Even though the Army has been fighting the shadowy insurgency for four years in Iraq, it has been slow to change its conventional approach: massing firepower on an enemy's formations.
This is dillettante tripe wrapped in quasi-intellectual babble.

The article presumes that no one in the Army aside from the small unit leaders in the field "gets it."

That is not true--we got it years ago. And in this fight we have been getting it from day one. I can assure you that from the very first, we have at JRTC seen this as a small unit fight--buttressed by observation from theater.

The real issue is those who do not get it and who resist, delay, or block adaptation. There I would look to senior leadership and especially senior leadership via the proponent system.

As for trotting out the Israeli model for training--give me a break. The assumption that the IDF paras are on a higher plain of learning is --here you go, Ken White--more bovine excreta

Tom