Several different viewpoints on the now delayed UK deployment to Mali, an announcement that missed me amidst the pandemic media focus. A deployment that I consider unwise, which is more for non-Mali reasons - notably supporting France and others who have a military commitment there (mainly trainers and SOF).
Spotted today a House of Commons Library analyst examines the forthcoming role:https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8903/
An interesting passage within by ex-UK Army officer:On 29th April an American viewpoint on the wider lessons available, but seemingly ignored so far and cites what happened in Chad over a long period: https://www.theamericanconservative....rica-strategy/General Sir Richard Barrons, a former Commander of Joint Forces Command (UK armed forces), also gave evidence to the Committee. Discussing the events of 2012, when he was UK Director of Military Operations, he concluded “the net effect is that unless you can meet a problem like Mali on the scale and in terms of the nature of the challenges it presents, it will not fix itself”. On the proposed deployment of 250 military personnel, which he described as tokenistic, he questioned the wider thinking within Government towards the Sahel: “these minor contributions to Mali are not in support of a strategy of any kind other than ‘we should do a bit more UN peacekeeping’”.
From RUSI an upbeat view and explanation:https://rusi.org/commentary/building...-security-mali
Then a quite different RUSI view:https://rusi.org/commentary/uk-joins...le-fight-sahel
By a RAND analyst in March: https://wavellroom.com/2020/03/12/the-uk-in-mali/
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