As Russian-Egyptian military and economic cooperation increases, many comparisons have been made with Egypt’s early post-independence era (1956–1971), when Cairo grew close to Moscow. Egypt’s current strategic position, however, bears closer similarities to the foreign policy of the first decades of rule by the founder of modern Egypt, Ottoman Viceroy Muhammad ‘Ali (1805–1848). Like Egypt’s post-independence leaders, Muhammad ‘Ali sought to simultaneously modernize Egypt with foreign assistance while increasing its political independence. This was no easy feat, as it involved balancing allegiance to his suzerain, the Ottoman Sultan, while using (unofficial) French military assistance and training to strengthen his own hand without falling under French control. Current Egyptian president Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi now uses Russian military aid in much the same way to gain leverage in a deteriorating relationship with the United States.
Some of the objectives shared by Muhammad ‘Ali and President al-Sisi include:
Intensifying the purchase and manufacture of arms,
Expanding naval capacity,
Conducting military operations abroad to project Egyptian power,
Consolidating Egypt’s control of the Red Sea region,
Securing the supply of Nile waters from the south,
Diversifying international military suppliers and trainers,
Exterminating the previous regime, and
Repressing Islamist extremists.
The question for Moscow is whether its objectives meld with those of Cairo. The Kremlin is seeking enhanced military and economic relations with Egypt (see EDM, September 16, 2015; September 21, 2016; October 14, 2016), but the latter has no desire to be used merely as leverage against the US. Moscow will seek to meet its regional objectives by exploiting differences between Washington and Cairo and by filling any void left by diminishing US military aid and engagement with the Sisi regime. For their part, Egypt’s leaders remain wary of growing too close to the Russians—the last period of close cooperation ended badly. Nonetheless, Egypt may be seeking external military support in its failing campaign against Islamist extremists in Sinai (see Terrorism Monitor, December 15, 2016), and Russia’s military track record in Syria makes it an enticing partner (see EDM, October 19, 2017; December 14, 2017). Whether this can be achieved without paying a high price (such as the establishment of permanent Russian bases in Egypt) is Cairo’s dilemma.
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