"... Commanders must widen the focus of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) supporting an effects-based approach beyond traditional issues of military capabilities and intent (especially on “personalities” and “cultural” intelligence) and increase the focus of battle damage assessment (BDA) on detecting the systemic or psychological effects noted above."
Interesting article... one of the issues that needs to be addressed is how PIR and BDA focus on what will happen (PIR) or what happened (BDA) rather than what it really means... the "Effects-based approach" requires more of a focus on what it all means.

This is analagous to MOP and MOE; MOP tells you whether or not you accomplished the specific task you set out to do; MOP tells you whether or not it really achieved the purpose. Much of our current intel process focuses on tasks / measures of performance -- but what commanders really need to have intel focus on is purpose / measures of effectiveness.

I plan to address this in a new chapter in the next edition of Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade, and how MOP / MOE relates to Task / Purpose -- and then some examples on how BDA support may well collect metrics for MOP, but the analysis has to address MOE.