Officer Retention

[Cavguy]

The working percentage for active duty US Army personnel who have NOT deployed to either OIF or OEF is 40 percent. There was a USA Today article a few months ago about the phenomenon, but it didn't go below the surface of the factoid to explain why this was so.

For those of us who, after two or more deployments, have met many of our peers -- some of whom were promoted over us -- without combat patches, this figure seems about right.

Perhaps they're all on permanent profile.

A slide from Armor branch on HRC Website (as of Jan 07 - AKO Login Required) indicated that 72% of officers in Ranks CPT-COL in Armor have combat experience. Lowest YG's were 91-94 and 1980-84. That is the demographic that would have been in AC/RC, recruiting, or post command jobs during the first years of OIF. YG's 95 and later are tracking above 90% combat experience - the ranks where officers serve as PL's, XO's, and Commanders since 2003.

The skew of high experience in the 1984-1990 YG's is most likely because Desert Storm experience is counted, and the high density of BN/BDE CDR's, XO's, and S3's in those YG's in the 2003-2007 period. I haven't seen data posted on whether the combat experiencewas OEF, OIF, DS, Panama, or Grenada.

I imagine Armor Branch's trend is typical for other combat branches.

[Van]

As a reservist, I have volunteered to deploy repeatedly, only to be stone-walled by apathetic bureaucrats in uniform. I'd like one more promotion, and without a deployment, my chances are getting slimmer. I'll echo Cavguy that for some, maybe many of the folks that haven't deployed, it isn't for lack of trying. Frankly, I'm to the point where if I hear one more person complaining about a lack of volunteers in the reserves, I'll give an answer that is candid beyond professionalism...

Oh, BTW- According to LTG Caldwell, Commander Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, the current class of CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth is 75% combat veterans as opposed to the fraction of one percent when he went through the course.

[Cavguy]

Oh, BTW- According to LTG Caldwell, Commander Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, the current class of CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth is 75% combat veterans as opposed to the fraction of one percent when he went through the course.

I actually thought it would be higher now - interesting. I don't know if he was counting cross-service and foreign officers in the percentage though.

Thanks for the info.

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

CavGuy, you forced me to boldly go where I've never gone before. Who knew?

I can't see if there is any way to drill the numbers down further, to see if the combat patches came from earlier expeditionary campaigns or not, but I would imagine that for most of us in the combat arms of a certain generation it doesn't really matter: We hit Panama or Desert Storm (check), then Restore Hope (double check), then either Kosovo/Bosnia or Haiti before at least two deployments to OIF (double check) or OEF (not yet).

As one might obviously realize, these were unescorted tours, so the wives weren't hiding out at the Osan O-club after spending the paycheck at the PX grocery.

I don't really mind doing the unescorted tours because I signed the contract and expected as much. It's particularly annoying to hear National Guard officers and senior non-commissioned officers kvetch about being sent anywhere, considering most of their units hadn't seen combat since the Battle of the Bulge.

I think a combat deployment every 60 years or so is OK.

But it's also fair to say that the current optempo has been destabilizing for an Army (and its officer corps) that is increasingly married, unlike for previous wars.

Not seeing one's spouse for two out of the past three years can be bad for morale, as are the inevitable scourges of divorce, child custody battles, et al, that radiate from the deployment like so many ripples in a besplashed pond.

[Cavguy]

But it's also fair to say that the current optempo has been destabilizing for an Army (and its officer corps) that is increasingly married, unlike for previous wars.

Not seeing one's spouse for two out of the past three years can be bad for morale, as are the inevitable scourges of divorce, child custody battles, et al, that radiate from the deployment like so many ripples in a besplashed pond.

Agreed. The discussion made me think of the branch brief from Armor, so I thought it may be relevant. And as stated earlier, I like the USMC message because it doesn't belittle those who haven't been, but makes clear that they should start finding a way.....

Ref the deployments, I hear you. I spent four of my six years in Germany (2001-2007) either deployed (OIF x2, KFOR) or deployed for training aka "Grafenfels") The family separation is hard, and doesn't help a marriage ..... Not to mention even the single guys who desire a life.

Welcome to the board. Make sure you introduce yourself in the appropriate thread, if you haven't already.

[Rob Thornton]

Two Council Related Threads...

* Army Offers Officers Incentives
* Army Development of Junior Leaders

As was pointed out, we've done allot of thinking over this subject. I read Patriot's piece, and thought about it for the last couple of days.

Its one of these things where you know you have to have more qualified people to achieve the solution - which is to grow the officer corps to meet the OPTEMPO of the Long War, but at the same time you can't keep the people you want to keep because you can't grow qualified people fast enough to reduce the burden, and we are unwilling to go try something else besides incremental approaches toward retention.

We have a two-fold problem. Keeping what we have & growing more of it.

I think the solution may be one in the same. If you show the people currently serving that their worth means a great deal to the state by an investment strategy that speaks for itself, and is on par with the hardships they and their families endure for the freedom of their countrymen and their countryman's families enjoy, then perhaps they will continue to volunteer and deny themselves and their families the life that other Americans lead.

Once you have convinced the ones you already have, who are already risking all in the service of their nation, it stands to reason word will get out, and enough others will volunteer to meet our expanding needs.

I'd also submit that today's (and tomorrow's) battlefield, while as dangerous as any in its own way, requires a much broader, more mature and diverse skill set, with the ability to provide the type of innovation and creativity that private enterprise and OGAs covet, and are willing and capable of paying for. Companies have strategies for attracting and retaining talent that appeal to both the individual and their families. In some ways we do too, but our strategies are more inline with our requirements of the 1990s. Our need for the best and brightest have grown with our commitments, while our incentives and recognition of changing demographics have not kept pace.

The other day on Forbes Ben Stein was asked why we might have a tax increase and what we might do with it - he replied we should pay our military more, they are inadequately compensated for the job they do. I almost fell out of my chair - here is a well known financial guru on Fox, who the first answer out of the chute - is compensate the military adequately for the job they do! If he gets it, if that is his first answer out of all the things he could have said, why shouldn't legislators understand as well? Why would Stiller say that?

The first requirement for a civilization is security, without it, leisure time, art, economy,etc. will all fall to the barbarians. Our problem with officer retention should not be considered solely a problem which the military must fix, its far more important. It is a national problem. Its atrophy effects far more then just the uniformed services.

This does not necessarily mean a pay raise only, the plan would have to be holistic as mentioned before, and must appeal to the families as the demographics suggest - but a serious pay raise would immediately make the point about how much the nation values the services of its military.
Regards, Rob

[MattC86]

. . . growing more of it. . .

I think the solution may be one in the same. If you show the people currently serving that their worth means a great deal to the state by an investment strategy that speaks for itself, and is on par with the hardships they and their families endure for the freedom of their countrymen and their countryman's families enjoy, then perhaps they will continue to volunteer and deny themselves and their families the life that other Americans lead.

Once you have convinced the ones you already have, who are already risking all in the service of their nation, it stands to reason word will get out, and enough others will volunteer to meet our expanding needs.

. . .

The first requirement for a civilization is security, without it, leisure time, art, economy,etc. will all fall to the barbarians. Our problem with officer retention should not be considered solely a problem which the military must fix, its far more important. It is a national problem. Its atrophy effects far more then just the uniformed services.

This does not necessarily mean a pay raise only, the plan would have to be holistic as mentioned before, and must appeal to the families as the demographics suggest - but a serious pay raise would immediately make the point about how much the nation values the services of its military.
Regards, Rob

I can't speak to retaining current officers, but as far as attracting new officers with the skill sets I think you're referring to, I'm not sure the money will cut it. There's something deeper, more generational.

I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere so I'll keep it short, but at least from my perspective at Cornell, there is very little you could reasonably offer a lot of today's college students to become military officers. ROTC numbers are down, I am (so far, anyway) the only Cornell junior applying for Marine Corps PLC, and I know of almost no one who would entertain the idea. It's partly the fact that there's a war going on, but part of it is that lingering attitude of the military being no place for a young, educated, ambitious man (or woman). And as false as you guys may know this to be, I don't see additional money, whether in salary or bonus form, making the difference.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Matt,
Thanks for making a decision to serve!

I can't speak to retaining current officers, but as far as attracting new officers with the skill sets I think you're referring to, I'm not sure the money will cut it. There's something deeper, more generational.

It's partly the fact that there's a war going on, but part of it is that lingering attitude of the military being no place for a young, educated, ambitious man (or woman). And as false as you guys may know this to be, I don't see additional money, whether in salary or bonus form, making the difference.

I agree with you. I also agree with the your observation about youth, ambition and talent. What I am trying to say though is you have to change that sentiment, and you have to break down how you do that. It is probably not mono-causal since we are dealing with people's perceptions. I do think the first step in changing perceptions is by demonstrating the value you place on something. How do we do that in our society? When we really want to demonstrate how much something or somebody means to us, we sacrifice. How much does an education at the best University cost & why do people value it? How much does the best mechanic in town cost and why are people willing to pay him? How about food, automobiles, or anything else in our society? All of those things have some type of value and worth that translates and appeals to the general public. No matter if we are talking services or goods, we place value on things.

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

[Dennis]

Out of curiousity, what is the situation with the marine's in regards to mid-level officer retention?

[mmx1]

Out of curiousity, what is the situation with the marine's in regards to mid-level officer retention?

Can't speak personally to the retention levels or bonuses, but the Marines are behind the curve with respect to civilian graduate education. If I get a chance to get a sponsored Master's, it'll most likely be as a Major. Or I can try to squeeze it in on my own time and expense during a B-billet. Hard to admit, but I'm looking at my Army peers with some envy.

The official story is that any officer shortages are localized within particular grade/MOS combinations, not systemic as the Army's situation is. The following document outlines nothing as extensive as the Army has - incentive pay is limited to the aviation community (I recall hearing that they brought up helo incentives up to par with jets - there was previously a 2-3x disparity)
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/c...0Retention.pdf

[mmx1]

Hi Matt,

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

Having done recruiting at the other Ivy that starts with a C, you have to hit all those wickets, simply because of the level of ignorance that exists. Especially at elite universities, very few students know anyone in the military, so the first thing you have to do is clear the slate and set realistic expectations.
-No, you won't make comparable private sector pay, but you'll make comparable public service pay and the difference isn't drastic. Explaining BAH helps dampen the shock of putting a $26,000 base pay against, say, $60k + bonus as a first year analyst at a top firm.
-There is room for disagreement, particularly on ethical issues. The question "what if you get an order you disagree with" often comes up. It's not as though in the private sector, you can disobey your boss without consequences. But where we've gotten a black eye have been instances where no one stood up and said "this is wrong" - tied into the fact that William Calley was a college dropout.

To sell the military as not just something they can do but something they should do, we've hit on the role of college-educated officers as a moral compass. After all, our mandatory Contemporary Civilization course (a 1-year intro to western political philosophies), had its origins in a WWI course called "war studies" for cadets. Its purpose "rested on the fundamental principle that in the long run man's accomplishment can rise no higher than his ideals, and that an understanding of the worth of the cause for which one is fighting is a powerful weapon in the hands of an intelligent man. Indeed, I've come to appreciate the value of the class much more after commissioning, and have looked back on those works to reinforce my belief in and ability to explain why we're in this current fight. As Robert Kaplan puts it,

A frustrated warrior class, always kept in check by liberal-minded officers, is the sign of a healthy democracy.

Especially in a time when most people question our foreign policy, the "serving to defend" argument fails to carry water. Instead, we've refashioned it as a "shaping foreign policy at the ground level" argument. We will be overseas, and not necessarily for the right reasons - but you can do more good and have more influence as a JO interacting with foreigners than as a desk jockey at some other institution.

Ultimately, though, these young minds full of mush still have to adapt to a Martial lifestyle - one that is often alien to folks imagining themselves in a suit behind a desk somewhere. When your friends and family are aghast at such an idea, it's a lot of inertia to overcome.

I have to say I'm disheartened at hearing about the strains the military places on families. I didn't fully appreciate it when I joined and while it wouldn't have changed my decision, it would have given me some pause.

[CNP]

My first post since I joined SWC. By the way, I've enjoyed the exchanges I've read so far and appreciate the thoughtfulness of the comments on serious issues.

WRT bonuses, Navy's experience is quite different as Army is just starting down this road. We've been at it awhile - approx 1975 (I'm referring to specific lump-sum bonuses, not special pays like flight pay, sub pay, etc which are monthly adds that have quite a long history in the service).

My take-away from our experience is that the money, in and of itself, will never bring about a decision to stay for the people you really want to stay, but it will help prep the battlespace for the decision (particularly wrt spouse and family) if you get the amount right and keep it competitive.

What seems to work best in order to keep the best is a blended solution - meaningful operational tours with career recognition for those whose service merits it, advanced education opportunity and maintaining the proper balance between operational time (sea duty for us) and "home" time (shore duty).

Again, very different experiences going on now in Navy than with bulk of Army combat arms JOs, but the principles remain the same, I believe.

And, since in a very special way as Army goes so go the Armed Forces, I'm keeping a close eye on what is happening in my Army. Take care shipmates and all the best, JCHjr

[marct]

Hello Sir,

My first post since I joined SWC. By the way, I've enjoyed the exchanges I've read so far and appreciate the thoughtfulness of the comments on serious issues.

Welcome aboard!

My take-away from our experience is that the money, in and of itself, will never bring about a decision to stay for the people you really want to stay, but it will help prep the battlespace for the decision (particularly wrt spouse and family) if you get the amount right and keep it competitive.

What seems to work best in order to keep the best is a blended solution - meaningful operational tours with career recognition for those whose service merits it, advanced education opportunity and maintaining the proper balance between operational time (sea duty for us) and "home" time (shore duty).

I have a suspicion that it also relates to the concept of a "flexible career path". Ever since the demise of the "Organization Man" as a central cultural expectation (~1982 in Canada at the pop culture level), there has been an increasing expectation that each "job" (in the very old sense of the word) will give people new skills and network contacts that will be useful in finding their next "job", even if they stay in the same organization. A lot of recent research in career points to people choosing less money in order to gain favourable skills and network contacts, but only for a limited time (~2-3 years or so).

Many of the high tech firms got around the problem of retention by bypassing their HR departments in both hiring and career decisions. They adopted a mentoring model with hiring/project managers acting as mentors using a very dense network of weak ties as their basis, and this might be a model that the Army may want to adopt, at least in part (basically, it decentralizes a large part of the "individual career growth" responsibilities from HR to informal networks).

Marc

[Patriot]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army. The pressures on the Army to expand to 48 BCTs, transfrom, and simultaneously fight a long war have required making changes in historically levels and rates of promotion which have directly impacted the perceptions of officers that the promotion system is currently not merit based. The impact of promoting marginal performers can not be overstated. Imagine a CPT that worked with a marginal performing CPT who is now a MAJ. How demoralizing is that? Solutions to problems such as these are not derived in Washington or at some bureau but through dialogue with the force to capture their perceptions.

If company and field grade officers are not asked their opioions, attitudes, and beliefs then their perception is the Army is not interested in what thay have to say. But their is a disconnect in the thinking of many officers on the "Army". The Army is really made up of two halves - one the one hand is the Department of the Army bureaucracy that runs all the personnel and administriva systems - OER, boards, LES, etc., and on the other hand is the "real" Army made of the unit you were in, the one you're in now, and the one you're going to be in. Making the distinction between the two is important because it helps you identify the source of the problem, which is not the unit Army. Again, if the bureaucracy ignores the force it will never figure out why officers are leaving is the first place.

[Cavguy]

The impact of promoting marginal performers can not be overstated. Imagine a CPT that worked with a marginal performing CPT who is now a MAJ. How demoralizing is that? Solutions to problems such as these are not derived in Washington or at some bureau but through dialogue with the force to capture their perceptions.

Again, if the bureaucracy ignores the force it will never figure out why officers are leaving is the first place.

Agreed.

I'm not always a fan of everything posted over at Defense and the National Interest, but this article captured what I had been thinking.

What we are seeing now is little more than the bill coming due from the issues identified and discussed in 2000-2001 when my peers were leaving the force in high numbers due many of the same issues we're discussing here. 9/11 caused a stir of patriotism and service that caused many to decide to stay in the army to fight the enemy. Hence, the low exit rates in 2002-2004.

Now the chickens are coming home to roost. The army never dealt with the issues in the 2000-2001 studies, and the stress on the force (which people thought was bad then!) has grown exponentially. The Army didn’t deal with the structural and generational issues.

In a way, a perfect storm is here. Officers are generally getting out for a mixture of the following reasons:

1) OPTEMPO. Many officers I know that left the army enjoyed their service, but just can’t handle the repeated deployments. It is particularly hard on those who were LT’s since 2002. Most are facing their third or fourth deployment, and they don’t have an “exit option” to a slower job in the immediate future. All they see are additional deployments. If married, this means usually having been deployed to training or war the majority of their marriage. If single, it means they have no opportunity to develop meaningful relationships.

The cumulative effect of deployments cannot be underestimated. The “12 months dwell time” between deployments is more aptly described as “12 months of lighting your hair on fire and running in circles” to prepare for the next deployment. In effect, soldiers really get between 4-6 actual months of deployment time at home, and only the leave period is truly restful.

2) Leadership Failure. This is the issue from the 90’s that remains unaddressed, and the link above has all the studies and essays that define it. 9/11 gave the army a "hall pass" on the issue. Many young officers I know exit because their first boss was a “bad” boss. The army has no institutional incentive (unless another Marshall comes along) to reform it’s officer training and leadership system with respect to junior officers. That attitude is derived from “After all, the system obviously works because it recognized *my* talent and made me a LTC, COL, General, etc., and those who didn’t get promoted didn’t deserve it anyway”

It does all come down to leadership, and many junior officers don’t see that their leaders or the army really care about them. It’s not because the words aren’t right, it’s the actions and “can-do”/”suck it up, it will pass” attitude that comes out. We’ve all watched leave cancelled, equipment shortfalls, training corners cut, etc. It communicates a very clear message. I was fortunate that in my most wavering time I worked for an exceptional battalion commander, who built the best team I’ve seen in the army and made the army “fun”. Even through 15 months of OIF. Unfortunately, he’s the exception.

3) The Peter Principle. 100% of my peers in my year group got promoted to major. I know my peers. 100% of us didn’t need to get promoted. My former company xo, who left the army, citied high promotions as a factor before he left. Pointing to a universally known, subpar peer of mine, he said “If the army’s willing to make him a major and put him in charge of troops again, this isn’t an army I want to be in”.

Jack Welch, the former CEO of GE, writes in his book “Winning” about the criticality of differentiation. If you reward everyone equally, the middle “good” performers lose their motivation quickest (the top generally perform that way because it’s in their nature) and leave the organization. Hence Welch ruthlessly culled the bottom 10%. It resulted in better performance in the organization because people knew performance was rewarded and incompetence and underperformance was cut.

The army is turning into a version of the Special Olympics – in promotions, OER’s, and medals. Everyone’s a winner, but some of us are still handicapped. There is no block check on CPT OER's anymore. Everyone of certain grades (with rare exception) gets a Bronze Star at the end of their OIF rotation, deserved or not, fobbit or not, role or not. When a medal doesn’t differentiate from the population, it loses its meaning. How can someone differentiate what I did for mine versus theirs? What do you tell a young Sergeant who patrolled Ramadi every day and got an ARCOM when individuals who never left the wire walk away with Bronze Stars? (Don’t get me wrong, some supporters deserve every bit of it for keeping the line supplied, but since everyone gets it, it’s meaningless)

4) A mismanaged war. Kaplan’s article, and LTC Yingling’s, describe this one well. Our junior officers see this all unfolding, they have been closest to the line, and seen the most suffering among their soldiers and peers. It's personal, painful, and emotional to them, and they want someone to blame. That's natural (to a point) in all wars.

That said, I remain optimistic. I think that, like after Vietnam, those that remain and went through the crucible as a junior officer will enact significant change on the system. And I think that today’s leadership are actually slightly more attuned to the issue than the Vietnam generation, and are at least beginning to try to find solutions. But I think the calculus is that for now it is easier to bribe them to stay in (bonuses, grad school) than to address the real systemic problems while at war.

Finally the whole discussion and GEN Cody brief reminds me of this incident with GEN Abrams while chief of staff in the early 70’s. Will our leadership be as perceptive?

[mmx1]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army.

That this is assumed to be fact is a problem in and of itself. I was answering marct's question, but the tie-in is that the shift in recruiting in the past decades away from the west and northeast and towards the south is hurting the diversity and quality of the officer pool - with the result that you have more poor performers demotivating everyone else and competing for the same slots come promotion time.

For example, compare the city of New York with Alabama. NYC has twice as many occupants and four times as many college students as the state of Alabama. But we have just 2 AROTC programs vice 10 in Alabama, producing 1/5th as many officers.
http://online.wsj.com/public/resourc...bk0702-14.html
The Army blames this on the difficulty of recruiting Northeast and urban students. But it's become a self-perpetuating prophecy. The closure and consolidation of urban ROTC units and the consequent shift in recruiting funds have dwindled the ROTC presence in major college towns like Boston and New York to a wisp - ROTC recruiting is practically nonexistent outside of the two home campuses.

The distribution of funding and programs makes sense from a numbers perspective to go after easier markets, but only under the dangerous assumption that every student is interchangeable - that the 200th student you add here is just as good as the 10th student elsewhere. When you're digging 20x as deep in one student pool vice another, don't be surprised at the results.

I find it ironic that we'll praise civilian graduate liberal arts education on one hand, holding up Petraeus' Princeton doctorate as an example, and then so quickly write off undergraduates from the same elite institutions as not worth the effort to recruit.

Public service will always have trouble competing with the private sector in terms of monetary compensation - and I worry about the day that the federal government becomes the most lucrative employer. But the problem today is that to many Americans, military service is considered distinct and inferior to other forms of public service.

[MattC86]

The problem in my initial posting was not how to attack ivy league types (who will never elect to enter military service). My objective was to discuss the problem of keeping company and field grade officers in the Army.

Sir, my apologies; didn't mean to hijack your thread. I do want to respond to Rob, though.

Hi Matt,
Thanks for making a decision to serve!

Thank you. But only if they let me - I still gotta apply and pass OCS. . .

So I'd ask you how you change the attitude of your peers? How do you convince the bright & ambitious young men and women of Cornell, that a career in the uniformed service is something they not only should do to safeguard their freedoms, but something they want to do because it will fulfill both their moral sensibilities and their more physical ones such as providing a standard of living for them and their families which is comparable to the many other vocations their abilities might secure?

Best Regards, Rob

Certainly the money is an issue - it's the right place to start. Beyond that, I'm not sure I can solve the problem; maybe just further diagnose it. The problem lies in part in what my peers value - and what their parents value. My parents are exceedingly unhappy about my decision, and they aren't nearly as shallow as some were about the importance of "Ivy League" status or any of that. It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains. The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.
So it's a self-perpetuating problem. The only way out of it I see is a national call to service - someone or something simply has to inspire certain kids in my generation to stop worrying only about instant gratification and serve the nation. I think Bush failed after 9/11 to do that. There was no call for America's best and brightest to put off their legal or I-banking ambitions and don a uniform. And at this point, I don't think anyone would listen to him. I am not sure what short of a new leader and a new national catastrophe would change that.

I know - I didn't really solve the problem, just explained it more. Oh, well.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Matt,
You are going to make a very fine officer I think. We certainly appreciate your candor - it will serve you and those you lead well.
Best regards, Rob

[jonSlack]

It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains.

I think part of the problem is that being an officer in the military is no longer viewed as a profession but rather as just another management job that comes with the added "benefits" of being more dangerous, having crappier hours, and providing less pay.

The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.

How do you attract those college grads?

How about target them while they are still undergrads? I not talking about my stepping up current recruitment strategies.

Rather, lets send back high quality post-command captains and even junior captains for a second undergraduate degree. Introduce undergrads, many of whom may still be undecided about their post-graduation plans, to an officer not much older than them. Show the undergrads via first hand personal interaction that the military is not full of "homocidal neanderthals" but men and women who at the core are not much different than them. Additionally, the officers' main task would not be to actively recruit, their main task would be to earn a second undergraduate degree. However, through the social interaction that will happen in classes and study groups as well in extracurricular activities such as campus organizations, clubs, and intramural sports they are able to present a positive image of what a military officer is.

Basically, I think one of the the best ways, if not the best way, to change the negative perceptions undergrads may have of the military is by increasing personal contact and relationships with those currently serving in the military.

So it's a self-perpetuating problem. The only way out of it I see is a national call to service - someone or something simply has to inspire certain kids in my generation to stop worrying only about instant gratification and serve the nation. I think Bush failed after 9/11 to do that. There was no call for America's best and brightest to put off their legal or I-banking ambitions and don a uniform. And at this point, I don't think anyone would listen to him. I am not sure what short of a new leader and a new national catastrophe would change that.

I do not know how much of an impact the call to service would have had immediaetly following 9/11. A think alot of the young people who would have been inclined to heed the call would have been the same ones who saw the "implied task" in watching 9/11 unfold live on CNN and were already looking into how to serve. Additionally, a call to national service now would also be ineffective as those who are willing to serve are already planning to serve. The "call" now may push some fence-sitters but I think more fence-sitters will end up being drawn in by the recruiting bonuses out there.

Reference money: I think money is atleast a partial answer to recruiting and retention at all levels. However, while I think the increased OPTEMPO requires bonuses as a reward/incentive for staying, I also think that a substantial increase in base pay across the board, E-1 to O-10, would be a signal that the military, and the nation, is willing to invest in servicemembers and that an increased level of financial compensation will remain over the long-term, not just as long as there is increased OPTEMPO. Additionally, if you intend to retain officers, and junior Soldiers and NCOs, by selling the military to be a longterm career the increased base pay would provide more financial promise than the current system of relying solely on bonuses. Increased base pay equals relatively guarenteed and predictable future financial compensation while bonuses are really just a short-term increase in base pay for as long as there is an increased demand and/or decreased supply caused by increased OPTEMPO or other factors.

[Stan]

Hey Matt !

I echo the praise of the others herein...Thanks for joining what I consider to be America's finest institution !!!

Certainly the money is an issue - it's the right place to start. Beyond that, I'm not sure I can solve the problem; maybe just further diagnose it. The problem lies in part in what my peers value - and what their parents value. My parents are exceedingly unhappy about my decision, and they aren't nearly as shallow as some were about the importance of "Ivy League" status or any of that. It's as if some parents (and it transfers to their kids) believe all that matters is status, as represented by money and "rank" on the social totem pole. Beyond the money, the military is no longer viewed by these people as honorable. The stereotype of homocidal neanderthal remains. The only way to break that cycle, obviously, is to prove it wrong by attracting more ambitious college grads.

I recall our neighbors freaking out when my old man told them I was joining the Army. He blew it off, but not before giving them a load of Sierra for not wanting their son in the service of our country. Later in the 80s their kid joined anyway.

I don't recall if the issue was just money (back then it wasn't the greatest paycheck), but our neighbors were very worried about the status quo. Some colleges won't permit US Military recruiters to post ads or even let them address classes.

So it's a self-perpetuating problem. The only way out of it I see is a national call to service - someone or something simply has to inspire certain kids in my generation to stop worrying only about instant gratification and serve the nation. I think Bush failed after 9/11 to do that. There was no call for America's best and brightest to put off their legal or I-banking ambitions and don a uniform. And at this point, I don't think anyone would listen to him. I am not sure what short of a new leader and a new national catastrophe would change that.

I fully concur with you. Following 9/11 would have been an ideal opportunity for a draft. Granted not all will remain after fulfilling their conscript periods, but those that remain want to, and that's paramount. At the very least, we will have a cadre of young educated folks that better understand the US Military, appreciate what others are sacrificing, and who are sufficiently trained to pick up a weapon and fight for the USA !

Regards, Stan