FCS in future conflicts

[SWJED]

Am I the only one that thinks the original post was written by a defense contractor for FCS? I smell SAIC:

:

I resemble that remark .

[Rob Thornton]

All good bumper stickers - however, the effectiveness of the platforms, payloads, SoS, etc. all depend on the quality of the people who crew, use fight, interface with the GUIs, conduct operations in, from and around them, and most of all lead soldiers against tough enemies in challenging enviornments where technology does not solve all the problems and sometimes even encmbers us.

From one of the UAEE/FBCT-EE plank holders I'm hoping we wind up with the right tools. With the quality of some of the folks like COL Schaill, I believe we'll do OK.

As for contractors - I just consider that "life after" - although I'm still a few years shy

[MountainRunner]

Kreker,
That's a great narrative, but how does it fit with the reality of interfacing with people on the ground in a time where even the HMMWV is seen as less useful than the classic open air jeep?

[Ski]

There's no way in hell that 15 EBCT/FBCT's are activated. A single FCS equipped BCT costs well into the mutiple BILLION dollar range. Hell, a Stryker BCT costs $1.2B.

This is the fallacy of the Army and FCS - they continue to expect to have these massive defense budgets with gigantic procurement programs. Hell, the FCS program was just tagged with an additional $13B rise in costs, now bringing it up to $174B for the entire program.

And as Mountain Runner states, it isn't even going to be that useful outside a high intensity conflict. A buried 500lb bomb will blow one of these to hell like any other vehicle.

I've read the argument about why FCS is needed - to counter hyper-kinetic rounds. We can't even get LOSAT right, and that sucker is 9 feet long and almost 200 pounds.

[MountainRunner]

FYI: In the spirit of this thread, over in another part of SWC I posted this link to a brief survey on robots in war. Thanks in advance for filling out the survey.

[Granite_State]

There's no way in hell that 15 EBCT/FBCT's are activated. A single FCS equipped BCT costs well into the mutiple BILLION dollar range. Hell, a Stryker BCT costs $1.2B.

This is the fallacy of the Army and FCS - they continue to expect to have these massive defense budgets with gigantic procurement programs. Hell, the FCS program was just tagged with an additional $13B rise in costs, now bringing it up to $174B for the entire program.

And as Mountain Runner states, it isn't even going to be that useful outside a high intensity conflict. A buried 500lb bomb will blow one of these to hell like any other vehicle.

That's my fear in a nutshell.

[Kreker]

There's no way in hell that 15 EBCT/FBCT's are activated. A single FCS equipped BCT costs well into the mutiple BILLION dollar range. Hell, a Stryker BCT costs $1.2B.

This is the fallacy of the Army and FCS - they continue to expect to have these massive defense budgets with gigantic procurement programs. Hell, the FCS program was just tagged with an additional $13B rise in costs, now bringing it up to $174B for the entire program.

And as Mountain Runner states, it isn't even going to be that useful outside a high intensity conflict. A buried 500lb bomb will blow one of these to hell like any other vehicle.

I've read the argument about why FCS is needed - to counter hyper-kinetic rounds. We can't even get LOSAT right, and that sucker is 9 feet long and almost 200 pounds.

Ski,
I only state the facts as I know them. What the future holds is anyones best guess. As of today, the Army leadership supports FCS. It's the Army's major modernization program. To put it in perspective funding wise across DOD it is the ONLY
Army program in the top 10!

Don't know where you can up with the additonal $13B.

Yes, a 500lb buried bomb will blow up an FCS vehicle. But, hopefully with the sensor array, UGVs, UAVs, that 500lb bomb will be detected, either during emplacement or prior to contact.

Thanks for the opportunity to dialogue.

[Kreker]

Kreker,
That's a great narrative, but how does it fit with the reality of interfacing with people on the ground in a time where even the HMMWV is seen as less useful than the classic open air jeep?

Good Day MountainRunner,
Good question. The FBCT ground Soldier (all Soldiers serving in close combat, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment systems who fight outside there FCS vehicles) ensemble features the same software capabilities, networked communications, and embedded training as found on the vehicles. As a minimum, each Soldier system is able to integrate a Soldier radio that can communicate as well as interact with sensor fields, UAVs, UGVs, and networked fires. Leaders have additional capability. The Soldier radio enables the Soldier to transmit and receive digital messages, orders, reports, and graphics. The radio can send and receive digital, voice, text, video, pictures, operational graphics, and overlays. The Soldier will be interoperable with current (legacy) and future C2 systems, as well as Joint, Interagency, and Multinational C2 systems. Will have to wait and see about the latter. This may not have fully addressed your question. Again, PM FCS is incorporating lessons learned from the ME, so I would hope that a Soldier being on the ground interfacing with HN forces, civilians, refugees, and displaced civilians, will have the means to interoperate/support the mission requirement.

[TT]

Hi Kekar,

Thank you for addressing the issue of FCS (a recent report said that the Army has come up with a new name but so far has not released what this is).

A question I have is how resilient is the FCS? This question arises from its ‘system of systems’ concept. A general argument is that the more complicated an interdependent system, the more likely it is that something will not work or go wrong, and the greater the possibility of a resultant damaging cascade across the system. I know you said that ‘tactical FBCT formations are more survivable … than current tactical units in the COIN urban environments’. Nonetheless, a question has to be to what degree is it possible, or even likely, that the functional elimination or even reduced capability of parts of the system could lead to substantial system degradation or even system failure?

I am not purely thinking of the consequences of lethal combat, but also the possible (probable?) use of electronic counter measures by an opponent. The possibly of the FCS networked system being seriously degraded or even collapsing in the midst of combat is a terrible prospect.

Thanks!

[Kreker]

Hi Kekar,

Thank you for addressing the issue of FCS (a recent report said that the Army has come up with a new name but so far has not released what this is).

A question I have is how resilient is the FCS? This question arises from its ‘system of systems’ concept. A general argument is that the more complicated an interdependent system, the more likely it is that something will not work or go wrong, and the greater the possibility of a resultant damaging cascade across the system. I know you said that ‘tactical FBCT formations are more survivable … than current tactical units in the COIN urban environments’. Nonetheless, a question has to be to what degree is it possible, or even likely, that the functional elimination or even reduced capability of parts of the system could lead to substantial system degradation or even system failure?

I am not purely thinking of the consequences of lethal combat, but also the possible (probable?) use of electronic counter measures by an opponent. The possibly of the FCS networked system being seriously degraded or even collapsing in the midst of combat is a terrible prospect.

Thanks!

Hi TT,
The Army plans on releasing the new name at the AUSA National Convention in October.

On your second and third points, the Battle Command Network (BCN) is an interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, displaying, disseminating, storing and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support personnel. That said, the BCN dependability results from the network’s redundant, multilayered architecture, reliability of network components, and the network’s capability to withstand attack. Not only is the network dependable and secure, but it is to be self-configuring, self-healing, and survivable. I’ve included a word document that provides a basic overview of the BCN.

Thanks.

[Anthony Hoh]

Kreker,
My problem with this kind of technology is that the "Army" wont find the time to train the analog methods. As an OC I have followed the SSG that could not do simple mounted land navigation due to his dependace on the BFT. This unnamed Soldier had taken this route twice before. We made multiple "route corrections" and by 3 oclock in the morning I was ready for him to hook his tow bar to my vechile and drag me around the "box" at his lesiure. Super cool guy technology is great. But it will fail me. Technology still has to be fielded by the right people. I feel as if the Army is trying to overcome the soft underbelly of the Nintendo generation with technology. When what Soldiers need is tougher realistic training with no batteries included. Are any of the technology experts talking about how much training time will be consumed by mastering these imporved digital systems? And will their be time for me to teach a SSG how to do terrain association on a map? I have seen the FCS video at the last AUSA convention. I admit its cool and it briefs well. I have seen some of the stuff upclose, as we have an RDECOM rep next door to me. However I feel lethality needs to take a backseat to personality in a COIN enviroment. Give me 1.2B and I would teach every Soldier in the Army basic Arabic now that would save lives.

[kit]

Good Day MountainRunner,
Good question. The FBCT ground Soldier (all Soldiers serving in close combat, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment systems who fight outside there FCS vehicles) ensemble features the same software capabilities, networked communications, and embedded training as found on the vehicles. As a minimum, each Soldier system is able to integrate a Soldier radio that can communicate as well as interact with sensor fields, UAVs, UGVs, and networked fires. Leaders have additional capability. The Soldier radio enables the Soldier to transmit and receive digital messages, orders, reports, and graphics. The radio can send and receive digital, voice, text, video, pictures, operational graphics, and overlays. The Soldier will be interoperable with current (legacy) and future C2 systems, as well as Joint, Interagency, and Multinational C2 systems. Will have to wait and see about the latter. This may not have fully addressed your question. Again, PM FCS is incorporating lessons learned from the ME, so I would hope that a Soldier being on the ground interfacing with HN forces, civilians, refugees, and displaced civilians, will have the means to interoperate/support the mission requirement.

If he's so busy interfacing and communicating, when will he find the time to shoot back? Can we say, "sensory overload?"

[kit]

When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

[Kreker]

When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

Hi Kit,
Couldn't agee with you more, thus twice the number of boots on the ground in a FBCT than a HBCT.
Cheers.

[Kreker]

I resemble that remark .

This thread started with a question from Granite State based on my background input, which stated I was a defense contractor working FCS...not SAIC or Boeing. That said, I've spent the last 36 years working for the Army. I take great pride in that institution and try to do the best of my ability and beyond for today's Soldiers...for they are the ones carrying the load.