Jets or GIs?

[Granite_State]

Kagan anticipates that his call for greater defense spending will "inspire howls of protest in certain quarters," and he is right: there will be howls from members of the Bush administration, the Pentagon, and Congress, all of whom realize that the 41 percent increase in baseline defense spending of the past four years cannot and will not be duplicated in the next four. This is why the Department of Defense and others are busily prioritizing for leaner times. The five-year plan submitted to Congress last year called for a $30 billion reduction in defense spending between fiscal years 2006 and 2011, and the Pentagon has been instructed to reduce its 2007-12 plan by another $30 billion. Ryan Henry, the Pentagon's principal deputy undersecretary for policy, has acknowledged that the defense spending levels of the past few years are unsustainable, and he is planning accordingly. And as the chief executive of Boeing's military division lamented, "[It] has been a great ride for the last five years, but it's over. There will be a flattening of the defense budget."

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/200611...-shortage.html

I think they're right, that we need to start choosing between people and machines, and not soon enough.

[Jedburgh]

...an interesting look at the issue from Cordesman at CSIS, 23 Aug 07:

The Changing Challenges of US Defense Spending

...A recent CBO report estimates these costs for the 2008-2017 period at a total of $481 to $603 billion under a more rapid withdrawal of US forces. It projects that it would cost $924 to $1,010 billion in a scenario involving a more gradual withdrawal from Iraq.

The cost of defense expenditures in the future is, therefore, likely to be significantly higher than the current estimates, but this does not mean that the resulting defense burden on the American economy would be high by historical standards. In fact, despite the relatively large recent increase in Defense Outlays since FY2001, the GDP burden is almost 20 percent lower than during the “peace-dividend era” of the early 1990s.

If one looks at the annual peaks of national defense spending during past conflicts, the US spent 38 percent of GDP on defense in World War II, 14 percent at the height of the Korean War, and 9.4 during Vietnam. The Reagan era “military build-up” caused a peak annual defense burden of 6.2 percent of GDP in 1986, the highest post-Vietnam value. By comparison, even including the Global War on Terror supplemental funding, the current burden for FY2007 and FY2008 will merely amount to a little over 4 percent.

Another way to analyze the defense burden is to consider what percentage of annual federal spending is allocated to national defense. The Global War on Terror brought about a shift in national priorities, but even with the increases in defense spending over the past six years today’s value of the defense share in the federal budget is 40 percent lower than the peak Reagan-era value in FY1987.

None of the three major components of the defense budget (Manpower, O&M, and Investment spending) are likely to experience a cost decrease in the future. However, the Administration’s FY2008 budget request anticipates markedly lower levels of total DoD spending in the coming years despite the recent trend in the opposite direction. The current wartime environment is likely to force DoD’s planners to revise upwards their estimates for the out-years in the FY2009 budget request and beyond.....

Complete 43 page report at the link.

[kit]

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/200611...-shortage.html

I think they're right, that we need to start choosing between people and machines, and not soon enough.

The only reason defense spending must be reduced is because we're not willing to prioritize defense at the expense of other things. It's just another example of the old "guns and butter" spending priorities, as opposed to "guns OR butter."

The sad fact is that the current war isn't a higher priority to this administration than is social spending. Consequently, DOD suffers and so does the war. It can't help but make one wonder just how commited this administration is to victory. If it's not enough to even curtail domestic spending to see to it that DOD has what it needs to win, then what's the point of fighting?

[house_of_marathon]

Moreover, it's an ability to think constructively

Billions queued for JSF, FCS, and DDX and what is routinely cited for fostering greater receptivity in Pakistan and Indonesia, two key battlegrounds, in the past two years - the contributions made by the inexpensive US Navy hospital ship, the Mercy, after the tsunami, and transport helicopters after the earthquake.

Long-range budgeting have long moved away from being strategic planning documents to winks and nods among the partners in the iron triangle - defense contractors, wastrel congressional reps, and service leadership lining up for positions in the corporate sector.

[Cavguy]

The sad fact is that the current war isn't a higher priority to this administration than is social spending. Consequently, DOD suffers and so does the war. It can't help but make one wonder just how commited this administration is to victory. If it's not enough to even curtail domestic spending to see to it that DOD has what it needs to win, then what's the point of fighting?

I like Tom Friedman's argument. *IF* this war (and GWOT) is a struggle of as great importance to the nation as WWII, and defeat will mean terrible things for our nation, then why on earth has the administration refused to treat it as such in anything but rhetoric over the last six years? We're not organizing the government to wage this kind of conflict, we're not willing to raise taxes (but willing to run debt and cut the DoD budget), we're not significantly expanding the military/USAID/state, and we're not even asking people to serve at a national level. And this is a WWII level conflict?

Our budgeting and bureaucratic priorities speak much louder as to the importance of this war than the words coming from DC.

[Ken White]

That is a fact.

The Armed forces have been to war a number of times in the intervening years, large parts of them anyway and they're sure there now -- but the Pentagon has not been to war since 1945, either (and that shows...).

Lacking an existential threat -- and Islamic international terrorism is not such; very significant, yes but not existential -- we aren't going to war as a nation. That, rightly or wrongly, is I think also a fact.

Politicians do double speak more easily than they breathe, that too is a fact. We cannot and should not ignore them but ignoring what they say and watching what they do is probably advisable. Presidents or Congress critters -- makes no difference -- they will sell you down the river in a second. That, unfortunately goes with the territory in a democratic society -- even in a democratic constitutional representative republic. It is the price we pay for the freedoms we had and have.

That ought to be okay, no matter how much it annoys (this is my monthly understatement) those of us who get to go to war and toss a spear or two. That's why most of us signed up; regrettably, the downsides just go with the job. Can't speak for anyone else but after 45 years of it, I'd do it all again.

But we can still gripe about it -- and should; maybe someone will listen before it's too late.

[Granite_State]

I like Tom Friedman's argument. *IF* this war (and GWOT) is a struggle of as great importance to the nation as WWII, and defeat will mean terrible things for our nation, then why on earth has the administration refused to treat it as such in anything but rhetoric over the last six years? We're not organizing the government to wage this kind of conflict, we're not willing to raise taxes (but willing to run debt and cut the DoD budget), we're not significantly expanding the military/USAID/state, and we're not even asking people to serve at a national level. And this is a WWII level conflict?

Our budgeting and bureaucratic priorities speak much louder as to the importance of this war than the words coming from DC.

I see this argument, but we're talking about an open-ended global war on an ideology, not a conventional war with a definitive ending. The rhetoric doesn't match the reality in Washington, but neither does the reality match the rhetoric, in terms of which was a greater threat to our way of life, radical Islamists vs. Nazism and Communism.

Three other points:

1. Our economy is the foundation of all our strength. With a massive budget and trade deficit, long-term domestic threats (education), and an aging population (albeit not as bad as everyone else's), we need to balance domestic spending, low taxes, competitiveness, growth, etc. with our military's real needs.

2. The military is getting a ton of money. We are spending as much on defense now as we did at the height of the Cold War. The U.S. spends more on defense than, I forget if it's the rest of the world combined, or just the next ten nations combined. Only one other country has a real full-sized aircraft carrier. We have twelve! Even with our global obligations, I suspect there is ample money, if it's allocated correctly.

3. This argument is interesting:

MOYERS: Where… and your specialty is the defense budget. Where is the money going?

SPINNEY: Well, it goes into cost growth.

MOYERS: Cost growth.

SPINNEY: Cost growth. We basically if you want to understand how the Pentagon operates like everything else in Washington you follow the money.

MOYERS: I don't understand the term cost growth.

SPINNEY: Basically the cost of weapons increases faster than the budget. And this has been going on for 40 years. And when the budget increases, that basically creates an incentive structure to jack up the cost even further.

Now we saw this in the 1980's. You can think of the 1980's as the mother of all experiments. And when Ronald Reagan poured money into the defense budget, the cost went through the roof.

MOYERS: Are you saying that costs went up because the…

SPINNEY: The money went in.

MOYERS: The money went in.

SPINNEY: I have data showing that when we reduce the budget the contractors cut their costs. In some cases they come in under cost estimates when the money dries up. Producing the same product. It makes no economic sense in any kind of commercial context. It makes perfect political sense.

http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/tr...t230_full.html

I don't buy into military-industrial complex conspiracy theories, but I think the extent to which defense budgeting and procurement is driven by domestic politics and interests, and not national security threats, is unbelievable.

[MattC86]

This is getting beyond small wars and into "the bureaucracy of a large government: why it sucks," but literally the day before 9/11, on September 10, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld announced that since the mid 70s, I believe, the Pentagon had lost (not put into black programs, LOST) $2.3 BILLION dollars. On a yearly basis, the Pentagon can't keep track of somewhere between 15 and 25 percent of it's budget.

It's been said over and over, and there's a tendency to ignore it, but if proper accounting practices and defense contract discipline were put in place at DoD (and throughout the government as a whole) they could spend enough to make even the Air Force happy and still cut the current budget.

The dilemma facing the United States is that we do have security needs that require a massive military. But historically, nations that spend large chunks of their national fortune on the military do not long maintain their economies.

The unfortunate tenures of Robert McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld as SecDef could have been remarkable successess if they had not been forced into managing wars, which they did poorly. Both had the knowledge and the rough personalities to ramrod more efficiency into the Pentagon's spending process, which is EXACTLY what is needed.

Just like granite state said, so much of it is domestic politics and makes no economic sense. If any corporation, responsible to its stockholders, was run the way our government (and especially the Pentagon) is, the CEO and Board of Directors would have been fired and probably defenestrated.

And theoretically, the stockholders of the US government are US citizens. Accountability is simply a fiscal necessity.

Matt

[carl]

But historically, nations that spend large chunks of their national fortune on the military do not long maintain their economies.

The unfortunate tenures of Robert McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld as SecDef could have been remarkable successess if they had not been forced into managing wars, which they did poorly.

Matt

A bit over 4% of GDP does not constitute a large chunk of the national fortune to my mind.

Pardon my garbled analogy but the statement about McNamara and Rumsfeld is like saying you hired a mechanic as a pilot and he would have been a good pilot but unfortunately he had to fly the plane.

[Granite_State]

This is getting beyond small wars and into "the bureaucracy of a large government: why it sucks," but literally the day before 9/11, on September 10, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld announced that since the mid 70s, I believe, the Pentagon had lost (not put into black programs, LOST) $2.3 BILLION dollars. On a yearly basis, the Pentagon can't keep track of somewhere between 15 and 25 percent of it's budget.

It's been said over and over, and there's a tendency to ignore it, but if proper accounting practices and defense contract discipline were put in place at DoD (and throughout the government as a whole) they could spend enough to make even the Air Force happy and still cut the current budget.

The dilemma facing the United States is that we do have security needs that require a massive military. But historically, nations that spend large chunks of their national fortune on the military do not long maintain their economies.

The unfortunate tenures of Robert McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld as SecDef could have been remarkable successess if they had not been forced into managing wars, which they did poorly.
Matt

Aside the fact that the whole philosophy of war-fighting both men embraced was completely wrong-headed (RMA and urine sensors on the Ho Chi Minh Trail).

[Ken White]

This is getting beyond small wars and into "the bureaucracy of a large government: why it sucks," ...

It's been said over and over, and there's a tendency to ignore it, but if proper accounting practices and defense contract discipline were put in place at DoD (and throughout the government as a whole) they could spend enough to make even the Air Force happy and still cut the current budget.
. . .
. . .

Just like granite state said, so much of it is domestic politics and makes no economic sense. If any corporation, responsible to its stockholders, was run the way our government (and especially the Pentagon) is, the CEO and Board of Directors would have been fired and probably defenestrated.

And theoretically, the stockholders of the US government are US citizens. Accountability is simply a fiscal necessity.

Matt

A number of people have for many years tried to get the US Government to drop its beyond extremely opaque and arcane accounting system and move to simple double entry GAAP. All have failed. They failed because Congress does not want that opacity removed, they like the ability they have to fiddle...

The nominal CEO is the President, the Board is Congress. Both are elected and the US Citizens as shareholders are the voters of record. Ergo...

[Ken White]

Aside the fact that the whole philosophy of war-fighting both men embraced was completely wrong-headed (RMA and urine sensors on the Ho Chi Minh Trail).

They both had company in the embrace of wrong headed war fighting [Conventional war and conventional war (-) an afterthought].

[Rob Thornton]

Matt makes a good point though about our strategic culture and predisposition toward technological over human solutions.

I think the key to getting our priorities straight is understanding why we default to believing technology is always the best and cheapest answer. Then we need to hold the basis of those beliefs up against the current and most likely future problem set so we can see the limitations of technical solutions.

I also believe we can and should maintain our technological edge - I want to have the best stuff in the fight - I just don't want it so bad that I'm willing to sacrifice investing in people to get it.

I'm pretty sure the two afore mentioned SecDefs were/are great Americans, its just that their management philosophies were more attuned to producing things for a profit then managing a bureaucracy of which the most important "product" is its people (substitute warrior/leader/etc. if you like). I'm not sure you can run the Pentagon (or for that matter the Federal Govt.) like a for profit based corporation - maybe that too is not a problem, just a condition that you cope with the best you can.

I admit to being somewhat amazed by citizens of their caliber (Robert McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld) - for whatever we criticize them as Sec Def or their "vision" (rightfully criticize I think) of how the DoD should function - they were/are brilliant men who love & served their country - they just tried to make something into what it was not, could not or should not be. GM/Ford/Chrysler are not the same as the DoD. In my humble opinion though - I would not want to walk a mile in their shoes for a million dollars.

On a side note about tech:

We got a lecture from Con Crane while at BSAP where he asked the question why we thought the USAF believed technology so important? The answer was so simple and obvious, yet of profound importance - you can't fly without technology! You have to give the platform/system driven services credit for recognizing the importance of technology to their roles and missions. I'd also say you can find where platform an human meet in the ground services in their crewed systems - ala Abrams/Bradley/Stryker/FCS.

On the flip side, we can't allow the fascination and obsession with technology to obscure that people fight the wars and ultimately people make the peace. We need some part of war to be recognizable for the ugly but sometimes necessary act it is so that as quickly as possible we can restore order and put people's lives back together and maybe avoid worse.

Best regards, Rob

[Tom Odom]

A longstanding question on the orals board for the Masters program at Leavenworth was and still may be, explain the relationship between doctrine and technology. Now when I sat for my orals or sat on the boards, we lumped doctrine and TTPs together as in the category of "ways to do things" and technology was "Things to do stuff with". Army, Marine, and foreign ground warriors usually got it; that there is no set relationship, that doctrine and technology see saw back and forth in concert and in opposition. When we get 'em in concert it really works well. When they are in opposition (waves of infantry charging machine guns for example), it's a real bitch.

But when it came to Naval officers (surface, subsurface, and air) and Air Force it was always technology leads. Doctrine--when they talk it and neither the Navy nor the Air Force really likes doctrine--is basically an owner's manual for the technology. Doctrine then serves to get the best use out of the technology versus setting the parameters for what you want the doctrine to help you do.

Rumsfeld as a former Naval aviator is/was classic.

best

Tom

[Ski]

Quick correction - the GAO has found that $2.3 Trillion is not accountable since the 1970's.

The defense budget process has been so screwed up the Army Audit Agency, along with other governmental audit agencies, cannot even audit the military to find what is wrong and what is missing.

What needs to be done is to redefine and recreate the POM. It's archaic, convoluted, confusing, and in a 24/7 society, way too inflexible and slow.

Good luck with anyone tasked with that project. Talk about shattering rice bowls.

[Ski]

Good info here. Always saw doctrine and technology as a see-saw - one could potentially drive the other.

A longstanding question on the orals board for the Masters program at Leavenworth was and still may be, explain the relationship between doctrine and technology. Now when I sat for my orals or sat on the boards, we lumped doctrine and TTPs together as in the category of "ways to do things" and technology was "Things to do stuff with". Army, Marine, and foreign ground warriors usually got it; that there is no set relationship, that doctrine and technology see saw back and forth in concert and in opposition. When we get 'em in concert it really works well. When they are in opposition (waves of infantry charging machine guns for example), it's a real bitch.

But when it came to Naval officers (surface, subsurface, and air) and Air Force it was always technology leads. Doctrine--when they talk it and neither the Navy nor the Air Force really likes doctrine--is basically an owner's manual for the technology. Doctrine then serves to get the best use out of the technology versus setting the parameters for what you want the doctrine to help you do.

Rumsfeld as a former Naval aviator is/was classic.

best

Tom

[stanleywinthrop]

On the flip side, we can't allow the fascination and obsession with technology to obscure that people fight the wars and ultimately people make the peace. We need some part of war to be recognizable for the ugly but sometimes necessary act it is so that as quickly as possible we can restore order and put people's lives back together and maybe avoid worse.

Best regards, Rob

Quite true, as John Boyd said (an air force officer no less) weapons don't fight wars, terrain doesn't fight wars, people do--and they use thier minds.

[pvebber]

Another Kaplan piece in Atlantic Monthly>

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/...merica-decline

Focuses on the Navy - but much of the "problem" is military wide.

My favorite part:

Of course, admirals will continue to march to Capitol Hill and declare that no matter the size of the budget, they will succeed in every mission. Managing decline requires “a degree of self-delusion,” as Aaron Friedberg put it in his 1988 book, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905. “British statesmen,” Friedberg observed, “continued to talk as if nothing of any significance” had occurred, even as they abandoned worldwide sea supremacy. Abandoning supremacy was, in Friedberg’s view, a “prudent” and “sensible” strategy, given the economic and political realities of the time. And it didn’t stop Britain from helping to save the world in succeeding decades.

When there is nobody in senior military leadership really pressing for prioritization of roles and missions and drawing a line where the dollars run out, we will continue to get a "do more with less" peacetime mentatlity, that casues us to spend exhorbatant amounts in "war". Its a amazing to pull the string of the money trail of what the "cost of war" includes - and doesn't include!

I'm not sure I agree with Kaplan's fear that we are going "overboard prioritizing COIN" - when I look at the budget just passed, its the same ole Cold War stuff. Halsey or Spruance would feel perfectly comfortable leading from the Vultures Row of a current CV, except for the part that there are only 3-5 ships dending a CVN toady instead of a 10-15 15 years ago, and 20-30 in their day...

I am fearful that his prediction that - win or lose in the big picture in Iraq, the next adversary we will face will try to exploit the tactical imbalance of our naval forces and maritime dependance in ways our mindset, like 9/11, just won't see.

PS

Having done time in the Navy's DOctrine shop at NWDC, the reality in the navy is even worse than "technology leads doctrine". The TTP full of flow charts and decision matrices indicate that we want to tacke decision making out of the hands of warfighters and create training that "programs them like a computer to take the right action". Which of course is perfectly fine because our future autonomous naval systems will form a complex adaptive network, capable of tactically relevant, emergent, (some dare say creative!) response to adversary action.

The Navy of the future is being built on the premise that humans should think like machines, and machines should think like humans.

[Tom Odom]

Having done time in the Navy's DOctrine shop at NWDC, the reality in the navy is even worse than "technology leads doctrine". The TTP full of flow charts and decision matrices indicate that we want to tacke decision making out of the hands of warfighters and create training that "programs them like a computer to take the right action". Which of course is perfectly fine because our future autonomous naval systems will form a complex adaptive network, capable of tactically relevant, emergent, (some dare say creative!) response to adversary action.

We learned nada from the "Robo-Crusier" shoot down?

Tom

[pvebber]

Only that it demonstrated the dangers of the humans not having a strict procedural script to follow that would have prevented it.

You have to understand the the standard Navy system engineering development process assumes that meddling humans exist only to degrade the theoretically possible capabilities of a Naval weapons system.

If a human screws up, it costs you money to remidiate, if a machine screws up, the Navy can recoup money from the contractor for failure to perform.

Of course its all being done under the uncontestable veil of "getting the sailor out of harms way". Who can be "for" keeping sailors unnecessarily in harms way?