Basra transition

[section9]

When the Brits pull out, I don't see any choice but for us to go down there and secure it.

Cordesman's assessment was right. The response of the British Army and the commentariat surrounding the Brown Government was to call Anthony Cordesman a right-wing neocon.

Anything but.....

Question: will we have enough Mojo in Anbar to pull forces from there to go down south? It will definitely have to be an overwatch kind of thing, as I think the Iranians have decided that they want to get a stranglehold on our supply lines.

The Brits are great and all, but the Brown Government wants out, ASAP.

[Rob Thornton]

There is probably a decision point about when & if to step in and reinforce Iraqi Security Forces. I'd think it would have several COAs on how to do so.

However it may mean allocating resources that might have been planned for elsewhere.

I just don't know enough about BASRA regarding its transition. It certainly brings up some of the problems of working with partners (any partners) who have their own political timetable - sooner or later partners must consider their other interests, commitments and for democracies especially - public will.

I don't know if you can hold up what happens in Basra as a model for future transitions - each city seems to be unique. However, I do think there are probably some lessons to be considered as we watch it. If it does go badly, the first questions may be why and if anything that was not done or was done wrong could have prevented it from going bad - somethings are problems with solutions - somethings are just conditions. That might lead us to a whole host of other questions that inform any larger scale transition plan.

The problem with any plan that calls for a vacuous style withdrawal is there is no flexibility to adjust to changing conditions because it would be difficult to really understand the causal relationship between events since everything goes at once. This is why a phased withdrawal that is contingent on setting at least some local, provincial and national conditions is paramount to reducing the amount of violence/friction/etc. It is critical. A transition should not be a source of additional instability that provides the enemy an opportunity to easily fill the vacuum left behind.

We've identified that we have long term vital interests in the Middle East for a number of reasons. Even if tomorrow we (the U.S.) somehow found an alternative energy source it would be sometime before we could replace our hydro-carbon industries, and far longer for evolving world economies to do so. Since our economy is tied to the global economy, it will continue to be vital to us to foster stability in the region. Iraq is a piece of that.

I hope nobody takes this as a swipe at the Basra transition - I'm just thinking how this event can inform the larger transition plan, and how this is (and will always be) also a civil-military issue for our policy makers who may not understand the fog, friction & chance associated with such decisions.

Articulating this in September is going to be a real challenge. We have some good folks in Congress. I hope they understand that as Gen Petreaus answers their questions he is providing them with his best military advice to achieve U.S. policy interests, and safeguard our most precious resources.

[tequila]

British troops on verge of long-awaited pullout from Basra - GUARDIAN, 23 Aug.

Britain's long-awaited and much-postponed pull-out from the Basra palace, its last remaining base in the Iraqi city, is imminent, sources have told the Guardian.


The move, which is symbolically significant and will improve the safety of British troops, is expected to take place within the next two weeks and may come within days, officials say. An announcement will be made by the Iraqis.

The decision to hand over the palace to Iraqi forces comes at a time of growing criticism by elements in the US military of Britain's role in southern Iraq. The criticism is dismissed by British military commanders ...

[tequila]

Militia moves on police center as Brits leave - AP, 27 Aug.

Shiite militiamen from the Mahdi Army took over the police joint command center in Basra on Sunday after British soldiers withdrew from the facility and handed control to the Iraqi police, witnesses said.
Police left the building when the militiamen, loyal to anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, arrived, the witnesses said.

The British military disputed the reports, saying they had been in contact with the Iraqi general in charge of security in Basra, who has said the Mahdi Army was not there.

But the witnesses said the Mahdi Army emptied the building — taking generators, computers, furniture and even cars, saying it was war booty — and remained there in the early evening.

The British military had maintained a small number of soldiers at the command center to help train Iraqi police.

However, the British withdrew Saturday night “in the framework of the plan for the handover” of British positions in the city to Iraqi control, said British spokesman Maj. Matthew Bird ...

[Granite_State]

Here's a question: is the British retreat from Basra, which is certainly what it looks like, a serious blow to the British counter-insurgency approach, supposedly perfected over decades in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Aden, Malaysia, and many other theaters? Softly softly, berets instead of helmets, and rapid enlistment and cession of control to local elements seems to have worked no better than much heavier U.S. tactics in Anbar, and indeed, probably worse.

The Financial Times covered this to some extent:
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage...9599778&page=1

"A soft approach to the population when you are talking about counterinsurgency is one thing, but it doesn't work when you [are up against] a large and dedicated military force," he says. The model that worked in Northern Ireland would not work in southern Iraq because of the thousands of militiamen who were challenging UK forces: "There were several hundred activists in Northern Ireland – that was not what you had in southern Iraq."

Seems to me, and maybe this is stating the obvious, that it's further proof that almost all of what we talk about here, like "population-centric" vs. "enemy-centric operations," levels of firepower, role of indigenous security forces, etc., depends almost entirely on the situation. Maybe there are some broad counter-insurgency principles, from the likes of Thompson, Galula, Kitson and others, but even these seem to make a lot more sense in the classical Communist insurgency case.






Of course, the article also says this:

The actions of UK troops also had on occasions inflamed local sentiment, the two men said in a report on the British experience in southern Iraq. In Maysan province, one of the four for which the UK had responsibility, UK forces upset locals by their efforts to collect heavy weapons. Elsewhere, house searches for explosives using dogs caused considerable anger.

"Despite their reputation for 'community soldiering', British soldiers had crossed local red lines without knowing it," the two authors concluded. They "did not know enough about the cultural environment [they] were operating in".

[jcustis]

All I can say is that instability in the Basrah-Nasiriyah-Rumalliyah area scares me.

I fought for Safwan Hill (just SW of Basrah on the border) and passed through the area twice in mid 2003 and 2005. Mahdi control would be a very bad thing.

The one plus is that much of the area is very barren, which makes for better kinetic (i that's what it takes) operations should folks decide to get uppity in the area.

[tequila]

As British leave Basra, militias dig in - CSMONITOR, 28 Aug.

The last contingent of British soldiers based in the center of this southern city will leave by Friday, says a senior Iraqi security official, adding that a deal has been struck with leaders of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army to ensure their safe departure.

As they pull back to a base outside Basra, the British will leave a vital provincial capital in the throes of a turf battle between Shiite factions – one that Mr. Sadr's militia appears to be winning.

"By the end of August, there will be no presence for British forces at the palace or at the joint coordination center. Both will be in the hands of the Iraqi government," says the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the matter. "I think it's best if they leave, because they did nothing to stop the militias, which were formed in the womb of their occupation." A spokesman for the British military in Basra confirmed that a small force left the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC), site of a British-Iraqi security task force, Saturday. He declined comment on the timing of the pullout of 500 soldiers from a compound of four Saddam Hussein-era palaces that are located on the strategic Shatt al-Arab River. The buildings have been occupied by coalition troops since the start of the war in 2003.

Ahead of the pullout, an agreement between British and Iraqi authorities resulted in the transfer of more than two dozen Mahdi Army prisoners from British to Iraqi custody, according to the security official. They were then released by an Iraqi court in an attempt to pacify the militias during the highly symbolic handover of the palaces to Iraqis, he said. The British did not comment on any arrangements ...

[Tom Odom]

Here's a question: is the British retreat from Basra, which is certainly what it looks like, a serious blow to the British counter-insurgency approach, supposedly perfected over decades in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Aden, Malaysia, and many other theaters? Softly softly, berets instead of helmets, and rapid enlistment and cession of control to local elements seems to have worked no better than much heavier U.S. tactics in Anbar, and indeed, probably worse.

The Financial Times covered this to some extent:
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage...9599778&page=1

Seems to me, and maybe this is stating the obvious, that it's further proof that almost all of what we talk about here, like "population-centric" vs. "enemy-centric operations," levels of firepower, role of indigenous security forces, etc., depends almost entirely on the situation. Maybe there are some broad counter-insurgency principles, from the likes of Thompson, Galula, Kitson and others, but even these seem to make a lot more sense in the classical Communist insurgency case.

Of course, the article also says this:

While I agree with much of what the Brits advocate in COIN and irregular warfare, they are not perfect and the ones I listen to, say that up front. I would say the greatest factor undermining British ops and expectations in southern Iraq was the issue of duration, complimented by British history in Iraq. It was obvious to the Iraqis and the Brits alike that the UK's forces would not be staying. Up until recent drawdowns, British forces were fairly easily accepted as the Shias waited for them to exit. Certainly there was a very dark side to Shia corruption and militia activities in the south but compared to Anbar, there was no comparison. I would characterize what is happening now as clearing the battleground for what is coming, a settling of scores and levelin of ambitions until a leader or two is left standing, one probably with ties to Iran.

Finally I would say that the British approach to COIN is built on the assumption that the peoples in question do indeed see themsleves as a people defined by the nation-state versus tribe against a religious matrix. The Brit approach and ours is supposedly shoring up the legitimacy of the government to govern; the Shia have not accepted the central government as the legitimate holder of such power.

Best

Tom

[SWJED]

3 September London Times - British Troops Pull Out of Their Last Base in Basra City by Michael Evans.

The final 500 British troops in Basra city last night withdrew under the cover of darkness from their base, a former palace of Saddam Hussein.

The highly symbolic pullout from Basra Palace began at about 10pm local time. Residents then reported seeing helicopters overhead and a convoy of eight tanks, six Land Rovers and five other large vehicles, possibly armoured personnel carriers, approaching the main British airport base from the palace shortly before midnight.

The streets of the city were largely deserted, and the convoy of troops from the 4th Battalion The Rifles was not attacked. Troops at the palace suffered daily attacks over the summer, with nine members of The Rifles being killed since May 21.

Basra airport will now be the only base for the 5,500 soldiers still serving in southern Iraq. With the palace base handed to the Iraqis, the Government is expected to announce that the British presence in Iraq will be reduced by 500 within the next few weeks...

The pullout came as two of Britain’s most influential generals during the Iraq war delivered scathing attacks on the Americans for their handling of the campaign after Saddam’s defeat. Major-General Tim Cross, who supervised reconstruction projects alongside his American counterparts in 2003, joined General Sir Mike Jackson, former head of the Army, in criticising the US for ignoring British advice. General Cross, a Royal Engineer, is retired but he was a hugely respected figure in the Army and had unrivalled experience in dealing with postwar nation-building. He revealed that he gave advice to Don-ald Rumsfeld, the former US Defence Secretary, about the size of the force needed to tackle the challenges after Saddam’s downfall, but was ignored.

The attacks by General Jackson, the former Chief of the General Staff, in his autobiography, and General Cross, in an interview with the Sunday Mirror, have laid bare the anger felt by the British military over the way that Mr Rumsfeld dismissed all the warning signs of a potential disaster in Iraq.

Although much has been said about the failures of the American strategy in Iraq, not least by Sir Jeremy Green-stock, the former British Ambassador at the United Nations and later Tony Blair’s special envoy to Baghdad, the strong criticism from the two generals has added to the growing sense of a rift between Washington and London...