Seven weeks ago a public report on UK counter-terrorism revealed, within reason (national security and operational methods mainly) a great deal and some pointers to what was to be implemented next. Apologies for the delay, only today was there time to read the report and related comments.

The catalyst being in the words of the author, David Anderson, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (whose role is to monitor UK counter-terrorism legislation for its fairness, effectiveness and proportionality):
The excellent recent record of MI5 and police in defending the UK from terrorist attack came to a brutal end this year at Westminster, Manchester Arena, London Bridge and Finsbury Park….After four such incidents over a short period, unsparing reflection was required.”
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017...ons-just-nine/

The attacks were: 22nd March @ Westminster Bridge, London four deaths, with thirty-two injured by a suspect (shot dead) using a van and knives; 22nd May @ Manchester Arena, twenty-two dead, with one hundred and sixteen injured by a suicide bomber; 3rd June @ London Bridge, London, eight dead and forty-five injured by three men (shot dead) with a van and knives; and 19th June @ Finsbury Park Mosque, London one dead, eleven injured by a suspect in a van (currently on trial).

They are covered in the main thread:UK Counter-Terrorism (merged thread)

The Home Secretary's official statement is cited in part:
In the case of the Westminster attack, Khalid Masood was a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack. Neither MI5 nor the police had any reason to anticipate the attack. Regarding the Manchester Arena attack, Salman Abedi was also a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack, and so not under active investigation. In early 2017, MI5 nonetheless received intelligence on him, which was assessed as not being related to terrorism. In retrospect the intelligence can be seen to be highly relevant. Had an investigation been re-opened at the time, it cannot be known whether Abedi’s plans could have been stopped: MI5 assess that it would have been unlikely.
In the case of London Bridge, Khuram Butt was an active subject of interest who had been under investigation since mid-2015. A number of different investigative means were deployed against him, but they did not reveal his plans. His two conspirators had never been investigated by MI5 or CT Policing.
In regards to Finsbury Park, neither MI5 nor the police had any intelligence about this attack.
The recommendations made in the MI5 and police operational review fall into four broad categories:
First, there needs to be a concerted effort to enhance MI5 and the police’s ability to use data to detect activity of concern, and to test new approaches in the acquisition, sharing and analysis of data.
Second, MI5 should share its intelligence more widely, and work with partners such as local authorities on how best to manage the risk posed by closed subjects of interest in particular. We are considering undertaking multi-agency pilots in a number of areas including Greater Manchester, and I have already started discussing how to take this forward with Andy Burnham.
Third, there should be a new approach to managing domestic extremism, particularly extreme right wing groups, where their activity meets the definition of terrorism. Fourth, there are a large number of detailed and technical changes which could be made to improve existing operational counter-terrorism processes.
Link:https://www.gov.uk/government/speech...ter-and-london

I have selected from the report a few key points IMHO:
1.13 to 1.27 is a short section on terminology and in IMHO is the clearest explanation of how MI5 manages investigations and priorities in the public domain (There is a longer explanation in an Appendix pgs. 57-61; which has been amended after publication in an ISC report, November 2014).. 2.3 My more limited aim has been to give an idea of the quantity and quality of the intelligence that was available on each attacker at material times, thus introducing the context that needs to be understood before sense can be made of the recommendations in the various internal reviews.
2.38 Another tool promised well, but did not produce results in time. A process devised by MI5 to identify activity of renewed intelligence interest conducted by closed SOIs, using targeted data exploitation and other automated techniques, identified Salman Abedi as one of a small number of individuals, out of a total of more than 20,000 closed SOIs, who merited further examination.
2.77 How best to deal with the risk from persons not under active investigation has been a long-standing challenge for MI5, in respect of which a number of solutions have been tried in the past.39 Many of the recommendations in the OIR, summarised in chapter 3 below, are directed to improving coverage of such persons.

The report at 5.23 cites the Director General of MI5 recently described the work of his staff in the following terms
They are constantly making tough professional judgments based on fragments of intelligence: pin pricks of light against a dark and shifting canvas.
Link to the report:https://www.daqc.co.uk/wp-content/up.../12/Report.pdf and his introduction:https://www.daqc.co.uk/2017/12/05/re...dling-reviews/


To be continued.