Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
Well, the manual says, "Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare" (p. 1-1) and "The purpose of America’s ground forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars" (p. 1-19, emphasis added). We don't normally "play for a tie" in war. We may settle for it to stave off defeat, but we don't aim for it. What I'm suggesting is that a "tie" is the normal and most realistic outcome in insurgency, so we have dissonance between our doctrine and reality.
I can see your point, but after years of 'interpreting' doctrinal guidance (I have never seen the 'perfect' doctrinal pamphlet), I am not 100% concerned about strictly literal interpretations of what are often 'default' or obligatory lines of text that often occur across series of publications. I suspect that the line you have cited from p. 1-19 occurs in a number of FM. It would seem to me , within the context of insurgency, and the content of the rest of the textual philosophy of the FM 3-24, that this line is one of those. With a sub-editors hat on one might rewrite the line to read something like " "The purpose of America’s ground forces is to provide the landforce combat element of the interagency [in Australia we would say 'whole of government'] effort to win the Nation’s counterinsurgency wars"

I do not for a minute believe that Crane, Nagl et al believe, at any level, that America's ground forces alone can defeat an insurgency. That is clear from any holistic reading of the FM. Furthermore, if we are true to the views that we espouse on SWJ, surely the idea of any military pamphlet being able to provide a 'blueprint' for COIN victory (that is a 'strategic victory' as opposed to tactical or operational success) is a nonsense.

Any half decent military pam on COIN that I have read has words to the effect that 'victory' cannot be solely achieved by military means. Since other government agencies, NGO and political leaders (that is, the other critical bits of any successful COIN response) probably do not read a great deal of military doctrine, and if they do are not obliged to heed it anyway, at one level it becomes a somewhat moot point whatever military doctrine proscribes regarding 'victory'. The only value in it doing so would appear to be so that Mil advisers, where they are listened to, can be aware as to what they might seek from other agencies in giving their advice.

I guess what I am saying is that where a military COIN publication strays from advice regarding suitable military actions or thought within the permits, processes and capabilities of the military, it becomes 'advisory only'.

Surely it is only State strategy, not military doctrine, that can reasonably direct the path to COIN 'victory' as that is the only thing that all the required players are compelled to address or follow.