https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas...-years-later-0

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later

This is balanced statement, with numerous implications. Much more in the article than what I'm focused on below.

Politically, China is already benefitting from the BRI with individual countries and globally. Traditional partners like Pakistan, where BRI-related investments total roughly $62 billion, have become even closer. Chinese infrastructure loans have helped persuade some countries, including the Philippines and Cambodia, to reevaluate military or diplomatic ties with the United States. China is also forging ties with countries further west, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe. China’s “16+1” framework brings together a diverse set of countries in the region, many of whom have little in common other than their interest in doing business with China. These and other developments suggest the BRI is producing political dividends.
Most SWJ readers understand the nexus of economic and security interests, but perhaps don't have visibility on the global scale of this challenge to U.S. and allied interests.

Even more important to U.S. economic interests is the BRI’s longer-term impact on major global systems. Since World War II, the United States has played a leading role in creating, expanding, and defending open trade and financial systems. The United States has done this not merely out of goodwill, but also out of self-interest.
A BRI that succeeds on China’s terms could revise these systems to reflect Chinese interests. Changes would be seen in supply chains for goods, from manufactured products to energy and other resources. China’s currency would become more widely used. Chinese technical standards, for everything from high-speed railway systems to wireless networks, would become more widely adopted, as would Chinese preferences for environmental and social safeguards. Collectively, these changes would push the United States away from its current position in the global economy and move China toward the center.
A BRI that fails also has implications for U.S. economic interests.
The following assertion calls into question our ability to predict the future, and how fast things can change. Although we arguably did create a vacuum both economically and militarily.

It is sobering to recall the U.S. position in Asia at the beginning of this century. In 2000, a bipartisan commission at the Harvard Kennedy School examined U.S. national interests and noted, “No country in East Asia, including China, appears capable of seriously challenging US leadership any time soon unless America, through neglect or indifference, were to create a vacuum.”24 Today, the U.S. position in Asia is considerably weaker.
Finally the recommendation.

The BRI has all the marks of a difficult foreign policy challenge. It is a slow-moving development that will unfold in decades rather than days. It is functionally and geographically vast, spanning the responsibilities of many U.S. agencies. It requires grappling with both economics and security issues. It will be tempting to delay action and difficult to coordinate an effective response. Ultimately, the best U.S. response to the BRI is not a response at all, but a compelling U.S. economic vision, resourced strategically and sustained over time.