Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
Coinicidentally, here's the passage I've been writing over the past 30 minutes for my in-progress monograph entitled The Fragile Assumptions of American Strategy:

. . .

 Maximum disengagement from the from the Islamic world. (This is based on the assumption that when Islamic extremists say they are motivated by American penetration of the Islamic world, they are telling the truth—that is what motivates them, not a “hatred for freedom.”)
 Ending America’s petroleum addiction.
 Developing a list of partner and non-partner states based on whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism, not simply whether they prosecute al Qaeda (our current criterion). States like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and others which by commission or omission tolerate and even encourage anti-American extremism would be non-partners. Aid to, immigration from, and visas for the citizens of non-partner states would end.
 Approaching cyberspace as a key battlefield. Currently, it is the ultimate "ungoverned space." Consider hosting web sites or transmitting information which advocates violence as a hostile act. Take action against it. In other words, don't allow the extremists to hide behind the importance we place on free speech and the transnational nature of information.
 Be prepared to launch spoiling raids as necessary against hostile groups but do not reengineer their nations. While this may be a worthy endeavor, the strategic costs outweigh the benefits.
That is good. In order:

- I agree but would offer the caveat that while many of the Islamists do indeed mean that, many Muslims would not like to see us go. Further and as you know, not all Islamists would cease and desist. It is admittedly easier to deal with a few rather than many but the process would not be either clean or quick. I guess what I'm saying is this needs to be done cautiously and over time.

- Definitely!

- I certainly agree but I'm very, very skeptical the political will is there. There is also the obvious tie-in with the first and second points. It's possible that a 'sales job' may be required to get true and merited consideration of the very valid premise.

- That needs to happen and should not be problematic or even controversial.

- Agreed and PT is correct, the operators are ready but yet again, the political will problem (as he mentions) rears its head. That problem is not limited to civilian politicians. There is also the fact that the Armed forces are a reflection of US society, as the general population has gotten a little softer and more risk averse, so too have the Armed forces. Risk aversion in high places kept foot patrols out of Iraqi streets in 2003 when, lacking the abysmally stupid (IMO) disbanding of the Army and the Cops things might not have deteriorated to this extent.

A follow on to that is that we as a nation IMO do not have the patience to do long term things and we are confronted with the fact that we have an image rebuilding problem. It took us from 1975 until about 1985 to start rebuilding internationally from Viet Nam and that process was barely complete by 1990. The Somalia operation hurt and the fly swats with Tomahawks plus Bosnia and Kosovo were quite minor setbacks; Iraq has been a major setback and I see another ten year rebuild phase coming on. If we don't screw it up...

All that is a long way of saying that your spoiling raids will take a lot of work; we, 28 years after the Tehran fiasco are still not ready to do that effectively due to spending a lot of money on the wrong equipment, inadequate training *, wrong organization for the wrong combat *, emphasis on numbers and mass instead of stealth and deception, lack of will and and over zealous 'force protection' concerns in the aforementioned high places. Most Americans ( >60% ) will tolerate casualties, they just want good payback; in other words, do what you have to but get it done right and don't take too much time doing it.

* Not totally pertinent to your paper but I suggest, organization first -- that we need to be prepared for a major conventional war (my way would be an enlarged Heavy National Guard with no more than 8-9 Bdes of Active heavy types); Mid level (I guess we're gonna have Strykers and get FCS; again 8-9 active Bdes, max); The probable future of light infantry prepared to get attached or OpCom support elms, the remaining 27+ Bdes, 8 of 'em Airborne for a rapidly deployable strategic reserve. I put the organization first because the training hinges on that. The average infantry battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do given the same expenditure and effort for training. JSOC needs a slight beef up and the SF Groups need to get out of direct action. We need the long distance insertion capability tha should've been the priority from 1980 on -- we still do not have it (but we can of course, fight across the north German Plain...). Thus was written the gospel according to St. Ken...

All that has no bearing on your words, they are good. I merely throw out those thoughts for consideration based on my experience that the senior guys really like turnkey answers and like to ask "why do you say that...". .

P.S.

I have a few skeletons I can trot out to vote for you...