Quote Originally Posted by SSG Rock
What were we to do with conventional forces after phase 1?
I think I can help explain, or perhaps give another perspective, what the extra troops could be use for. When one country goes kinetic against another country, there are a series of events that can be use toward a successful campaign. Except when the US military was containing Russia, the US military seemed to use a strategy developed by Col. Boyd called PISRR, which means Penetrate, Isolate, Subvert, Reorientation, and Reharmonize. Roughly the campaign goes something like this. First you Penetrate your enemy’s country. Then you Isolate the government from its people (in Iraq’s case it simply meant Isolating Saddam from his people). Then you Subvert the Iraqi people by reorient their government towards our government’s way of thinking. The last R is for Reharmonize the nation towards its new government. Re-harmonization happens as the government starts to function under its new orientation and the people follow.

You use those “extra” troops in the reorientation phase of the PISRR movement. Unlike we did in Iraq, you don’t stand-down the government of the nation you are trying to Reharmonize. You reorient the government to your way of thinking. I am not quite sure how to do this, but one way I imagine is: you can get any military to pay attention to your way of thinking by paying them and keeping them with food and supplies. I believe this is something our conventional forces understands and could have accomplished. I believe solders pay transcends language barriers and culture. Our conventional forces could have enabled government officials to keep the support coming to the new Iraqi military forces. Standing an American GI behind Iraqi government official would help to reorient them to our way of thinking. If not, an attitude adjustment would have been in order.

If we had put our conventional forces in charge of tasks that consisted of getting Iraqi government officials to do their jobs, reorientated to the US military standards, I believe it would have taken all extra conventional forces to accomplished this. These tasks could then move out to mayors, clerks, and other government official in all parts of the Iraqi government. I think it would have taken a lot of troops.

I believe something happened like this after Germany fell during WWII. Suddenly in Germany none of the mayors, clerks and government’s officials were Nazis. They were simply pawns of the Nazis movement, or so they say. It may have been true, but it may also have had something to do with an American GI standing behind them with a rifle. I think ex-Saddam officials would have claimed something similar.

But then, during Reorientation it doesn’t matter what their implicit laws are (those beliefs inside their heads) as long as they function to our explicit rule-sets. Re-harmonization comes later and really involves the people of the nation you are trying to build and not those in positions of power.

I believe the amount of troops to use was never in question (no general goes to battle with too few troops, troops are something you can never get more of in time for the battle). What was in question was the battle plan. Did we want to go into Iraq with A PISRR movement or something else? If Saddam had used WMD’s there would have been fewer people to handle in Baghdad, so maybe the thought that they would receive us as liberators doesn’t seem so far fetch, as it does to me now. Also, because the outcome of a war cannot be known, there is an element of chance in any battle plan, so theoretically any plan could work. It may be safe to say we can learn from any battle but it is hard to judge.

Besides the element of chance, planning for a war represents an Observation, Orientation, Decision making and Acting (OODA) movement, also developed by Col. Boyd. If your enemy knows you well enough, they can enter into your orientation and control your decision-making. As an example, if they know you will be using a high maneuver orientation, such as a Blitzkrieg, they will know the importance of information. They will know the extreme measures needed to gain information and the extreme pressure that will develop to use those extreme measures. Not only that, but the enemy will also understand how public outcry will develop in the case of possible indiscretions of interrogators. I believe one such enemy entered our planning of the Iraq war. That enemy was Iran and they entered our loop through ex-Iraqi patriots beholden to the ways of Iran.

In many ways, the war in Iraq is a continuation of the war between Persians and Arabs. I don’t know a lot about their struggle, I think it has to do about Islam. Persians think anyone can become a prophet and the Arabs say no they can’t. Shia’s are the dividing line. Iran is using the Shia as pawns in their war with the Arabs. It would be like playing a game of Chess and your opponent uses not only their pawns but yours as well. If I am not mistaken the Persians invented chess. Anyway, the Iranians are still in our loop. What ever we do against Iran, because Iran is still in our decision making loop, Iran already knows the outcome.