Some commentary on what's going on in Yemen - and especially in Aden - of the last few days...
The official Saudi aim of the military intervention in Yemen is 'halting Iranian expansionism' and 'bringing leaders of the Houthi/Saleh coalition to the negotiating table'. For this purpose, the Saudi-led coalition insists on 'supporting the legitimate government' - that of president/former president Hadi.
Indirect aim of related efforts is the re-establishment of the Saudi position of influence in Sana'a.
Now, what caused the ongoing civil war in Yemen are major rifts that emerged within the Yemeni military, and thus the entire Yemeni state, in the wake of reforms introduced by Hadi in period 2012-2014. He dissolved the Republican Guards (always loyal to Saleh, only) and purged the military of Saleh's relatives and allies, thus they opposed him. But, he also tried to purge the military of those affiliated with the Islah Party - the de-facto Yemeni version of the Moslem Brotherhood - like Major-General Ali Mohsen. Thus, they opposed him too, and so on.
Over the time, multiple power blocks crystalised, with 50-60% of the military siding with Saleh and thus with the Houthis, 4-5 brigades with Hadi, up to 15 with Ahmar and thus the Islah etc. The rest of the military either declared neutrality, or sided with the Southern Separatists (i.e. Hirak and the Hadramawt Confederation) or was overrun by the AQAP.
However, Hadi has no wider political support inside Yemen. He's actually supported only by a small number of allied generals and a few (4-5 at most) of Yemen National Army's brigades.
Thus, the Saudis and Hadi were increasingly dependable on the support of the Islah Party - which is de-facto the Yemeni version of the Moslem Brotherhood (MB).
However, back in 2014, Saudi Arabia declared the MBs for terrorists and stopped supporting them. Thus, this party lost badly. Indeed, it could be said that this enabled the Houthis to take over in Sana'a.
But then... well, when the Saudis and allies invaded southern Yemen, in July-August 2015, they advanced so rapidly, a true power vacuum developed in their backs. This was so because the Houthi/Saleh alliance completely destroyed the governmental system, police, and the military in all parts of southern Yemen they've held until then. The AQAP jumped in and brought much of the country under its control.
This was something nobody could tolerate.
Thus, the Saudis and allies had to de-facto stop their advance on Sana'a (in turn offering Houthis/Saleh plenty of time to heavily mine all the ways into northern Yemen), and start building-up new government and new security forces.
In the course of that process, Saudi and Emirati ways of pursuing the re-establishment of the government went each their own way. Since Hadi still has no political support in the country, he and Saudis were left with little choice but to ally with the Islah Party. Unsurprisingly, Riyadh removed the MBs from the list of terrorist organisations, and Ali Ahmar was appointed Hadi's new Minister of Defence. This secured Hadi (and Saudis) the support of everybody affiliated with the Islah.
However, in the meantime the Emiratis have pursued their own politics. They are not only anti-AQAP, but also anti-MBs. And, they are primarily cooperating with the Hirak (Southern Separatists) and the Hadramawt Confederation. They also work with Quietists (Yemeni Salafists fighting against the AQAP and the Houthis). The Emiratis spent most of the Year 2017 securing the Aden area, constructing another forward base (including an airfield) at Perim (or Mayun) Island, and running COIN operations against the AQAP in the Mukalla area. Their alliances with the Hirak, the Hadramawt Confederation, the Quietists, and establishment of the Security Belt Forces resulted in creation of powerful proxies that are controlling de-facto all of southern Yemen. There's next to no place there - except the area few quarters of Aden and most of the area around the Bab al-Mandeb - where the Islah still has the say.
With other words, it's the Emiratis who are now in de-facto control over those parts of Yemen 'liberated' from the Houthis, not the Saudis. Unsurprisingly, the Emirati-supported National Transitional Council now wants to destroy whatever was left of the Hadi's government.
If I'm to ask, this was a great opportunity for the Saudis to get rid of Hadi. There's simply no point in continuing to support him, because political and military realities in Yemen of 2018 are entirely different than they used to be as of September 2014 (not to talk about March 2015). Question is, if they can afford doing so: after all, they all the time insisted that he's the only legitimate president of Yemen.
It appears they - and even the Emiratis - have concluded they can not send Hadi into retirement. Thus, the NTC/STC is already announcing it recognizes Hadi as legitimate president.
I.e. expect the things to get back to where they were before this coup. Only difference will be that Hadi-loyalists will now really have nothing to say.
...and then the net result will be something like Somaliland: an independent South Yemen not recognized by anybody from the outside.
(Note: an alternative would've been a split of the country into two, as originally demanded by the NTC. Something like Northern Yemen, say, ruled by somebody like Saleh's son Ahmed with support of the Islah and the Houthis; and Southern Yemen, ruled by the NTC.)
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