Originally Posted by T. Jefferson
That's an interesting case since it doesn't involve an outright insurgent victory over the regime--Hamas hasn't marched into Jerusalem. In fact, I think that kind of illustrates my point. Our doctrine identifies strategic success in counterinsurgency as eradication of the insurgents and full government control. I think that's unrealistic and by making that an element of our strategy and doctrine, we are setting ourselves up to fail.
What I'm trying to suggest is that outcomes that are something less that a full victory for either side are actually the norm. I believe we ought to change our strategy and doctrine to identify finding a resolution that both sides can live with rather than total victory by the government as the objective.
Your point on diverse motivations is also important. I'm wrestling with it now in the book I'm writing, but let me throw out some half baked ideas.
First, the notion of different motivations doesn't just apply to insurgents. In World War II, the motivates of Franklin Roosevelt were not the same as those of Sgt Kilroy. But I think the more important point is that our doctrine conceptualizes insurgencies as driven strictly by political objectives. That would suggest that if you address the political grievances, you fix the problem.
But, as you point out, many insurgents are fighting more for psychological reasons than political ones--they seek fulfillment, empowerment, paradise, or something like that.
So, the question becomes: Should we or can we adjust our counterinsurgency doctrine to account for the psychological motives of insurgents? I think we can and kind of took a stab at that in the presentation I gave this week. If you haven't seen it, I'd be happy to send a copy. And anyone I sent it to early in the week may want the update--I've added a few slides, changed a few, and augmented the narrative based, in large part, on the excellent discussions in here.
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