Exit Strategies

[SWJED]

17 July Washington Post - Exit Strategies by Karen DeYoung and Tom Ricks.

If U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq in the near future, three developments would be likely to unfold. Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate nations.

That was the conclusion reached in recent "war games" exercises conducted for the U.S. military by retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson. "I honestly don't think it will be apocalyptic," said Anderson, who has served in Iraq and now works for a major defense contractor. But "it will be ugly."

In making the case for a continued U.S. troop presence, President Bush has offered far more dire forecasts, arguing that al-Qaeda or Iran -- or both -- would take over Iraq after a "precipitous withdrawal" of U.S. forces. Al-Qaeda, he said recently, would "be able to recruit better and raise more money from which to launch their objectives" of attacking the U.S. homeland. War opponents in Congress counter that Bush's talk about al-Qaeda is overblown fear-mongering and that nothing could be worse than the present situation...

[Jedburgh]

17 Jul 07 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding Policy Options in Iraq:

Steven Simon, CFR

....Withdrawal is the strategically appropriate course of action, provided that it is systematic, orderly, and geared to a coherent diplomatic gameplan. The sooner we grasp this nettle, the better.

James Dobbins, RAND

...Faced with a real prospect of American withdrawal, I believe most Iraqi leaders, and all regional governments will urge us to stay, not indefinitely and not necessarily in our current numbers, but in some strength, and for some further period. Open ended consultations about America’s future role can thus help us forge a regional consensus about that role, and about the shape of a future Iraq that we currently lack. Knowledge that the United States will not remain indefinitely in Iraq in current numbers, or permanently in at any level can provide American diplomats some leverage in moving governments of the region to recognize their own interests in, and responsibilities for, stabilizing Iraq. I would therefore urge Congressional action that presses the President to move in this direction, without so circumscribing his discretion as to render such diplomacy ineffective....

Michael Rubin, AEI

....Success in Iraq is possible. It is imperative that the Iraqis take the lead in their future. The U.S. mission should be to enable them to secure their own country. This requires that the surge continues. If the Iraqis do not have the opportunity to develop their own multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian security forces then their country and the wider region will descend into chaos and war. It will take hard work. We should not pull the carpet out from beneath them.

[selil]

When dealing with an insurgency who is not attempting to win but only intersted in fighting what does an exit strategy look like? Mismatched goals of adversaries increase the risk of protracted conflict. What is the disagreement and point of contention and whatever the answer will there ever be a point exit is apropriate?

[SteveMetz]

When dealing with an insurgency who is not attempting to win but only intersted in fighting what does an exit strategy look like? Mismatched goals of adversaries increase the risk of protracted conflict. What is the disagreement and point of contention and whatever the answer will there ever be a point exit is apropriate?

I think you're on to an important point. Our traditional or "classical" way of thinking about counterinsurgency imputed a means/ends, politically-focused rationality to the insurgents. But what if what they want is not attainment of some political endstate, but simply to participate in conflict? In other words, the conflict is about psychic fulfillment for them, not political objectives. I think that undercuts much of our understanding of the phenomenon--and our doctrine.

I've come to better understand this as I've worked with people who seem to be in constant conflict with their colleagues. Eventually it dawned on me that they weren't using conflict to attain some defined end, but they actually had a psychological need to be involved in conflict. That makes for a very different solution set.

[Granite_State]

I think you're on to an important point. Our traditional or "classical" way of thinking about counterinsurgency imputed a means/ends, politically-focused rationality to the insurgents. But what if what they want is not attainment of some political endstate, but simply to participate in conflict? In other words, the conflict is about psychic fulfillment for them, not political objectives. I think that undercuts much of our understanding of the phenomenon--and our doctrine.

John Robb would also argue that a permanently "hollowed out" state is the goal of terrorists and criminal entrepeneurs, and of broader movements like Hezbollah.

[SteveMetz]

John Robb would also argue that a permanently "hollowed out" state is the goal of terrorists and criminal entrepeneurs, and of broader movements like Hezbollah.

I haven't read that book but have a copy inbound from Amazon. The idea makes sense. I'm just hard pressed to imagine al Qaeda or Hezbollah marching triumphantly into the capital a la the Vietnamese or Cuban insurgents and becoming the national government.

What worries, me though, is that that is exactly what President Bush is using to rationalized continued involvement in Iraq.

That leads to the thinking and writing I'm doing. "Classical" counterinsurgency conceptualized the conflict like conventional war--as one where either the regime or the insurgents were "victorious" (meaning that the other ceased to exist). If that basic conceptualization no longer holds, then our strategy and doctrine need serious revision.

I'm sitting here right now working on an essay based on the presentation I gave earlier in the week (entitled "Everything You Think You Know About Insurgency May be Wrong"). I'm thinking I'll submit this first to Foreign Affairs, then work down from there. Let's see--I've done 855 words in the past hour or so. I'm about ready to give up for the day and go home and peck away on my insurgency book.

[SteveMetz]

I'm normally not a big Al Franken fan but I did think it was a good line when, after returning from an entertain-the-troops trip to Iraq, he said, "I've had several MREs in the past week and none of them have an exit strategy."

[jcustis]

When dealing with an insurgency who is not attempting to win but only intersted in fighting what does an exit strategy look like? Mismatched goals of adversaries increase the risk of protracted conflict. What is the disagreement and point of contention and whatever the answer will there ever be a point exit is apropriate?

I think this depends on your definition of "win", because I definitely believe the insurgent wants to win something. His definition is different than ours, but he has a desired endstate, even if it is to set conditions for future mayhem and violence (i.e. hollowing out a state).

This leads me back to an old thread about classical insurgency, and the distinction between terrorists and insurgents. Need to find that and re-read all of the excellent comments offered there...

[tequila]

Old, old joke. I got told that one by my company gunny in boot camp. He was so salty he actually liked the MRE omelette.

"MRE = Meals Refusing to Exit."

I can't really imagine al-Qaeda holding a victory parade, but Hizbullah? Certainly. They have been the de facto government of the Lebanese south for years and already constitute something of a Shia state-within-a-state. If they were to go head up vs the Lebanese army (or rather what would remain of the Lebanese army without its Shia enlisted), I wouldn't bet against them.

[SteveMetz]

Old, old joke. I got told that one by my company gunny in boot camp. He was so salty he actually liked the MRE omelette.

"MRE = Meals Refusing to Exit."

I can't really imagine al-Qaeda holding a victory parade, but Hizbullah? Certainly. They have been the de facto government of the Lebanese south for years and already constitute something of a Shia state-within-a-state. If they were to go head up vs the Lebanese army (or rather what would remain of the Lebanese army without its Shia enlisted), I wouldn't bet against them.

But the state-within-a-state idea is the kicker. That wasn't normally what Cold War era insurgencies wanted. We kind of conceptualize the outcome as either the regime in control of the whole country or the insurgents. Should we adjust our conceptualization (and strategy and doctrine) for insurgents who only want control of part of the country? There are a lot of them, from FARC to, potentially, AQI

[selil]

But the state-within-a-state idea is the kicker. That wasn't normally what Cold War era insurgencies wanted. We kind of conceptualize the outcome as either the regime in control of the whole country or the insurgents. Should we adjust our conceptualization (and strategy and doctrine) for insurgents who only want control of part of the country? There are a lot of them, from FARC to, potentially, AQI

What about insurgents that no longer care about the state? As in the state is not even an issue. I guess the point I'm working around is when basic services like medical, water, food, and law enforcement have broken down what are insurgents fighting for? Is it freedom of religion or desire for lack of freedom of religion as an example? People kill people all the time "just because". We project power and legitimacy onto foreign governments with expectations of the populace realizing or legitimizing the projection.

If the power of a government is actually a shadow rather than an ability to act and the insurgency isn't interested in toppling the nascent government but in destabilizing the society what are we fighting? I'm trying to grapple with the ideas of insurgency and terrorism in a stateless society.

We talk about terrorists and insurgents as if they are different or motivated differently. The answer may be that insurgency and terrorism are tactics or strategies and the actors employ the destabilization method of choice at that time. The GWOT has been co-opted as a political euphemism and as such perhaps misdirected the discussion from the reality of the conflict.

I'll be honest I'm still moping and thinking on the topic. Since it isn't my area of expertise I figure I'll get whacked, but then again that's half the fun.

[Steve Blair]

I actually do think there is a difference between insurgents and terrorists in terms of motivations and goals, and went into some detail in another thread.

[SteveMetz]

What about insurgents that no longer care about the state? As in the state is not even an issue. I guess the point I'm working around is when basic services like medical, water, food, and law enforcement have broken down what are insurgents fighting for? Is it freedom of religion or desire for lack of freedom of religion as an example? People kill people all the time "just because". We project power and legitimacy onto foreign governments with expectations of the populace realizing or legitimizing the projection.

If the power of a government is actually a shadow rather than an ability to act and the insurgency isn't interested in toppling the nascent government but in destabilizing the society what are we fighting? I'm trying to grapple with the ideas of insurgency and terrorism in a stateless society.

We talk about terrorists and insurgents as if they are different or motivated differently. The answer may be that insurgency and terrorism are tactics or strategies and the actors employ the destabilization method of choice at that time. The GWOT has been co-opted as a political euphemism and as such perhaps misdirected the discussion from the reality of the conflict.

I'll be honest I'm still moping and thinking on the topic. Since it isn't my area of expertise I figure I'll get whacked, but then again that's half the fun.

In my own scribblings, I don't even bother to categorize movements as "terrorists" or "insurgents." I view insurgency as a strategy and terrorism as a tactic or technique.

[Jedburgh]

I actually do think there is a difference between insurgents and terrorists in terms of motivations and goals, and went into some detail in another thread.

In my own scribblings, I don't even bother to categorize movements as "terrorists" or "insurgents." I view insurgency as a strategy and terrorism as a tactic or technique.

Here's the older thread that has been referred to a couple of times in this thread: Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?

[selil]

Here's the older thread that has been referred to a couple of times in this thread: Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?

So from that thread we agreed to disagree on the similarity and disparity between insurgents and terrorists? Other than "ThePartisan" (who i'd love to know if his IP address was at a US University) the discussion devolved to semantics.

[SteveMetz]

So from that thread we agreed to disagree on the similarity and disparity between insurgents and terrorists? Other than "ThePartisan" (who i'd love to know if his IP address was at a US University) the discussion devolved to semantics.

That's what I didn't participate: I'm anti-semantic

[T. Jefferson]

I'm just hard pressed to imagine al Qaeda or Hezbollah marching triumphantly into the capital a la the Vietnamese or Cuban insurgents and becoming the national government.

Isn’t that what Hamas has just accomplished in the Gaza strip?

I would believe that for some jihadists the fight and own death is a goal in and of itself in order to attain heaven. However I think these people are only cannon fodder for those groups seeking to accomplish some discernable political goal here on earth.

[tequila]

T. Jefferson - Amen. It's important not to confuse what motivates some of the cannon fodder (especially the human torpedos) vs. what motivates the leadership/core fighters.

[SteveMetz]

Isn’t that what Hamas has just accomplished in the Gaza strip?

I would believe that for some jihadists the fight and own death is a goal in and of itself in order to attain heaven. However I think these people are only cannon fodder for those groups seeking to accomplish some discernable political goal here on earth.

That's an interesting case since it doesn't involve an outright insurgent victory over the regime--Hamas hasn't marched into Jerusalem. In fact, I think that kind of illustrates my point. Our doctrine identifies strategic success in counterinsurgency as eradication of the insurgents and full government control. I think that's unrealistic and by making that an element of our strategy and doctrine, we are setting ourselves up to fail.

What I'm trying to suggest is that outcomes that are something less that a full victory for either side are actually the norm. I believe we ought to change our strategy and doctrine to identify finding a resolution that both sides can live with rather than total victory by the government as the objective.

Your point on diverse motivations is also important. I'm wrestling with it now in the book I'm writing, but let me throw out some half baked ideas.

First, the notion of different motivations doesn't just apply to insurgents. In World War II, the motivates of Franklin Roosevelt were not the same as those of Sgt Kilroy. But I think the more important point is that our doctrine conceptualizes insurgencies as driven strictly by political objectives. That would suggest that if you address the political grievances, you fix the problem.

But, as you point out, many insurgents are fighting more for psychological reasons than political ones--they seek fulfillment, empowerment, paradise, or something like that.

So, the question becomes: Should we or can we adjust our counterinsurgency doctrine to account for the psychological motives of insurgents? I think we can and kind of took a stab at that in the presentation I gave this week. If you haven't seen it, I'd be happy to send a copy. And anyone I sent it to early in the week may want the update--I've added a few slides, changed a few, and augmented the narrative based, in large part, on the excellent discussions in here.

[tequila]

What I'm trying to suggest is that outcomes that are something less that a full victory for either side are actually the norm. I believe we ought to change our strategy and doctrine to identify finding a resolution that both sides can live with rather than total victory by the government as the objective.
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I agree with you, but with FM 3-24 isn't that now government doctrine as well? Isn't that what all the rhetoric about "political, not military solutions" and all the pressure for reform of de-Baathification and a more equitable oil law in Iraq are all about?