Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
We need to remember the enemy in COIN. He, too, adapts or dies. If he plays his hand poorly and our side plays its hand just a little better, we win and he loses - vice versa. In the end, our strategy, operations, and tactics do not need to be perfect, just better than the enemy's. I wonder how many COINs have been won at the margins.

One really interesting question is why the Army and USMC have adapted so much more rapidly than they did in Vietnam. I suspect that it involves less resistance at more senior levels to change. Part of that has to do with 15 years of reasonable emphasis at CGSC on MOOTW/LIC/and all the other 100 names. Part of it has to do with pretty good doctrine for much of that time in FM 100-20 (1990) and JP 3-07 (1995) and related doctrine pubs like FM 100-23 for any who cared to refer to them. Clearly, some officers have had experiences that have made them ready to draw analogies to COIN ops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, it seems likely, that unlike several past instances , there was a cadre of senior and relatively senior officers who, when brought together, could and did provide a critical mass for change on the ground.

John,

If I had to point to one factor above all the others I would point to the existence of a tailored CTC program. NTC led the way in Gulf War 91 as the flagship of the heavy forces. JRTC led the way in 2001, rather JRTC had paved much of the way already. The variety of "assymetric" tactics and forces had long been a staple of JRTC.

The other link as self-serving as this sounds was CALL. Now I say that as much as a philosophical answer as a factual answer because what CALL represents is the attitude and the idea that we should learn and adapt. Where we fall short is where we fail to live up to that idea.

Taken in tandem and and now looking back a bit, I would say that JRTC was more than ready in 2004-2005 with all the elements of COIN as they emerged in 3-24. The small unit leaders were already doing most of what 3-24 callls for. What was missing was an approach that drew senior acceptance of ideas like "the best weapons in COIN don't shoot." It was not that we did not understand that idea; it was that senior leaders had to be led and in some cases bludgeoned into listening to such ideas. There was too much movement to contact and not enough situational understanding.

I don't discount anything you said above, I just point to the CTCs where leaders could actually put in motion what the schools taught and learn from the experience. To me the classic was the brigade commander of the Rakkasans who told vistors in 2002 that he had considered all the variety of elements portrayed at a JRTC rotation (pre-9-11) to be unrealistic until he ended up dealing with them all in Afghanistan.

Best

Tom