Could you or anyone else expand on a "regimental system"? Thanks.Originally Posted by Steve Blair
Just my pre-coffee $.02. It was an interesting article, though. Personally, I'd like to see a return to a regimental system....
Could you or anyone else expand on a "regimental system"? Thanks.
Just my pre-coffee $.02. It was an interesting article, though. Personally, I'd like to see a return to a regimental system....
"But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
"Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"
I'll jump on that and say what SB was probably referring to is the Brit tradition of families serving in the same Regiment through multiple generations, as well as the career progression where a guy might leave the Regiment for a tour elsewhere, but would always return home to the same Regiment.
I wish we could achieve something like that too.
I was also referring to the Old Army system where the regiment was the largest organized unit maintained in peacetime. Officers tended to stay within their own regiments for some years, and each developed its own personality and methods for preserving doctrine and tradition.
Like all systems, this did have some problems, but I feel that in most practical cases the good outweighed the bad. Battalions were ad hoc field organizations, as were squadrons, and not part of the regular organization.
I don't think we'll see something like this again, which is to my mind a real loss. Those old regiments had esprit de corps that you don't find today in many units.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Sometimes that "esprit" was really little more than a form of group think. In the case of British regiments, this could equate to centuries of tradition unhampered by progress. Look at some of the debacles of the British Wars of Empire, up to and including WWI, for instances. More near and dear examples would be the British advance and retreat from the American colonial towns of Lexington and Concord or Braddock's defeat during the expedition to reduce Fort Duquesne (Braddock was a longtime member of the Coldstream Guards).
Perhaps, but we see the same thing now on a larger scale. There were other contributing factors to the British problems (to include their officer accession system...purchase, anyone?). I'm not saying the regimental system is perfect (because there is no such thing as a 'perfect' system), but I do think it would be better than what we have now.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Properly controlled and administered, it probably has value--post-Cardwell reforms versions anyway. But I do not think that we want to try to develop it along the lines of geographic recruitment and home base staging areas used by the Brits (and French for that matter). BTW, I thought we went through this whole exercise back in the late 80s-early 90s--I seem to remember wearing regimental crests on the right pocket or some other location depending on which variant of shirt/sweater/jacket/blouse you chose to wear, honorary colonels, and all that other mumbo-jumbo. I guess it was an idea whose time had not yet come, eh?
Maybe we just didn't have catchy enough names, like John Wayne's Own Rifles (sort of like the Queen's Own Hussars) and such.
The US Army never used home basing as a concept for its regiments. It was kicked around a few times in the 1880s or so but never took root. The Army has tried reviving regimental traditions from time to time, an effort that has been somewhat successful in cavalry units (partly because of their organization and partly from the cav mystique) and less so in other units. I'd hazard a guess that part of the reason for that is the reflagging and such that usually accompanies such "efforts," making them counter-productive. Our rotation/personnel 'development' programs (even in peacetime) also don't lend themselves to stable units.Properly controlled and administered, it probably has value--post-Cardwell reforms versions anyway. But I do not think that we want to try to develop it along the lines of geographic recruitment and home base staging areas used by the Brits (and French for that matter). BTW, I thought we went through this whole exercise back in the late 80s-early 90s--I seem to remember wearing regimental crests on the right pocket or some other location depending on which variant of shirt/sweater/jacket/blouse you chose to wear, honorary colonels, and all that other mumbo-jumbo. I guess it was an idea whose time had not yet come, eh?
Maybe we just didn't have catchy enough names, like John Wayne's Own Rifles (sort of like the Queen's Own Hussars) and such.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
The Triumph of Bureaucracy
Seems to me that proper control and administration may be part of the problem. British Army traditions post Cardwell did an amazing amount of good -- all destroyed by "good personnel management practices." The 'human resources' fetish is just dangerous. The British Army today is having many of the same problems we are having due to that fallacy. Sad. In both cases.Properly controlled and administered, it probably has value--post-Cardwell reforms versions anyway. But I do not think that we want to try to develop it along the lines of geographic recruitment and home base staging areas used by the Brits (and French for that matter). BTW, I thought we went through this whole exercise back in the late 80s-early 90s--I seem to remember wearing regimental crests on the right pocket or some other location depending on which variant of shirt/sweater/jacket/blouse you chose to wear, honorary colonels, and all that other mumbo-jumbo. I guess it was an idea whose time had not yet come, eh?
Maybe we just didn't have catchy enough names, like John Wayne's Own Rifles (sort of like the Queen's Own Hussars) and such.
We did try that starting in the early 80s -- that was one of Shy Meyer's many good contributions to the Army. Unfortunately, his attempts to cut MilPerCen in half -- it would not have been needed if we had truly implemented his plan -- were stopped dead by all those civilians living in northern Virginia flooding the Capitol and he was told to back off. MilPerCen survived, grew and is now the US Army Human Resources Command. May God have mercy on the Army. The 41s will not, those guys eat their young.
A properly set up regimental system will be self tending and will not need control or administration to speak of. Meyer's plan was good, the bureaucracy just waited him out.
The names aren't necessary. The closest you can get to a regimental system today is the 82d Abn Div. Folks leave there and go on short tours or long ones (mostly to the two other Airborne units) and return to Bragg. When they get back, they fight to go back to the same Brigade. Unit loyalty is strong; maybe not Brit post-Cardwell strong but close to it. Try to put a 504 guy in the 325 and he'll rebel -- and vice versa.
There is the disadvantage you cite of group think -- that is also a plus. Group think has saved the day in ground combat on many an occasion. Ask the Marines. There is also a significant advantage. Those Officers and NCOs returning to the same units keep other Officers and NCOs honest. In a typical Army unit, if you have a dirt bag for a peer, you'd like to get him boarded out of the Army -- but he's leaving in six months, it's too hard to do, so you don't bother. Or you're leaving and you don't bother. In a unit with personnel continuity, one will not tolerate the slackers.
Which reminds me -- to all you future Chiefs of Staff out there; AR 600-200 says any NCO that gets selected by the centralized board will be promoted unless his Commander writes a letter to have him removed for cause. Commanders do not have time to write letters about marginal people so slackers get promoted just by sticking around. When you get to E Ring, change that to read the person will NOT be promoted unless the Commander writes a letter.
Regimental Negatives
I'd definitely agree on the issue of esprit de corps, a few guys I know and/or work with are ex-British Army, and a friend of mine just started at Sandhurst, and it seems like the benefits of the regimental system here are enormous.
But in the bigger picture, there are a lot of negatives too. In the past, the regimental system both retarded uniform training and institutional knowledge (see Britain's small wars from Clive on up), and even impeded modernization (cavalry regimental loyalties and fears often played a bigger role than conservatism in the slow pace of mechanization in the Twenties and Thirties).
That may all be in the past, but there are still some substantial negatives, mainly tied to parochialism, each regiment jealously guarding its perks and slice of the budget, particularly the more influential ones, i.e. Guards, Paras, etc. Lewis Page goes into some detail in his book, http://www.amazon.com/Lions-Donkeys-...0260057&sr=8-1 , which I highly recommend. My copy's in storage or I'd find the excerpts.
However, some of these negatives might be negated in a much larger army like America's, I don't know.
The US regimental system didn't really work along the same lines in terms of budget (although the original 2nd Cavalry was an exception...it was Jefferson Davis' pet regiment when he was Secretary of War) or perks. You did see squabbling from time to time between the combat branches, but most acrimony was reserved for Staff officers.
In the Old Army most resistance to change surfaced with senior branch officers and not within the regiments per se. There was some fussing and resistance about mechanization among cavalry units in the 1920s and 1930s, but part of that had to do with the fear that a new armor branch would cut into their traditional roles (which it of course ended up doing...but then armor became as protective of its roles and uses...).
The biggest issue with the old regimental system in the US had to do with how promotions were handled. At the time it was by regimental seniority first, then by branch. That was later changed, but in the years after the Civil War there was a tremendous amount of rank stagnation.
There are certainly regimental negatives, but I'm not sure they outweigh the positives IF the system is designed correctly.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
As a Product of the Regimental System...
I'd like to say that the Regimental System, when properly functioning overall, institutionalizes a degree of basic competence, and somethime outright execellence, that most other systems cannot provide under normal conditions. Probably the single most important virtue in practice of the Regimental System is that you don't have to keep re-training everyone at each and every turn in the basics, or keep having to reteach lessons learned; that's all (when the Regiment is functioning properly) more or less automatic. Obviously the troops have continue to hone the basics; but in the Regimental System there is (normally) sufficient stability and continuity of personnel and standards of training that make keeping and honing the basics much easier and more efficient while allowing for a great deal more time and effort to be used in learning about and training for much more advanced tactics and operations. Steve is very correct about the benefits of the Regiment System (when functioning properly).
The US Army wouldn't be particularly inclined (though doctrine in theory allows for this) towards using a regular (ie. Non-Air Assault/Airborne/Ranger) infantry battalion in an air assault raid on an enemy HQ or airfield, but a Commonwealth Army would. Similarly, US Marines are tasked with most of the amphibious mission (Rangers have a slice of the pie too) in the US Armed Forces; but a Commonwealth Army considers amphibious assaults a normal part of the infantry battalion role. A great deal of this is making a virtue of necessity, as the money and manpower just isn't there to maintain an entire Marine Corps or a large Airborne Force (and Commonwealth Airborne Forces and Marines tend to be commando-trained, not regular infantry who happen to be on jump-status or trained in amphib ops). But the Regimental System produces efficiencies that may allow for a much more expansive range of training and taskings for what would otherwise be a rather more pedestrian infantry battalion in an Army without such a Regimental System.
Also, an ordinary rifleman in a Commonwealth Army receives 6 month's recruit and basic infantry training (with no specialization in machine-gunning, recce, assault pioneer, anti-armour, etc. - that's for later - , just rifleman training) and to a generally higher standard than most other armies, where the battalions are expected to train the troops up to snuff, taking away valuable time for other training. The Regimental System goes a long way to avoiding this last situation. And again, it (normally) provides a continuity and stability of personnel and training standards that most other systems can't surpass, although a few can match. When you join a Regiment, you are a part of it for the rest of your carrer, and will spend most or even all of your career within that Regiment. This results in a cumulative degree of professional excellence and experience that is very difficult to acquire by most other means.
But, as Granite State and others pointed out, there are, amongst others, two potentially serious problems that they have already identified with the Regimental System. The first is "Group Think". Now, as pointed out by others, this actually has benefits too, providing both a sense of tradition and example and a force of will in the face of adversity that stands in good stead at critical moments on the battlefield. But there is also the problems that when the system isn't functioning properly, "Group Think" especially resulting in nepotism and the like, can result in tactical ossification and downright moral corruption and break-down of morale and discipline. There are such things as bad regiments, and when that happens, it often takes a wholesale housecleaning by outsiders to retrieve the situtation.
The Second, and perhaps most common problem with the Regimental System is Tribalism, which not only makes it difficult to work with other Regiments, Corps, and Arms at times, also resulting in tactical ossification, but in some real unpleasantness between Regiments. For those who have never been part of a Regiment, it may be difficult to grasp the sometimes gut-level, even visceral at times, psychlogical and emotional impact that being part of a Regiment has. The Regiment is your world; the Army is a "foreign" body with which your Regiment in effect has a contract with.
Promotions in the Regiment are made by the Regimental Senate, not the Army. Each Regiment has not only its own history and traditions, but its own institutions, museums (even Battalions of a Regiment may have their own museums), libraries, messes, clubs, barracks, associations, etc., that are all directly owned (except for barracks, the Army owns these) and supported personally and financially by the members of the Regiment (and to which each member must contribute). No outsider is permitted into these places without being accompanied and signed in by a member of the Regiment. Each Regiment is kept separated from the others by a respectable and safe distance. Real unpleasantness may occur when these rules are not consciously followed.
But the best system is not the Regimental System. For all its superiority over most other systems, the WWII German Divisional System is by far the best. Generally similar to the British Regimental System, including an emphasis on local recruiting, the Divisional System (in turned prodeuced by the Wehrkreise System) is the best, and while it produced no less strong regiments than the British system, the focus of tribal identity was the Combined-Arms Division, not the single-arm Regiment. Couple this with the superb training, discipline, leadership, and Auftragstaktik with the Geenral staff System (another thread in itself), and you have the finest "System" in the world. The performance of the Deutchesheer in WWII I think bears this argument out rather well. This is the system every Army should use.
The Regimental System is not exactly a stranger to the selective use/abuse of history for noble, and less-than noble purposes, especially when used to justify or excuse tactical ossification.
A perspective from inside a Regiment.
Last edited by Norfolk; 10-08-2007 at 08:17 PM.
I agree there are many pluses to a Regimental
system -- and to the German system; I think the biggest advantage of the former is, as Norlfolks says:
The advantage that accrues is an intangible -- if one is going to stay in a unit, one wants to be with competent people who can be tolerated. In most of the US Army for many years since WW II, people tended to move every two to three years. Thus if there was a slacker, it was too easy to say "He'll (or I'll) be gone in seven months, he's not worth getting into a hassle over." The transfers don't happen as often but that is still the overarching mentality. How much those transfers lend to professional competenece and development and how much they serve to justify a large personnel bureaucracy is in the view of the beholder and grist for another thread."...When you join a Regiment, you are a part of it for the rest of your carrer, and will spend most or even all of your career within that Regiment. This results in a cumulative degree of professional excellence and experience that is very difficult to acquire by most other means."
An exception to this has been the 82d Airborne which, in this sense functions like a large Regiment. Men go to the Division and spend years there; they may rotate out to Alaska or Korea or even Europe but they tend to go back to the Division and will generally fight to go back to their last unit. Thus, the NCOs there are long serving and prone to come down on the marginally competent and run them off.
Thus, the advantage is, I think, the continuity and not the structure.
A downside of the system is that local recruitment. The biggest problem is that if a unit has a bad day and receives massive casualties, it can devastate a small town back home.
Then there is the tribal issue. I've heard Patricias say bad things about the RCRand heard the Black Watch say unbelievable things about the rest of the British Army. The opinion of the 3 RAR about the rest of the Strine Army is also not good. In fairness, with no local recruitment at all, the opinion of the Fifth Marines about the 1st and 7th did not bear repeating once upon a time and the guys from the 504PIR will tell you about the shortcomings of the 325 and 505. Tribalism is an acquired trait in that respect but it has been my observation in the larger Army that such tribalism and unit loyalty is less intense, mostly due to the large number of units with whom one has served in several Divisions because of an individual assignment policy.
I suggest the greatest advantage the Commonwealth Armies have is in this:
and this:"Also, an ordinary rifleman in a Commonwealth Army receives 6 month's recruit and basic infantry training (with no specialization in machine-gunning, recce, assault pioneer, anti-armour, etc. - that's for later - , just rifleman training) and to a generally higher standard than most other armies, where the battalions are expected to train the troops up to snuff, taking away valuable time for other training."
That, fortunately, is changing but is sure isn't changing fast enough. These kids and units are capable of doing much more than we ask them to and, terribly, the biggest impediments all too often are nothing more than 'fear of failure' and lack of imagination. Norfolk is too polite to say so, I'm not -- we have too much money and we tend to overspend on the wrong things and pay inadequate attention to training."The US Army wouldn't be particularly inclined (though doctrine in theory allows for this) towards using a regular (ie. Non-Air Assault/Airborne/Ranger) infantry battalion in an air assault raid on an enemy HQ or airfield, but a Commonwealth Army would."
We train better now than we have in my lifetime -- we still do not do it long enough to get an inculcation of the standards and basics embedded in Joe's little psyche. We're still oriented to training WW II draftees -- and Lieutenants. The Marines do it a little better for both Officers and peons but we're shortchanging the troops. Shame on us...
Ohhhh, it Burns!
Then there is the tribal issue. I've heard Patricias say bad things about the RCR
These kids and units are capable of doing much more than we ask them to and, terribly, the biggest impediments all too often are nothing more than 'fear of failure' and lack of imagination. Norfolk is too polite to say so, I'm not -- we have too much money and we tend to overspend on the wrong things and pay inadequate attention to training.
We train better now than we have in my lifetime -- we still do not do it long enough to get an inculcation of the standards and basics embedded in Joe's little psyche. We're still oriented to training WW II draftees -- and Lieutenants. The Marines do it a little better for both Officers and peons but we're shortchanging the troops. Shame on us...
Well, I guess I just had that coming to me for my rash and unthinking statements vis-a-vis how the Airborne should go to the Air Force and saying the Marines were a part of the Navy (I have since engaged in some clarification of my statements in those matters, but that's another thread)..., and Ken has been so good as to be forgiving of my "youthful indiscretion"...
But ordinarily such statements would be considered fightin' words, and the flamethrowers would come out and the offenders shown no mercy for their insolence and offence to the Regiment (and after this post, I'm going to work off my frustrations on a few PPCLI's [pronounced "picklies" - and that's the polite version]). But right now, I have to save the flamethrower for those Marines and Paratroopers who took undue offence to my earlier statements
The truth is that much of USA and USMC doctrine is actually an improvement over Commonwealth Armies' doctrine, even at tactical level. It just gets lost in often inadequate individual training as well as the personnel turbulence of US units (especially the Army). Take, for example the rifle squad or section. US Army has a 9-man squad right now, with a Squad Leader and two 4-man fire teams; USMC has its 13-man squad with its Leader and three 4-man fire teams; most Commonwealth Armies have an 8-man section right now, with two 4-man assault groups/fire teams, but the Section Commander has to pull double-duty as the leader of one of the two assault groups/fire teams, so he's not free to direct covering fire (doctrinally, the Section 2i/c, who also pulls double duty as the leader of the second assault group/fire team, does this, while the Section Commander leads the assault) on the enemy during an attack, or to move about to coordinate the defence.
Furthermore, in the advance-to-contact, the entire Section moves all at once, as one, thus completely exposing itself to enemy observation and fire. In movement-to-contact, both the US Army and the USMC squads provide overwatch with at least one Fire Team and the Squad Leader under cover as the other Fire Team (or Teams) move to cover, thus greatly reducing the risk of crippling losses to the squad. A Commonwealth Section requires the rest of the platoon to provide overwatch (and this may be a single section and the weapons det overwatching the other two). Granted, a Commonwealth Section is easy to control (it's really more or less just a big fire team), and it's quick to respond with all its firepower on contact, all at once, but it's terribly vulnerable in the meantime.
The US troops (particularly the Army, less so the Marines) just aren't given a chance to realize their potential as either individual soldiers or as cohesive units. The US Army infantry especially is not given much of a chance to really show what it is potentially capable of. It would be just as good as the best Commonwealth units, and those US Light Infantry units (as well as other types involved in the same program) that were formed and trained under COHORT twenty or so years ago were on paper almost as well-led and -trained, and probably exceeded in those same areas many, perhaps even most Commonwealth units in practice. On those occasions when it's allowed to get its act together, the US Army can shine with the best of them. Trouble is, the System usually won't let it, but the Army could do it if the System let it, make no mistake. Ken's right that the Army is still stuck in WWII training-wise, and that it programmed to produce mass quantities of mediocrely-trained troosp. It's not right and can and should be changed.
Last edited by Norfolk; 10-08-2007 at 11:04 PM. Reason: I somehow put my own words in someone else's quote.
Let's assume that's true. I don't know if it is, or isn't, but if it is.....
Since the division is now acting more like a corps why not go the final step and organize permanently into big separate brigades commanded by a brigadier? The brigadier could have one or two colonels under him in case something smaller was needed for a specific mission. They could command ad hoc combat commands (or something similar to a Marine Corps MEU designed to fit the Army's needs) of one or two battalions for a specific mission.
Tradition and heraldry could still be maintained. You could still have the 82nd Airborne Brigade, etc. In fact, a lot of historic division shoulder patches that haven't been worn since WWII might have to come back for brigade HQs. The National Guard does that now.
You could also divide the U.S. into brigade districts. This would probably meet our needs for "tribalism" and a sense of primary group somewhat better than the British regimental system. A soldier from a particular region could still serve with his region's combined arms brigade even if he did not want a combat arms MOS. Not so for a single branch regiment drawn from a particular region.
And if you don't like those ideas.....we could always call them legions and subdivide them into cohorts!
Strength and honor!
Last edited by Rifleman; 10-10-2007 at 04:58 AM.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Horrors!
The Pen-tagun will revolve on its axis! You're eliminating Major General spaces. Absolute no-no, that...Let's assume that's true. I don't know if it is, or isn't, but if it is.....
Since the division is now acting more like a corps why not go the final step and organize permanently into big separate brigades commanded by a brigadier? The brigadier could have one or two colonels under him in case something smaller was needed for a specific mission. They could command ad hoc combat commands (or something similar to a Marine Corps MEU designed to fit the Army's needs) of one or two battalions for a specific mission.
. . .
. . .
And if you don't like those ideas.....we could always call them legions and subdivide them into cohorts!
Strength and honor!
(Even though you're really right on big brigades, the command structure and the lineage and patch bit. That's been proposed many times and what I said has always defeated it -- that and the WW II mentality. Which is ironic because other than North Africa, we really fought all of WW II as RCTs, the divisions just tried to keep up and for the most part, did the repple depple, beans and bullets bit...)
Last edited by Ken White; 10-10-2007 at 05:24 AM. Reason: added last sentence before going to bed :)
The Brigading of Regiments
Rifleman, you have articulated something that I have been thinking about for some time now, which is the idea of returning to the old system of brigading regiments. Now, the exact composition of such brigades would obviously depend upon their role. For example, I'd like to see an Armoured Brigade composed of 2 Regiments of Armoured (mechanized) Infantry and a Regiment each of Armour, Artillery, Engineers, and a Recce Battalion (at least),et al , bumping brigade back up to the level that it had in the US Army prior to McNair's Triangular Division (but not necessarily dispensing with the triangular arrangement, let alone return to the old Square Division, unless that proved to be tactically better). Division in turn would likewise be bumped up back up to the same level as it had pre-c.1940, and Corps in turn would displace Field Army; "Army Group" would simply be what you find in NATO (a multi-national group of army corps). Think about; in the entire US Army, their would be at most 2 corps commander slots, and that's including both Active and Reserve Components.Let's assume that's true. I don't know if it is, or isn't, but if it is.....
Since the division is now acting more like a corps why not go the final step and organize permanently into big separate brigades commanded by a brigadier? The brigadier could have one or two colonels under him in case something smaller was needed for a specific mission. They could command ad hoc combat commands (or something similar to a Marine Corps MEU designed to fit the Army's needs) of one or two battalions for a specific mission.
Tradition and heraldry could still be maintained. You could still have the 82nd Airborne Brigade, etc. In fact, a lot of historic division shoulder patches that haven't been worn since WWII might have to come back for brigade HQs. The National Guard does that now.
You could also divide the U.S. into brigade districts. This would probably meet our needs for "tribalism" and a sense of primary group somewhat better than the British regimental system. A soldier from a particular region could still serve with his region's combined arms brigade even if he did not want a combat arms MOS. Not so for a single branch regiment drawn from a particular region.
And if you don't like those ideas.....we could always call them legions and subdivide them into cohorts!
Strength and honor!
There's something oddly satisfying just imagining the howls and screams emanating from the galaxy of the stars as 2-,3-, and 4-star types fell from their lofty heights with no inflated formation structures to "justify" their holding of excessive rank. It feels kind of good...until Ken comes along and administers the usual dose of grim, depressing reality
.
P.S.: While I'm still dreaming, I'd like an Infantry Brigade of 3 Regiments of Infantry (foot), a Regiment of Artillery, and a Battalion each of Armour, APCs, Engineers, Reconnaissance, etc.; basically what the good old-fashioned regular infantry divisions used to be, but much better-led and -trained.
All right, dreaming over.
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