly the Taliban production factory in Pakistan is seldom ever touched, so we're not killing them at a sufficient sustained effort to break their will. Again, that may or may not be the preferred the course of action, but it is misleading to assert that killing our way doesn't work based on that example.

To his point about Iraq, having been there in 2007, where the strategy was to kill our way out of the seemingly uncontrollable chaos, it actually worked at the tactical and operational level. However, we didn't tie the killing to a political object beyond buying time for some magic to happen at the political level, which of course never materialized. The author is correct that we were strategically adrift.

To his final comment, "The instant we become a monster to slay a monster, war is lost." That is an opinion, arguably a nave one that has no historical support whatsoever. War is repugnant period, but allowing war to drag on endlessly with no end in sight because we think we can win it with half measures is a sin.